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Political Science Quarterly

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CENTENNIAL YEAR
1886-1986

Published by
The Academy of Political Science

Issue No. 5, 1986

REFLECTIONS ON PROVIDING FOR "THE COMMON DEFENCE"

Robert Jervis — The Nuclear Revolution and the Common Defense

Walter LaFeber — The U.S. Emergence As a World Power

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Issued in Spring, Summer, Fall, and Winter, POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY (ISSN 0032-3195) is published by the Academy of Political Science, 2852 Broadway, New York, New York 10025-7885. Subscriptions are obtained through membership in the Academy. Regular membership, $25.00 a year. Three years, $58.00. Students, $16.00 a year. Libraries and institutions, $35.00 a year. Foreign postage, $6.00 additional per year. Second-class postage paid at New York, N.Y., and additional mailing offices. Volume 101 Number 5, 1986.
Postmaster—Send address changes to Political Science Quarterly, 2852 Broadway, New York, N.Y. 10025-7885.

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CENTENNIAL YEAR 1886–1986

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Published continuously since 1886.

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CENTENNIAL YEAR 1886–1986

In commemoration of its centennial in 1986 *Political Science Quarterly* is publishing five numbered issues. This issue contains commissioned articles on the mandate to "Provide for the Common Defence." A previous issue contained commissioned articles on the constitutional injunction to "Promote the General Welfare." The publication of the two special issues was made possible by a gift from the Exxon Education Foundation.

Manuscripts, books for review, and editorial correspondence should be addressed to the Managing Editor, POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY, 2852 Broadway, New York, N.Y. 10025-7885. Correspondence about advertising and reprint permission should be addressed to William V. Farr, Business Manager, The Academy of Political Science, 2852 Broadway, New York, N.Y. 10025-7885.

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Articles that appeared in the POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY before 1953 are indexed in *The Reader's Guide to Periodical Literature* and since that year in the *Social Sciences Index.* Articles are also listed in *ABC Pol Sci,* the *International Bibliography of Political Science,* and the *Public Affairs Information Services Bulletin* and abstracted in *United States Political Science Documents, The International Political Science Abstracts, Historical Abstracts, Urban Affairs Abstracts,* and *America: History and Life.* Book reviews are listed in the *Book Review Index* to *Social Science Periodicals, Book Reviews Index,* and *Book Review Digest.* A title page and an index of articles and book reviews for each volume of the QUARTERLY are included in the Winter issue.

Back issues prior to 1976 and reprint editions may be ordered from Kraus Reprint Co., Route 100, Millwood, New York 10546. Other back issues may be ordered from the Academy. A check payable to the Academy of Political Science should accompany all orders. Single issue, $6.25. Reprints of articles are available from University Microfilms, 300 North Zeeb Road, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106. Toll free number: 800-521-0600. One copy, $10.00. Additional copies, $1.50 each. Complete issue, $0.20 a page with a $20.00 minimum charge. All prices are subject to change.

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Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 7-36315.

Printed by Capital City Press, Montpelier, Vermont.

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Political Science Quarterly

Volume 101
Number 5
1986

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From the Editor:

In this issue of specially commissioned articles on the constitutional injunction to "provide for the common defence" of the United States:

ROBERT JERVIS analyzes the implications of the nuclear revolution for the United States and other superpowers' ability to defend their national security. He addresses the paradox that while the United States is more powerful militarily than the Founding Fathers could have imagined, the U.S. is nevertheless unable to provide a secure defense against destruction by other nuclear powers.

WALTER LAFEBER discusses how the view of the "common defense" changed from that of the Founders as the United States emerged as a world power in the early years of the twentieth century.

INIS L. CLAUDE, JR. examines the difficulties faced by the United States and other great powers in making their external responsibilities for defense of their allies and for the stability of the international system as a whole compatible with their obligation to provide for the "common defense" of their own societies.

GEORGE H. QUESTER considers some trends and paradoxes about common deterrence as it has taken the place of common defense and examines the credibility of the United States extending a "nuclear umbrella" to protect its close allies.

GEORGE L. SHERRY suggests that impasse management and conflict control among the smaller powers and not defending American defense interests are the main political functions of the UN.

BRIAN M. JENKINS reflects on the impact of international terrorism—not a threat to the common defense the framers of the Constitution had in mind nor a kind of war our armed forces have been trained for, but nevertheless a rising threat to Americans and American institutions.

STEPHEN D. KRASNER examines American concepts of the relationship between international trade conflict and the common defense. Focusing on American-Japanese relations, he concludes that the policy of "diffuse reciprocity" in trade, pursued by United States leaders, fails to achieve its intended effects.

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From the Editor:

JORGE I. DOMÍNGUEZ discusses insurgencies and revolutionary regimes in Latin America in light of the interests and values shared by the United States and allied liberal democracies.

WILLIAM B. QUANDT analyzes the impact of the electoral cycle on the president's ability to manage foreign policy, finding distinctive problems associated with each year of the normal four-year presidential term.

JEROME SLATER and DAVID GOLDFISCHER assess the various arguments that have been made for the Strategic Defense Initiative against hostile ballistic missiles. They contend that only one argument is not flawed—the SDI's capacity to provide limited population defense within the context of a new and major arms control regime.

DEMETRIOS CARALEY*

* I would like to acknowledge my appreciation to Tilly Friedman-Lichtschein, *PSQ*'s former Managing Editor, for her contribution to the planning of this issue and her continued help in editing its articles.

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The Nuclear Revolution and the Common Defense

ROBERT JERVIS

"We the people of the United States, in order to form a more perfect Union . . . provide for the common defence . . . do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America."

"A nuclear war cannot be won and must not be fought."

—Ronald Reagan

One purpose for forming a country out of the thirteen colonies and a purpose for the formation of most modern states was to "provide for the common defense." Although throughout much of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries the United States had few enemies, and even in World Wars I and II it was less directly menaced than were its allies, defense remained a crucial national task. But defense is now impossible, even though the United States is more powerful than its Founders ever imagined. Nuclear weapons have led to the replacement of brute force by coercion, or, as it is more frequently put, of defense by deterrence.[1] There is no way that we could prevent the Soviet Union from destroying us; indeed, there is no way we could prevent Britain, France, and perhaps Israel and China from doing so. The paradoxes and puzzles in this transformation are familiar, but their effects are so profound and pervasive that continued analysis is necessary.

[1] See Glenn Snyder, *Defense and Deterrence* (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1961); Thomas Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1960) and *Arms and Influence* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1960).

ROBERT JERVIS is professor of political science and member of the Institute of War and Peace Studies, Columbia University. His recent publications include *The Illogic of American Nuclear Strategy* and, with Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Stein, *Psychology and Deterrence*.

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In the past, military forces, especially armies, could simultaneously physically seize and hold what was in dispute, limit or decrease the military effectiveness of the other side's forces, inflict punishment on the other side, and, most important in this context, keep the adversary from doing these things to the nation. Strategic nuclear weapons can inflict punishment; they can also decrease the other side's military capability; they can facilitate the taking of disputed territory. But they cannot prevent the adversary from destroying what the nation values even if they are doing a very efficient job at meeting the other three objectives. Thus, as Thomas Schelling notes, what is significant about nuclear weapons is not overkill, but mutual kill—the side that is "losing" by various measures of military capability can inflict unprecedented destruction on the side that is "winning" as easily as the "winner" can do this to the "loser."[2]

The result is what can be called, without exaggeration, the nuclear revolution.[3] Nuclear weapons have brought the superpowers both great security and enormous insecurity. Security is great because the chance of war or conquest of the superpowers is unusually slight; it is simultaneously low because if a major war occurred, they would be destroyed. For the same reasons both common and conflicting interests are raised to new heights. In the past, conflicts and wars could be zero-sum. They could, although they did not have to, be situations in which conflict was total and whatever one side won, its adversary lost. States then worked on each other's capabilities, bargaining was impossible, and *military* victory was possible, even in a total war. Between the superpowers today, none of this is true. No matter how much one or both sides would like to conquer or undermine the other, no matter how bitter the conflict may be, both sides share the vital interest in avoiding total war. Total war would be worse than maintaining the status quo, worse than suffering a limited loss of influence and, if a modicum of rationality and common sense prevails on both sides, worse than being conquered by the other side—an eventuality that is hard to imagine. But of course this common interest does not lead to easy cooperation, because for war to be avoided requires only that one side—not both—cooperate. Thus the fear of war can be used as a lever with which to make competitive gains. What is crucial here is that because the situation is not zero-sum, it must involve bargaining; military power cannot directly provide security or reach many other important goals. The United States and Soviet Union have to work on each other's intentions, and while gaining a competitive advan-

[2] Schelling, *Arms and Influence*. Of course the same effect would be produced by any other technology that allowed each side to punish the other without first defeating its armed forces. Thus poison gas, bacteriological warfare, or bombing with powerful non-nuclear explosives could do as well, although the fact that neither gas nor conventional weapons could accomplish the destruction as quickly could alter the bargaining relationships.

[3] The first analysis—which is still among the best—is Bernard Brodie et al., *The Absolute Weapon* (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1946); for an excellent treatment, see Michael Mandelbaum, *The Nuclear Revolution* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981).

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tage in capabilities may be a route to this end, it must make its influence felt through affecting the other side's intentions.

There are two ways of gaining security through defense. If they were practical, they would negate the analysis here. First and most obvious would be the development of a defensive shield that could protect our society against nuclear attack. But few experts believe this will ever be possible, and none see it as conceivable within this century. So nothing more will be said about it here. A second theoretical possibility would be for the United States to gain the ability to stage a successful first strike that would eliminate all Soviet strategic forces. As with a defensive shield, this could produce protection no matter what the Soviets wanted to do to us. But it too is not in the realm of technological feasibility. Furthermore, if it were, the chances would be great that the Soviets would have the same first-strike capability, thereby providing each side with both offensive and defensive incentives to get the first blow in. Thus while several outcomes would be possible, stable peace would not seem to be one of them.

Implications of the Nuclear Revolution

The impossibility of defense has several important implications, only a few of which can be discussed here. First we will present two broad consequences and then will see how some more specific expectations derived from the nuclear revolution can be matched against the history of the nuclear era.

Need for the Union

We should start with the most radical, if most speculative, implication of the nuclear revolution. Several years ago the perceived rise in economic interdependence led some people to believe that "the nation-state has just about had it as an economic entity." One could make a parallel argument in the security area.[4] If security were the only value at stake, the Union could dissolve, with each state having its own small missile force. Although no one state could destroy the Soviet Union, the damage that each could do would presumably outweigh the benefits to the Soviet Union of conquering or dominating it. The logic here really is not strange; it is the same as that which underpins the British and French independent nuclear forces.

Even if the Union did not serve important domestic goals, we would not expect its imminent dissolution. Security is only the minimum foreign policy goal pursued; nations—especially great powers—also seek to protect secondary interests and to further their values. Thus it is not surprising that much of American foreign policy cannot be explained by security considerations, but instead is directed toward more ideological goals.

[4] See, for example, John Herz, *International Politics in the Atomic Age* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959), 96–108.

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Military Victory Not Possible

The second general implication of the nuclear revolution is that a major war cannot end in military victory. This seems obvious to most nonexperts, but in fact is quite controversial. Only a few experts believe that "the Soviet Union thinks it could fight and win a nuclear war."[5] While the Russians do appear to take nuclear war more seriously than Americans,[6] this may indicate a desire to do whatever might be possible to limit damage in case war should come, rather than any belief that its results would be less than catastrophic. But Americans who see victory as possible usually define it as doing better—in some sense—than the other side. Paul Nitze has been the most articulate exponent of this point of view. Thirty years ago he noted that one meaning of "winning" is "the comparison between the postwar position of the victor and the defeated" and argued that it is "of the utmost importance that the West maintain a sufficient margin of superior capability so that if general war occurred we could 'win' in [this] sense. The greater the margin (and the more clearly the communists understand that we have a margin), the less likely it is that nuclear war will ever occur."[7] More recently Nitze has stressed the importance of being able to deny a Soviet leader "the ability or perception that he might successfully prosecute a war-winning strategy and emerge from a war in a predominant military position."[8]

The reasoning, spelled out by Harold Brown when he was Secretary of the Air Force, is that "if the Soviets thought they may be able to recover in some period of time while the U.S. would take three or four times as long, or would never recover, then the Soviets might not be deterred."[9] By this kind of definition every war must have a winner because one side must recover more quickly and be stronger than the other. Nitze again puts the point well: "The victor [in a nuclear war] will be in a position to issue orders to the loser and the loser will have to obey them or face complete chaos or extinction. The victor will then go on to organize what remains of the world as best he can."[10] The logic in this sort of definition of victory leads to Dr. Strangelove's outburst at the end of the movie when he proclaims his fear of the "mineshaft gap"—the Russians have more mines than we do and so can shelter more survivors.

But this is a remarkably apolitical view. It does not relate the cost of the war to the objectives. It does not ask whether the destruction would be such that the

[5] The obvious exception is Richard Pipes, "Why the Soviet Union Thinks It Could Fight and Win a Nuclear War," *Commentary* 64 (July 1977): 21–34.

[6] Colin Gray, *Nuclear Strategy and National Style* (Boston: Hamilton Press, 1986).

[7] Paul Nitze, "Atoms, Strategy, and Policy," *Foreign Affairs*, 34 (January 1956): 190–91.

[8] Paul Nitze, "The Objectives of Arms Control," U.S. Department of State, *Current Policy* No. 667, 28 March 1985, 3.

[9] U.S. Senate, Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services, *Hearings on Status of U.S. Strategic Power*, 90th Cong., 2d sess., 30 April 1968 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1968), 186.

[10] Nitze, "Atoms, Strategy and Policy," 190–1. This statement dates from 1956, when the expected levels of damage were much lower than they are today. But current arguments are similar.

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winner, as well as the loser, would regret having fought. Victory can still be meaningful even if the state is worse off after the war than it was before it. This was true, for example, of Britain and France after both World Wars. But the victory was meaningful, if extremely costly, because they were better off having fought than they would have been had they conceded to German demands. It is hard to make a parallel claim for a major nuclear war. Karl von Clausewitz's central argument that war only makes sense as a means to political goals is as important as it ever was, but the levels of destruction mean that the implications are different.

It is not only the civilians who shrink from bloodletting and so think that victory is impossible. On several occasions and in several ways, Dwight D. Eisenhower gave vent to his exasperation with those who thought that victory was possible. Even before the Soviet Union could do overwhelming damage to the United States, he noted the problems of post-war reconstruction. As he put it to the Joint Chiefs of Staff when they talked of a world war: "I want you to carry this question home with you: Gain such a victory [as would follow from a nuclear attack], and what do you do with it? Here would be a giant area from the Elbe to Vladivostok, torn up and destroyed, without government, without its communications, just an area of starvation and disaster. I ask you what would the civilized world do about it? I repeat that there is no victory except through our imaginations."[11] Later, when he considered Soviet retaliation, his concern was not with who would come out ahead. Thus he told the critic of his disarmament policy that "even assuming that we could emerge from a global war today as the acknowledged victor, there would be a destruction in the country [such] that there would be no possibility of our exercising a representative free government for, I would say, two decades at the minimum."[12] As he continued to contemplate the growing Soviet arsenal, he wrote to a friend that "we are rapidly getting to the point that no war can be *won*. War implies a contest; when you get to the point that contest is no longer involved and the outlook comes close to destruction of the enemy and suicide for ourselves—an outlook that neither side can ignore—then arguments as to the exact amount of available strength as compared to somebody else's are no longer the vital issues."[13]

This does not mean that victory is impossible, however. Not only can the peacetime threat of war be used to reach important goals, but at least in principle limited wars—even limited nuclear wars—could yield enormous political benefits. These effects would be produced by the coercive impact of the possibility of unacceptable destruction, not by the potential or actual ability of one side to militarily defeat the other. In a crisis or limited war one side could win major concessions if its adversary felt that the cost and danger of continuing the confrontation were too great. Of course in this situation, which approximates the game of Chicken, both sides are at risk since neither can protect itself. Thus if a victory results it will not be a military one in the sense of having been accomplished by gaining

[11] Stephen Ambrose, *Eisenhower the President* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984), 206.
[12] Fred Greenstein, *The Hidden-Hand Presidency* (New York: Basic Books, 1982), 47.
[13] Dwight D. Eisenhower letter to Richard Simon, 4 April 1956.

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a military advantage, destroying the other side's forces, and thereby forcing him to do one's will.

If military victory is impossible, international politics should be drastically altered. Indeed, I believe this is the case. Many of the features of the post-1945 world to which we have become accustomed in fact are odd from the standpoint of traditional international politics. Although alternative explanations can be offered for each of them, they all flow logically from the nuclear revolution.

Peace

First, if military victory is impossible, major wars should not occur. This indeed has been the case since the end of 1945. It is historically rare for the major powers to go forty years without fighting each other. If peace continues, as almost all experts believe that it will, the situation will be unprecedented. Conflict, of course, can continue. Smaller powers can fight wars and the superpowers can jostle each other at lower levels of violence. But wars between the major powers are too costly to be fought, and while we no longer find the absence of such wars strange, we should not forget what a fundamental change this is.

Of course, nuclear weapons are not the only possible cause for such a transformation. Three other factors could be at work. First, even had these weapons not been invented, modern states are so hard to defeat and conventional weapons are so destructive that both sides could have come to the conclusion that meaningful victory was impossible.[14] Second, modern states might have come to view war as an anachronism; not only are its costs very high, but trade offers a more certain route to national economic goals. Third, bipolarity, by providing an easy and unambiguous identification of potential enemies, may make peace more likely.[15] Clear tests of these competing explanations are not possible, and indeed all could be operating simultaneously. But the fact that overwhelming devastation with conventional bombs could not occur quickly could remove at least some of the restraints on violence; the advantages of trade can only be reaped if states are secure; and a bipolar world in which either or both sides thought they could conquer the other would not be likely to be stable.

Preservation of the Status Quo

The nuclear revolution can also explain a second characteristic of the postwar world—the absence of peaceful change on issues of most concern to the superpowers. It is striking that the most far-reaching changes have occurred in areas

[14] For a further discussion, see John Mueller, "The Essential Irrelevance of Nuclear Weapons," unpublished manuscript, Rochester University, N. Y.

[15] See the discussion in Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1979). But Waltz places a greater stress on the role of nuclear weapons in *The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More may be Better*, Adelphi Paper No. 171 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1981).

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of least concern to the United States and the Soviet Union. Decolonization has transformed the map of the world. But almost nothing has changed in Europe, where Russia and the United States are most deeply involved. In other parts of the world the superpowers have gained or lost influence, most dramatically in the change in the orientation of China, first through a civil war and then through a diplomatic realignment. But neither superpower has been able to move the other out of the most important positions established after World War II. This is not surprising; peaceful change usually requires the credible threat of war. Of course, it is such threats that maintain the status quo and, in principle, they could be used to change it. But several considerations make the latter task much harder than the former.[16] States usually care more about keeping what they have than they do about increasing their territory or influence. Furthermore, the onus lies on the state that would seek change; unless that state is willing to run very high risks, the status quo will be maintained. Thus an understanding of the nuclear revolution would lead us to expect that the status quo would be maintained in areas in which the outcomes are dominated by superpower bargaining. That this has been the case indicates, although surely it does not prove, that this argument is correct. If it is, it brings us back to an earlier point: to the extent that America's major interest is in preserving the status quo, nuclear weapons have brought the United States a real, although nonmilitary, victory.

Crises Rare

A third implication of the argument is that once the lines of the status quo are clear and both sides have second strike capability, crises should be rare. Furthermore, those that occur should be in peripheral areas where neither side's stake is very high and usually will be initiated by local actors, not by the superpowers. Both these propositions are borne out by postwar history. Crises were most frequent—and perhaps most dangerous—in the late 1940s and early 1950s, a period in which the status quo was not entirely clear and before the United States, let alone the Soviet Union, possessed overwhelming levels of destructive capability. Indeed, if we date the Soviet acquisition of second-strike capability in the mid-1960s,[17] it is noteworthy that the age of mutual assured destruction has seen no serious crises. The closest we have come is the 1973 confrontation in the Middle East, which was mild compared with the crises that were frequent in the non-nuclear era. Neither side seemed to have had any real expectation of war; the incident followed intense and largely successful superpower negotiations; the Soviets were pushing, not for further gains, but for the Americans to make the Israelis live up to a Soviet-American agreement just concluded. Most of the other disturbing

[16] See Schelling, *Arms and Influence*, 69–86; and Robert Jervis, *The Illogic of American Nuclear Strategy*, (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1984), 153–7.

[17] Richard Betts notes that even in the 1950s American decision makers placed very high estimates on damage Russia could do the U.S. in a nuclear war. Betts, *Nuclear Coercion and Nuclear Balance* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, forthcoming), chap. 4.

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incidents since the onset of parity have occurred in areas where neither side was deeply involved, the status quo was unclear, and local actors played a predominant role in drawing the superpowers in. The clashes in Angola and the horn of Africa fit this pattern. These incidents are not trivial; they contributed to the decline of détente and in the future, incidents like them could lead to sharper confrontations. But so far their infrequency and unimportance, as compared to those in the prenuclear world, is what is most striking and significant.

In the prenuclear era crises were more frequent for two reasons. First, the balance of power could be upset if a significant actor shifted from one camp to the other. Thus the major powers' security interests were often deeply involved in a wide range of disputes. The series of pre-World War I crises provide obvious examples. The main reason why Britain supported France in the first, and even more so in the second, Moroccan crisis was the fear that if it did not, France might desert the entente and leave England dangerously isolated. Similarly, in July 1914, France had to support Russia, and Britain had to support France and Russia out of the fear that any other policy would break up the entente and leave the state exposed to German dominance. Similarly, Germany could not afford to see Austria-Hungary leave the alliance or, more probably, disintegrate. In the nuclear era, by contrast, security is provided by second-strike capability, and so the possible defection by allies is less important. Thus neither France's withdrawal from the military arrangements of NATO or China's realignment precipitated a superpower crisis. Second, with military victory an impossibility, neither superpower can challenge the other in the expectation that, if the other does not retreat, it can resort to war. The knowledge that war would be suicide, coupled with the bargaining advantage possessed by the side defending the status quo, means that superpowers should be loath to instigate confrontations.

Credibility

Because superpowers are made secure by their second-strike capability and military victory is impossible, the credibility of threats will be both important and difficult. It is the credibility of threats that protects the superpowers' homelands and their vital interests; were the threat of nuclear war to be totally incredible, nuclear weapons would not influence world politics. Credibility is difficult for an equally obvious reason—the threat to trigger mutual devastation is inherently incredible. But before we conclude that nuclear threats are so empty that we can barely protect the homeland, let alone other vital interests such as the security of close allies,[18] two factors must be considered. First, nuclear threats do not have to be highly credible in order to be effective. Even a very slight chance that a con-

[18] This argument is common across the political spectrum. See, for example, Robert McNamara, "The Military Role of Nuclear Weapons," *Foreign Affairs* 62 (Fall 1983): 59–80; and Samuel Huntington, "The Renewal of Strategy," in Huntington, ed., *The Strategic Imperative: New Policies for American Security* (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1982).

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frontation or provocation could lead to nuclear war will be enough to deter all but the most highly motivated adversaries. Second, states need not threaten to immediately launch a full-scale nuclear attack on the other in order to deter. Instead they can threaten to take actions that could lead to an undesired conflagration through a series of steps that cannot entirely be foreseen, let alone controlled. Schelling puts the point very well: "If war tends to result from a process, a dynamic process in which both sides get more and more concerned not to be a slow second in case the war starts, it is not a 'credible first strike' that one threatens, but just plain war."[19] Indeed, engaging in a confrontation carries with it at least some risk that things will get out of control and result in a major war. Since this probability—whose exact size cannot be known—is quite small, states can rationally engage in confrontations rather than sacrifice their vital interests. The result is that nuclear weapons can deter, even though the decision to start World War III would make no sense.

But the possibility of threats to create a dangerous situation does not solve all problems. Each superpower still must be concerned lest the adversary believe the fear of nuclear war will lead it to abandon important interests rather than run any risk of destruction. Credibility and resolve are hard to demonstrate, however. In the absence of really dangerous conflict, it is hard to see how the United States or the Soviet Union can provide good evidence that it would stand firm at the brink of war. Two implications follow. First, small issues will often loom large, not because of their intrinsic importance, but because they are taken as tests of resolve. What actually happens in many disputes in peripheral areas of world politics is not important; whether the United States and the Soviet Union have lived up to their commitments in these disputes is seen as significant, however. A great deal is uncertain here. Some argue that the United States is peculiarly concerned with credibility.[20] Furthermore, careful study of prenuclear crises shows that while states fear that others will draw wide-ranging inferences from cases in which they do not stand firm, in fact they do not examine the other's behavior in this way.[21] Indeed, it may not make a great deal of sense for states to try to tell how others would behave at the brink of war from what they do when the stakes and dangers are much lower. The costs and risks of fighting a major conventional war or exploding a few nuclear bombs are so much greater than those involved in the confrontations that have punctuated the Cold War that it is hard to see how these incidents really do much to establish either side's nuclear credibility. But in the absence of better indicators of resolve, it is understandable both that statesmen

[19] Schelling, *Arms and Influence*, 98; for elaboration see Jervis, *Illogic of American Nuclear Strategy*, 126–56.

[20] Patrick Morgan, "Saving Face for the Sake of Deterrence" in Robert Jervis, Richard Ned Lebow, and Janice Gross Stein, ed., *Psychology and Deterrence* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985), 125–52.

[21] Glenn Snyder and Paul Diesing, *Conflict Among Nations* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1977), 187; also see Robert Jervis, "Deterrence Theory Revisited," *World Politics* 31 (January 1979): 317–22.

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would look to minor conflicts as a way to show that they would be bold in a future and more important crisis and that the adversary in fact would not be particularly impressed.

The difficulties in establishing credibility also help explain why superpowers feel the need to deploy weapons systems that could not bring them victory in war and are not necessary to deny the other side victory. One of the main functions of building arms is to demonstrate resolve. It is often said that, war being impossible, many of its functions are now served by crises. But, as we noted, crises are quite rare, and so the crucial functions of demonstrating seriousness and credibility have to some extent devolved to arms procurement.

Creating Reality

The final implication of the nuclear revolution to be discussed here is much more elusive.[22] Perhaps it is summarized best by the following quotations:

> The capacity to produce atomic weapons bolsters Soviet prestige and greatly increases Soviet capabilities for exerting psychological pressure on Western Europe. (CIA report shortly after the first Soviet test of an atomic bomb.)
>
> Developing the hydrogen bomb "would have psychological value" in bolstering the American deterrent posture. (Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Omar Bradley, 31 October 1949.)
>
> To proceed forthwith [to develop the H-bomb] . . . I fear will be to miss an opportunity to re-examine and realign policy . . . and promote something better than a headlong rush to a war of mass destruction weapons. (Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, David E. Lilienthal, 31 January 1950.)
>
> What you declare in advance [about the way you would fight a war] is designed to affect the psychology of the other side. (former Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger.)
>
> Ballistic missiles are not "much [as] military weapons," but they have "great psychological importance." (Dwight David Eisenhower, 26 June 1957.)[23]

Something is extremely odd here. Hard-headed statesmen are talking about the most destructive weapons the world has ever known. Yet they use a strange vocabulary—they talk not of military victory or military defeat, not of armies that are vanquished and factories destroyed, but of psychological effects. This seems much too pallid; we are dealing with weapons of mass death and destruction, not with subtle instruments of persuasion.

[22] For an elaboration of the argument that follows, see Robert Jervis, "The Symbolic Nature of Nuclear Politics," a paper presented as the James Lecture at the University of Illinois.

[23] These quotations come from the following sources: The CIA report (16 November 1949) is from Thomas Lairson, "Hegemony, Credibility, and the Risk of War: American Strategy, 1947–1950," unpublished ms., 45; Bradley is quoted in David Lilienthal, *The Journals of David Lilienthal*, vol. 2, *The Atomic Years, 1945–1950* (New York: Harper & Row, 1964), 583; Lilienthal's own comments are in ibid., 627–628; Schlesinger is quoted by Gregg Herken, *Counsels of War* (New York: Knopf, 1985), 263; Eisenhower's views are from a memorandum quoted in Ambrose, *Eisenhower*, 396.

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In fact, the power of nuclear weapons is linked to the psychological nature of their influence. Because they are so powerful, their "utility [lies] in nonuse" as Bernard Brodie put it.[24] But nonuse means that most of our ideas about nuclear strategy must rest on logic and speculation, not empirical evidence. A large role is, therefore, created for our beliefs, especially because many of the characteristics of concern are peculiarly psychological. This is true, most centrally, for the notion of credibility. A threat is credible if the other side believes it is credible; a decision maker will have high resolve if he thinks he has it (and if he thinks the other side has low resolve and so is likely to retreat). Thus beliefs can build on themselves in a way that was unusual in previous eras. Indeed, many questions cannot be answered apart from decision makers' beliefs about those questions. For example, the belief that a nuclear war cannot be kept limited would make a limited war impossible. Similarly, there is no objective answer to the question of which nuclear postures and doctrines are destabilizing apart from the highly subjective beliefs that decision makers hold about this question. In many ways, then, statesmen's beliefs about nuclear weapons create, rather than merely describe, the world they live in. Three manifestations of this process can be noted.

Impressing Oneself

It is a commonplace—albeit perhaps a misguided one—that the United States must do certain things or develop certain weapons in order to impress the Russians with its resolve. Less remarked upon, but equally interesting, are decision makers' needs to act in certain ways in order to impress themselves, to give themselves Dutch courage so to speak. This may be one explanation for Harry Truman's inaccurate recollection that he had given Joseph Stalin a nuclear ultimatum over Iran in 1947. Not only did Truman like to think of himself as bold and decisive, but it would have been comforting to believe that the American nuclear monopoly enabled him to meet Soviet challenges quite handily. He would then have felt more secure in dealing with the Russians. Other examples are more recent. Secretary of State Alexander Haig argued that "perceptions of the military balance . . . affect the psychological attitude of both American and Soviet leaders, as they respond to events around the globe."[25] Thus it is of more than passing interest that President Ronald Reagan insists that his administration has rectified the previous imbalance of strategic forces. That objective analysis of the balance would not lead to this conclusion is not important. What is, is that Reagan has impressed not only the Russians, but also himself, and that if he acts as though the Russians do not have a significant advantage, then in fact they will not gain much of an advantage.

[24] Bernard Brodie, *War and Politics* (New York: Macmillan, 1973), chap. 9.

[25] Alexander Haig, "Peace and Deterrence," 6 April 1982 (U.S. Department of State, *Current Policy*, no. 383), 3.

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Expectations of War or Peace

The second way in which beliefs create reality is more disturbing. Deterrence requires not only the threat to go to war if need be, but also the promise to remain at peace if the other side behaves reasonably. Scholars and statesmen have paid little attention to this requirement for reassurance. Furthermore, it is peculiarly vulnerable to being undermined by a self-fulfilling prophecy. As long as both sides believe that all-out war would be enormously destructive, it is hard to believe that either side would choose war over even an unsatisfactory peace. But if either side believed that war was inevitable in the near future (and if it also believed that striking first was preferable to striking second, a topic we will put aside here), then it could attack. The choice it would face would not be between war and peace, but between striking or being struck. Thus, the belief that war was inevitable is probably a necessary proximate cause of war. Believing that the peace could be maintained would make it more likely that the peace in fact would be kept. As long as each side maintains control of its own military forces,[26] it will believe that the other side will launch an all-out attack only if the other believes that war is inevitable. The other side will believe this, in turn, only if it thinks that the first side is about to attack because it feels that the other is about to attack.[27] War will be unavoidable only if decision makers believe it is unavoidable.

Arms Control

Related to the previous dynamics is the psychological function of arms control. Some measures can reduce mutual vulnerability and so make inadvertent war less likely. But in many cases what is more important than the change in the level and kinds of arms on each side is the process by which those levels are established. Thus, if we woke up tomorrow morning to learn that Russia and the United States only had half as many warheads as we had previously believed, I do not think that most of us would feel more secure. But if Russia and the United States agreed to reduce their warheads by half, we would probably believe that the world was now safer. Indeed, the effects of most proposals on the military balance are minimal and, if military considerations were driving, many people would not take the positions that they do. For example, it seems odd that many of those who are most concerned about Soviet aggressiveness are not preoccupied by the danger that the Soviet Union could quickly add a large number of warheads to its inventory. No one denies that the Soviets could field the SS-24 and SS-25 more quickly than the United States could respond.[28] But those who are most vociferous in their calls

[26] This condition may be harder to meet than is frequently believed. See, for example, the discussion in John Steinbruner, "An Assessment of Nuclear Crises" in Franklyn Griffiths and John Polyani, eds., *The Dangers of Nuclear War* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1979), 34–49.

[27] The classic analysis of the "reciprocal fear of surprise attack" is in Schelling, *Strategy of Conflict*, 207–29.

[28] Robert Gates and Lawrence Gershwin, "Soviet Strategic Force Developments," testimony before

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for vigilance against Soviet military superiority are most resistant to the argument that an arms control agreement—even one that sacrificed the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI)—would be worthwhile, because it could limit these developments. Similarly, arguments against an agreement to ban antisatellite weapons and the pressures to break the antiballistic missile (ABM) agreement and SALT II cannot be explained in military terms. Rather, what is seen as primary is American resolve and will. Arms control agreements are bad then, not because they produce a less favorable military balance than would otherwise result, but because they produce psychological demobilization and disarmament. They undermine our readiness to compete with the Soviets by indicating that there are great common interests between the United States and the Soviet Union, that many of our differences can be treated by negotiation, and that gains for the Soviet Union are not necessarily losses for the United States.

Kenneth Adelman, director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, argues that arms control has suffered from the degree of public attention it has received. "Should arms control ever approach the public inattentiveness with which trade negotiations or civil aviation talks have been met, it would yield richer results."[29] This is quite wrong. Arms control matters because it receives a great deal of attention. People take the agreements to symbolize the state of Soviet-American relations. Thus, contrary to prevailing opinion, almost any arms control agreement would be good, and how we reach a particular configuration can be more important than the characteristics of that configuration. Thus when President Eisenhower sought to eliminate or limit nuclear testing he "did not want to act unilaterally," although he could do so and at least end radioactive fallout. "He wanted an agreement, almost any kind of agreement, that could serve to start the process of trust and accommodation."[30] Arms agreements show that the United States and the Soviet Union realize that arms levels are a matter of mutual concern that must be negotiated rather than being produced by the resultant of unilateral decisions. Agreements acknowledge that the Soviet-American competition is not total, that what is often more important than unilateral advantage is reaching settlements that are good for both sides, and that limiting national autonomy can help reach common objectives.

The most important goal of arms control is to reduce the threat of war. Many analysts argue that over the past years we have lost sight of this goal as we have focused on reducing numbers of weapons on each side while forgetting that lower numbers do not automatically produce greater stability than do higher numbers. More important than the number of weapons are their characteristics—especially their abilities to destroy the other side's strategic systems. While there is some-

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a joint session of the Subcommittee on Strategic and Theater Nuclear Forces of the Senate Armed Forces Committee and the Defense Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Appropriations, 99th Congress, 2nd sess., 26 June 1985.

[29] Kenneth Adelman, "Arms Control With and Without Agreements," *Foreign Affairs* 63 (Winter 1984/85): 243.

[30] Ambrose, *Eisenhower*, 518.

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thing to this argument, I think it overstates the importance of crisis stability seen in purely military terms. The danger of war is strongly affected by the political climate in general and by beliefs about the inevitability of war in particular. The main purpose of arms control in the nuclear era is to control our expectations and beliefs, not our arms. It is the former rather than the latter that will determine our fates.

Conclusion

Nuclear weapons have done strange things to our world. Although the basic facts are familiar, we have yet to understand and assimilate all the implications. As the controversy over the 1986 summit meeting in Iceland reminds us, many people, this writer included, are deeply ambivalent about whether either the United States or the world would be better off had nuclear weapons never been invented. On the one hand, mutual second-strike capability means that a major war is extremely unlikely; on the other hand, it means that if such a conflict should erupt, it is likely to destroy our civilization. With this basic question unanswered, if not unanswerable, it is not surprising that so many arguments rage.

Nuclear weapons have had similarly contradictory effects on the need for unity. Many states within the United States could probably develop their own nuclear retaliatory forces. With a high level of economic development and technical skill, large size is no longer needed for defense. But in another way, defense is more common than it was in the past. To the extent that credibility is central and that statesmen believe that their adversaries are drawing wide-ranging inferences from the way they behave anywhere in the globe, the United States may be forced to protect friendly states throughout the world. This can be true even though these areas—including West Europe—no longer add physical strength to the United States. In order to protect itself, the United States does not need Europe's economic power, army, or land mass to supply military bases. This argument applies even more strongly to all other parts of the globe. But to the extent that the Soviets believe that America's interests and commitments are of a piece, the United States must defend what is peripheral in order to defend what is more important. Even if the Soviets do not see credibility in this way—and there is very little evidence that they do—the knowledge on both sides that the clash of Soviet and American arms in any part of the world could lead to a nuclear war means that deterrence against the other superpower follows almost inevitably from either side's stationing large numbers of troops in an area. Thus, just as nuclear weapons have introduced greater elements of both conflict and cooperation in the relations between the superpowers, so they have both reduced and heightened the reasons why defense within alliances must inevitably be common.

Finally, nuclear weapons have also increased the extent to which the security of the two adversary powers is linked. Although each still strives to make competitive gains, and presumably will do so for the indefinite future, there are severe

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limits to how far this process can go without calling up an unacceptably dangerous response by the other. Similarly, even though each side seeks a military posture that increases its own security by decreasing the security of the other,[31] in the absence of the capability for physical defense, whether each side survives depends on the other's restraint. Thus, in day-to-day international politics, sharp confrontations, and even limited wars, the attempt to totally defeat the other will increase the danger of mutual destruction. Neither the United States nor the Soviet Union can succeed in purchasing a large degree of security by making its adversary very insecure. Whether we like it or not, the common defense now extends to adversaries as well as to allies.

[31] This statement is commonplace as far as the Soviet Union is concerned. Analysts less frequently apply it to the United States, but I think this is because of our natural national perspective and because we tend to concentrate on what national leaders have said about our strategy rather than on how we have planned to use nuclear weapons if war should occur.

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The "Lion in the Path": The U.S. Emergence as a World Power

WALTER LAFEBER

In 1900 the United States was emerging for the first time as a great world power. As a result of the 1898 war against Spain, the American military reach stretched from Latin America to China. After a half-century of incredible industrialization, the U.S. economic reach stretched around the globe. European observers warned that dollars served as the cutting edge for an American invasion of Old World markets. Many of those dollars were held by the first United States multinational corporations, which had appeared in the 1880s and 1890s.[1] In Asia, U.S. officials issued two historic "open door" notes, which asked the other powers to observe Chinese territorial integrity and, as Secretary of State John Hay phrased it, "a fair field and no favor" in the intensifying competition for China's vast markets.[2] To protect these multiplying interests, the United States Navy, which had ranked below the top dozen fleets (including Chile's) just a decade earlier, suddenly grew into one of the five largest navies by 1900. It could use newly seized bases, moreover, that included the Philippines, Guam, Hawaii, Cuba, and Puerto Rico. In a moment of conquest during the late 1890s, the nation had transformed itself from a continental to a global power. The American Century had begun.

The fundamental question for the U.S. political system was whether the Constitution of 1787 could provide an adequate plan of government for the new global

[1] Mira Wilkins, *The Emergence of Multinational Enterprise: American Business Abroad From the Colonial Era to 1914* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1970), 68–69, 71–73.

[2] Thomas J. McCormick, *China Market: America's Quest for Empire, 1893–1901* (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1967), 127.

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giant. What the Founders termed "the common defense" in the late eighteenth century in no way resembled the defense needs of early twentieth-century America. Indeed, the term "for the common defense" had apparently been inserted into the Constitution with little thought and less debate. It had appeared in the Articles of Confederation (which the delegates gathered at Philadelphia in the summer of 1787 were about to overthrow), and the Constitutional Convention inserted the words as part of a brief catchall description of the purposes for which a new Congress could levy taxes. James Madison much later recalled that the Philadelphia Convention, the state conventions which ratified the Constitution, and the First Congress under the Constitution accepted "the common defense and general welfare" provision with little concern, although he admitted he quickly became worried after Alexander Hamilton demonstrated how the phrase could be used to justify the exercise of national, and especially presidential, powers that Madison deemed unconstitutional during the 1790s.[3] After he entered the executive branch, however, Madison followed rather than repudiated Hamilton's interpretation. As Secretary of State under Thomas Jefferson, Madison accepted an extraordinarily broad construction of constitutional powers when the administration had to deal with the purchase, and especially the governing, of the vast Louisiana Territory in 1803–1804. Eight years later, President Madison saw fit to defend the common interest by seizing West Florida in a neat covert operation, taking the country to war against Great Britain in the war of 1812, and finally checking an attempt by New Englanders to secede from the Union.

By 1829, however, an aged Madison, soon to be known as the Father of the Constitution, concluded that regardless of how well the constitutional system had operated since 1789, its future was limited. In a century, he figured, the U.S. population would reach 192 million. The landed frontier would have ended, and its passing would mark the turning point in the nation's development. Without a frontier for further expansion, property holding would become difficult, especially for the crucial agrarian sector. The political factions that Madison had long feared could bunch up and clash violently. The Virginian warned that the small landholders who had a stake in the society and acted as its backbone would become a mere minority. The majority would then divide into two classes: "wealthy capitalists and indigent laborers." He wondered aloud how the propertied faction could protect itself against a rampaging majority in a country plagued with "nearly as crowded a population as in Great Britain." Around 1929, Madison thought, the structure of the American government would have to be reconsidered.[4]

His prophecy that 1929 was to mark the turning point in the history of the United States remains an interesting topic for discussion. But in 1898 one sharp observer worried that Madison was thirty years off. Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan, arguably the most influential military strategist in American history, declared that the United

[3] *The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787*, Max Farrand, ed., rev. ed., 4 vols. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), III: 494: Ibid., IV:85–86; Ibid., III: 99–100.

[4] "Note During the Convention for Amending the Constitution of Virginia," *The Writings of James Madison*, Gaillard Hunt, ed., 9 vols. (New York: G.P. Putnam, 1900–1910), IX: 358–360.

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States had already reached the crossroad. In a highly influential book of eight years before, the middle-aged naval officer had argued that because of its burgeoning farms and manufacturing plants that produced far more than Americans could consume, the United States had no choice but to find markets abroad. He warned that the nation must be able to protect those markets (and the sea lanes leading both to them and the overseas raw material sources on which the U.S. economy depended) with military power. By 1897 Mahan's message had taken on more urgency. The United States, he argued, had to join the British in using military force to order and civilize parts of the world. Not only U.S. economic interests but the American character would benefit: "It is to the soldier's experience that the spiritual life goes for its most vivid metaphors and its loftiest inspirations." The captain also emphasized that the Anglo-Saxons had to seize the initiative before they were outflanked by a newly organized Asia. The task was great and "immense practical difficulties have to be overcome. " Mahan was specific about these difficulties: "any project of extending the sphere of the United States, by annexation or otherwise, is met by the constitutional lion in the path. . . ." Somehow that "lion" had to be removed or circumvented: "If a thing is necessary to be done, the more difficulties, the more necessary to try to remove them."[5]

The strategist was especially disturbed by the American reluctance to annex the Hawaiian Islands and other bases he believed the new United States interests required. More generally, however, Mahan's words are of importance for two other reasons. First, without attribution he used the term "extending the sphere." The phrase of course comes directly out of Madison's *Federalist No. 10* when the Virginian explained that the new Constitution could solve the central theoretical problem plaguing the Founders: how to maintain a republican form of government in a vast territory. Nearly all the great political theorists had agreed that republicanism and large territories were incompatible. Republics could only exist in small areas where each citizen could keep an eye on everyone else. In his classic formulation, however, Madison argued that a large territory could indeed better preserve a republic: "Extend the sphere and you take in a greater variety of parties and interests; you make it less probable that a majority of the whole will have a common motive to invade the rights of other citizens; or if such a common motive exists, it will become more difficult for all who feel it to discover their own strength and to act in unison with each other."[6] Quite clearly, by 1829 Madison had concluded that in about a century no room would exist on the continent for the continued extension of the political and economic spheres. By 1898, however, Mahan believed that Americans urgently had to "extend the sphere" by finding overseas areas for markets and military bases.

That belief led him to his second important conclusion. He feared the Constitution—or, more accurately, the use made of the document by the "unwilling

[5] Captain A. T. Mahan, *The Interest of America in Sea Power, Present and Future* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1898), 256–257, 268.

[6] *The Federalist Papers* with an introduction, table of contents and index of ideas by Clinton Rossiter (New York: Mentor Books, 1961), 83.

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or the apprehensive" who feared overseas involvement—stood between Americans and the necessary expansion of their interests abroad.[7] Mahan did not want to slay "the lion in the path" of this expansion. No one of his time, not even Theodore Roosevelt or Andrew Carnegie, surpassed Mahan in his rock-hard faith that the Constitution's provisions were necessary to immunize the country against the deadly germs of socialism, communism, and other social disorders. Instead, the naval officer wanted the Constitution to be something of a manic depressive. It was to be a roaring lion as it maintained order at home, but become a tame, purring, cooperative cat as Americans found it necessary to stretch (or ignore) constitutional provisions to achieve the ends of the new global foreign policy.

Mahan thus anticipated a major theme of twentieth-century American foreign policy and government: maintaining the form of the Constitution, but reinterpreting its provisions so the foreign policy of a nineteenth-century continental nation could legitimately become the foreign policy of a twentieth-century global power. Madison had feared that a new governing instrument would have to be found before the middle of the twentieth century. But Mahan concluded that while a different political system was needed to obtain and operate the overseas empire required by post-Civil War America, such a system could be worked out within the traditional constitutional provisions. Those provisions only needed to be stretched and pulled a bit. The constitutional means for maintaining the common defense of 1900 was to be radically different from maintaining the common defense of 1787, but Mahan and colleagues such as Roosevelt believed the right handlers could train, rather than have to destroy, the lion who blocked the path of the new foreign policy. In doing so, these handlers dealt with many of the issues (and indeed created some of them) that plague their descendants who are responsible for maintaining the common defense during the Constitution's bicentennial.

The Transformation of the Common Defense

The debate between Mahan and the ghost of Madison occurred during the major turning point in American history. Until the mid-nineteenth century, the central theme of that history had been the conquering and settlement of the continental frontier. As young Henry Adams wrote in 1870, until the Civil War the nation's foreign affairs had "acted upon a single general principle . . . —the steady absorption of all the neighboring territory." But Adams then noted an important corollary to this expansion. It had been accompanied by "a loose and separately responsible division of government." The centralization of power brought about by the Founders in the 1780s had given way to rapid decentralization as Americans flooded across the continent during the Jacksonian era of 1815 to 1850. This fragmentation had begun to end, in Adams's view, with both the recent Civil War and the appearance of such consolidating forces as railways and telegraphs.[8]

[7] Mahan, *Interest of America in Sea Power*, 256–257.

[8] Henry Adams, "The Session," *North American Review* 61 (July 1870): 54, 60–62.

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Being an Adams, Henry had few heroes who did not share his last name, but he made an exception for William Henry Seward of New York, formerly Abraham Lincoln's Secretary of State and a politician-turned-statesman. Seward probably saw more clearly than anyone in the 1850s and 1860s how the United States would develop over the next half-century. Most important, he extended Adams's insight into the change shaping American development to predict that foreign policy would be deeply affected by the industrial revolution and the filling of the continent. He believed the transformation would affect political power centripetally, but foreign policy centrifugally. As American interests expanded abroad, power, perhaps necessarily, would centralize at home. In part, Seward's view came out of the old Whig-new Republican party doctrines that the future of the country's foreign policy lay in overseas trade (not further landed expansion) and that this course required an ever greater role for an efficient central government. Only an active national power could help and protect American entrepreneurs as they fought other great nations for markets in Asia, Europe, or Latin America. Seward consequently believed that at home the cry had to be "Organization! Organization!," as he pithily phrased it. He meanwhile so strongly emphasized that foreign policy must focus on overseas commercial expansion that a friend assured him the doctrine of "Old Monroe" in the western hemisphere was about to be replaced by "the Seward Doctrine" for the entire Pacific theater.[9] The growing debate in the 1980s over the importance of the "Pacific rim" would not have surprised the New Yorker.

Seward never lacked imagination (he once declared that the national capital should some day be moved to Mexico City so it could be more centrally located in the American empire), but U.S. development between 1870 and 1914 outran even his vision. As the landed frontier closed, the population more than doubled. Those people increasingly piled up in cities where only 16 percent of Americans had lived just before the Civil War, but 50 percent did so by 1900. An industrial complex producing $2 billion worth of goods in 1860 churned out more than five times that amount by century's turn. Nine-tenths of U.S. production was consumed at home in 1900, but the remaining one-tenth of the gross national product amounted to $1.5 billion dollars; was concentrated in the critical industries of steel, textiles, and agricultural staples; and comprised a foreign trade that exceeded that of every nation in the world except Great Britain.

Because they were tightly intermeshed, the economic and political realms developed along parallel lines between 1860 and 1900. As Seward understood, the rapid expansion of overseas economic interests was necessarily matched by an organizing and concentrating of power at home. One link between these two developments was the private business corporation. It was an entity the Founders thought little about; when they did consider the corporation they often viewed it as undemocratic and dangerous. Until the Civil War era the generalization held that law shaped corporate development. After that era the corporations shaped the law, as well

[9] Samuel Bulkley Ruggles to Seward, 4 February 1853, Papers of William Henry Seward, University of Rochester, Rochester, New York.

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as much else in American society.[10] By 1908, for example, six men had consolidated and operated the vast railway system that served as the nation's economic artery. One percent of all industrial companies produced 44 percent of the nation's goods. After 1897, when the economy suddenly moved into the greatest merger movement in American history, many of these corporations owed their existence to a few investment banking firms.

In the country's past, domestic and foreign policy developments have been locked in a symbiotic relationship. The 1865-to-1914 era, which marks the beginning of modern America, provides a case study of the relationship. As the domestic corporation became the most important economic agent, so the first U.S. multinational corporations appeared; by 1900 they dominated world markets in petroleum, sewing machines, cameras, and agricultural implements. As the holding of capital consolidated at home, the United States for the first time became a net exporter of capital. In 1897 Americans had about $700 million invested overseas. By 1908 the figure reached $2.5 billion, and by 1914 $3.5 billion. After centuries of being international debtors, in only several decades Americans were becoming world creditors. By 1914 they remained net debtors, but the future had been glimpsed in the late 1870s and 1890s when they lent more than they borrowed abroad.[11]

The common defense was beginning to mean systematic protection of American business entrepreneurs (and, in some regions, missionaries) abroad instead of defending frontier settlements against Native Americans or Spaniards. Official foreign policy moved in step with the private sector's overseas expansion and often anticipated it. In 1867 the United States took Midway Island as a mid-Pacific base, and that same year Seward bought Alaska from Russia. He purchased the vast region for many reasons, but among the most important was his understanding that it made the United States a power in the Pacific and Asian affairs; as one of his supporters phrased it, Alaska and the Aleutians formed a "drawbridge between America and Asia."[12] By the 1880s, Americans had opened Korea to much of the West, signing trade treaties that tightly pulled Hawaii into their economic orbit, and began to warn that it was only a matter of time before they would unilaterally build and operate an isthmian canal in Central America—a warning pointedly supported in 1885 by a major U.S. naval intervention in Colombia's province of Panama. The overseas expansion climaxed in the War of 1898, that "great year," in Mahan's words, "when old things passed away, and all things became new in the birth of a new national resolve, quickened into life by the crash of a falling [Spanish] empire and the devolution of its responsibilities upon our conscience."[13]

[10] This theme is well argued in James Willard Hurst, *The Legitimacy of the Business Corporation in the Laws of the United States, 1780–1970* (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1970), chap. II and conclusion.

[11] William Woodruff, *America's Impact on the World* (New York: John Wiley, 1975), 71–75, 235.

[12] Fred Henry Harrington, *Fighting Politician: Major-General N.P. Banks* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1948), 182–185.

[13] A. T. Mahan, *Retrospect & Prospect; Studies in International Relations Naval and Political* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1902), 24.

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In 1908 Woodrow Wilson pinpointed how the development of an overseas empire reshaped the American political system: "The war with Spain again changed the balance of parts. Foreign questions became leading questions again . . . and in them the President was of necessity leader."[14] Wilson had believed that the pre-1890s system was characterized by the term "congressional politics," but the climax of post-1870 developments in the war of 1898 and its overseas conquests ended congressional ascendancy. A new, powerful presidency appeared to dominate the political arena. William McKinley was the first modern president for many reasons: his ability to use foreign policy to control Congress and define the political agenda, his willingness to use force overseas without direct authorization from the House or Senate, his genius in utilizing overseas events and the chief executive's unique position to shape public opinion in his favor. In April 1898 he used his powers to take the nation into war against Spain on his own (and not Congress's) terms. He especially was determined not to recognize the Cuban revolutionary forces that had long been fighting against Spain. The President kept all options open so he could handle Cuba any way he pleased after the conflict. He followed the same course in the Philippines after Admiral George Dewey's smashing victory over the Spanish fleet in Manila Bay in May 1898. Power over the postwar Philippines centralized in the hands of the executive, not Congress or the Filipinos. In June 1898, he revenged one of his few political losses. The year before the Senate had refused the President's request for a necessary two-thirds vote to annex Hawaii. After Dewey's victory in the Philippines, McKinley resubmitted a bill to take Hawaii, but this time resorted to the device of a joint House-Senate resolution in which only majorities of each house were required to approve. There was precedent: a similar procedure had annexed Texas in 1845. McKinley's resurrection of the joint-resolution approach effectively broke a half-century of Senate power over the treaty process.

By October 1898, the President had reluctantly decided to annex all the Philippines. Originally he had wanted only the port of Manila, which he could use to protect the multiplying U.S. interests in the western Pacific and Asia. But he discovered that Manila was indefensible without taking the port's home island of Luzon, and Luzon could not be defended without annexing the neighboring islands. His decision led to a historic constitutional struggle in February 1899. Anti-annexationists in the Senate vehemently argued that the Constitution could not be stretched across the Pacific without snapping. The question of whether the common defense now required distant colonies and whether, if it did, the holding of such colonies was constitutional dominated public debate. In the Senate, George Vest (Dem.-Mo.) resolved "That under the Constitution of the United States no power is given to the Federal Government to acquire territory to be held and governed permanently as colonies." The Missouri Senator argued that only areas "suitable for admission into the Union" could be acquired; otherwise the govern-

[14] Woodrow Wilson, *Constitutional Government in the United States* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1908), 58–59.

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ment would inevitably change from a republic based on the consent of the governed into a "colonial system" that would destroy the Constitution.[15]

The pro-McKinley annexationists responded by arguing, in the words of Senator Orville Platt (Rep.-Conn.), that all governments actually operated with "the consent of some of the governed"—even in the United States where the mentally retarded, the illiterate, and the inhabitants of the District of Columbia were not permitted to vote. Henry Cabot Lodge (Rep.-Mass.), a close friend of Mahan and Theodore Roosevelt, strongly advanced the case that the Constitution allowed a highly centralized power to run the new overseas acquisitions. Except for the Thirteenth Amendment prohibiting slavery, Lodge declared, "The power of the United States in any territory or possession outside the limits of the states themselves is absolute." He focused on the similarity between the government's power over Native Americans and over Filipinos: "When our great Chief Justice John Marshall . . . declared in the Cherokee case [of 1831] that the United States could have under its control, exercised by treaty or the laws of Congress, a 'domestic and dependent nation,' I think he solved the question of our constitutional relations to the Philippines." Lodge's statement was one of many in 1898–1900 that directly compared the U.S. government's treatment of the Indians with its power to deal with Filipinos or other non-white foreign peoples.[16] Lodge's and Platt's views prevailed as the treaty to annex the Philippines passed the Senate in February 1899 by a paper-thin margin.

The United States annexed Hawaii and the Philippines outright, but its other conquests of 1898 were not handled as directly. As McKinley's reluctant decision to take all the Philippines dramatized, American expansion was less colonial (in the sense of desiring more land containing more non-Anglo-Saxons) than strategic. The United States wanted naval and commercial bases to defend its interests and become steppingstones to the markets of Asia and Latin America. Washington's views of its foreign policy needs were not comparable to those of the European colonial powers. Between 1870 and 1900 the United States seized about 125,000 square miles of territory (most of it uncharted portions of the Philippines where only Luzon was considered of importance), while Great Britain conquered nearly 5 million square miles and even Germany took over a million. McKinley intended to defend U.S. interests not through a colonial policy but by taking small, strategically located points of land. His definition of what Americans required for their common defense complicated the constitutional debate.

After the Philippines were annexed in early 1899, the debate revolved around the question of whether the 1787 document could properly govern unincorporated territory in Puerto Rico, rule a protectorate in Cuba, and oversee extensive military intervention in Latin America and China. As far as the territorial questions were concerned, the answer had apparently been given a century earlier by Gou-

[15] *Congressional Record*, 55th Cong., 3d sess., 287–297, 960, 1383.

[16] Ibid.; Walter L. Williams, "U.S. Indian Policy and the Debate Over Philippine Annexation," *Journal of American History*, 66 (March 1980): 810–831.

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verneur Morris, who wrote the first draft of the Constitution. The document, Morris believed, was so flexible that it allowed the creation of any kind of empire Congress might wish.[17] Between 1898 and 1903, Congress and the Supreme Court approved Morris's argument, most specifically in regard to Puerto Rico.

After U.S. troops met no resistance in conquering the island in 1898, it became a strategic stronghold and also a major source of sugar (most of it grown by American investors) for the U.S. market. For a number of reasons, of which racial antipathy was of special importance, the United States did not want to annex Puerto Rico as it had Texas or California a half-century earlier. For the first time, a treaty acquiring territory for the United States offered no promise of citizenship.[18] Many close observers believed that such expansionism violated the letter as well as the spirit of the Constitution. These "anti-imperialists," often belonging to old New England families and involved in law and business, hated the thought that constitutional tradition was to be destroyed for the sake of overseas expansionism of doubtful profit. They believed that neither Congress nor McKinley had the power to govern colonial peoples differently than U.S. citizens had been governed. As the popular phrase went, "The Constitution follows the flag."[19] The requirements of the common defense might have dramatically changed by 1900, but the constitutional principles, the anti-imperialists argued, had to remain the same. As far as they were concerned, those requirements had to be redefined so that they could be reconciled with the principles.

The Supreme Court disagreed. In a series of decisions between 1901 and 1904 that are collectively known as the Insular Cases, the court held that Congress could operate the newly acquired empire in just about any way it saw fit. The court sharply and closely divided, but in all the cases relating to the new overseas holdings a majority held that constitutional rights did not fully apply in areas taken from Spain until Congress "incorporated" them into the United States. Meanwhile, the unincorporated regions enjoyed only some "fundamental" constitutional rights; these did not include indictment by grand jury or even trial by jury.[20] Amid warnings by justices that any other interpretation could well "be fatal to the development of what Chief Justice John Marshall called the American Empire," the court obliterated the principle that the Constitution followed the flag. It was more accurate to assume, observed the era's leading humorist, Finley Peter Dunne's "Mr. Dooley," that given McKinley's smashing reelection triumph of 1900 the Supreme Court followed the election returns.

The conquests of 1898 and the nation's highest tribunal had greatly expanded the boundaries of the common defense clause. As McKinley's attorney general argued before the court, wide powers had to be obtained by the government, be-

[17] *Congressional Record*, 55th Cong., 3d sess., 294.

[18] Julius W. Pratt, *America's Colonial Experiment: How the U.S. Gained, Governed and in Part Gave Away a Colonial Empire* (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1950), 68.

[19] Robert Beisner, *Twelve Against Empire: The Anti-Imperialists, 1898-1900* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985), 216.

[20] Louis Henkin, *Foreign Affairs and the Constitution* (Mineola, N.Y.: Foundation Press, 1972), 268.

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cause in the future the United States might need to become involved in Egypt, the Sudan, Central Africa, "or a spot in the Antarctic Circle, or a section of the Chinese Empire."[21]

McKinley and Roosevelt: Expanding the Common Defense

The reference to "a section of the Chinese Empire" was well-founded. Using the newly acquired Philippine base as a point of embarkation, McKinley ordered 5,000 troops into the mainland of China in 1900. He ostensibly sent them to protect U.S. lives and property, but the President also wanted the army to help other powers control the Boxer Rebellion and—of particular urgency—watch those powers' colonial ambitions closely. The Japanese and the Europeans had already violated the open-door policy by seizing and closing off parts of the Chinese Empire. McKinley and his successor, Theodore Roosevelt, feared that the Russians intended to colonize vast areas of Manchuria. The Chinese actually declared war on the United States because of this military intervention, but the episode is more important because it set a historic precedent that the president, without express authorization from Congress, could intervene in a sovereign nation and, without that nation's consent, go about reordering its political affairs—including the putting down of revolutionary activity. Until McKinley's action, presidents who had ordered such landings had vowed they were only protecting U.S. lives and property while acting neutrally in the other country's affairs. Following McKinley's lead, Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson repeatedly dispatched troops over the next twenty years to Haiti, Santo Domingo, Nicaragua, Panama, Cuba, Mexico, and finally Russia to play a role in deciding the outcome of civil wars.[22]

Maintaining the common defense of the United States was beginning to mean repeated military intervention in the internal affairs of other nations, some as close as Mexico, others as distant as China and the Soviet Union. But by 1900, distance was less important in foreign relations than it had been earlier. Certainly it was less significant than in 1787. The transportation and communications revolutions had produced what Louis Fisher calls the "shrinking globe" theory of U.S. foreign policy. Throughout much of the nineteenth century Washington officials had fashioned a defensive war rationale to justify the use of power to defend, or more usually to extend, their country's borders. In 1898, however, McKinley partly justified intervention in Cuba by claiming the the problem was "right at our door." Fisher rightly argues that the "shrinking world" view took hold only after World War II, but a half-century earlier McKinley's, Roosevelt's, and Wilson's interventions in neighboring countries provided strong evidence for Fisher's observation

[21] *The Insular Cases: Briefs*, 56th Cong., 2nd sess., House Document No. 509 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1901), 367.

[22] A good analysis is Robert William Russell, *Documents Relating to the War Power of Congress, the President's Authority as Commander-in-Chief and the War in Indochina*, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 91st Cong., 2nd sess. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1970), 14–15, 58; Arthur Schlesinger, *The Imperial Presidency* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1973), 88–90.

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that the "idea of a shrinking globe has been part of the conceptual shift behind the enlargement of presidential power." As he neatly summarized the effect of the principle, "constitutionally it shrinks not merely the globe but congressional power as well."[23]

The Founders had carefully delegated the war-declaring powers to Congress and the war-making powers to the executive, but by 1900 both powers were largely in the president's hands. The Senate occasionally tried to arouse itself and reclaim its earlier authority. In 1901 it rejected an Anglo-American treaty that gave the United States the right to build but not defend an isthmian canal. The Senate demanded the authority to defend a new passageway as well. The defeat of the agreement led the self-pitying Secretary of State, John Hay, to compare a treaty entering the Senate to a bull entering the bullring. Not the result but only the moment of death was unpredictable, Hay lamented. Historians have paid more attention to Hay's remarks than have presidents. Theodore Roosevelt admired Hay, but the new President disliked Hay's treaty. The secretary of state consequently negotiated a second, more advantageous pact that gave the United States all it wanted. The agreement quickly gained Senate ratification.

In 1904–1905 Roosevelt raised to historic levels both the power of the president to conduct foreign policy without the consent of Congress and the authority to expand the boundaries of the common defense. In this case the defense of U.S. interests involved a radical redefinition of the Monroe Doctrine. In his 1823 declaration, President James Monroe had issued certain principles that were to have long lives: the United States refused to recognize further colonization of the New World by non-western-hemisphere nations; it wanted European powers to keep hands off the Latin American revolutions; and the United States, for its part, declared it did not want to become involved in European affairs unrelated to its own interests. For most of the nineteenth century, the limits of their military power forced Washington officials to restrict the application of the Monroe Doctrine principles to the North American continent. In 1870, however, President Ulysses S. Grant attempted to annex Santo Domingo, a site that held an especially magnificent port coveted by Grant and some of his close, highly corrupt friends in the private sector. The Senate rejected Grant's scheme, but the President nevertheless took the occasion to add a fourth principle to the Monroe Doctrine: henceforth no territory in the New World could be regarded as subject to transfer to a European power. In 1904, Santo Domingo again came into view of U.S. officials. Internal instability, complicated by claims made by French and German companies on the country's resources, threatened both the nation's independence and U.S. shipping and financial interests. Theodore Roosevelt dispatched the U.S. Navy to restore order, took over the customs houses to ensure that the Europeans would be properly paid off and have no excuse to land troops of their own, then justified his action by arguing that as the hemisphere's greatest power the United States

[23] Louis Fisher, *Constitutional Conflicts Between Congress and the President* (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1985), 292–293.

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had the responsibility to act as a "policeman" who maintained order among unruly, less-developed peoples.[24]

Several parts of Roosevelt's policy proved to be of special importance. The first appeared when he asked the Senate to ratify a treaty, made between U.S. officials and the Santo Domingo government, that allowed Roosevelt's appointees to operate the small nation's customs houses. The Senate refused to ratify, largely on the ground that it did not think the United States should assume a protectorate over the Caribbean country. Several of the more cynical legislators went farther and questioned whether U.S. military power should be deployed for the purpose of firming up the price of Dominican bonds held by New York investors. Roosevelt decided to ignore the Senate's action and signed an executive agreement with the Santo Domingo government that gave him the authority to run the customs houses as he wished. Executive agreements were not new in American diplomacy; a precedent had been set in 1817 when the Rush-Bagot pact between the United States and Great Britain demilitarized the American-Canadian boundary along the Great Lakes. But Roosevelt was going beyond the 1817 precedent by defying and then circumventing the Senate's constitutional power to approve or reject treaties. The Rough Rider nevertheless was building better than even he could have imagined. By 1972 Presidents had so well learned Roosevelt's lesson that executive agreements had largely replaced treaties in American diplomacy; the United States was signatory to 947 treaties, but 4,359 executive agreements.[25] As Roosevelt expanded U.S. power further into the Caribbean, he consolidated diplomatic authority in the White House.

The second important part of Roosevelt's action involved a fundamental redefinition of how the Monroe Doctrine related to U.S. defense. In November 1984, Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger appeared on cable television and used the Monroe Doctrine to justify the Reagan administration's policies in Central America.[26] In reality, Weinberger was referring not to the original Monroe Doctrine, but to the transformed and greatly expanded "Roosevelt Corollary" to the Monroe Doctrine, as historians have termed it. Monroe's Doctrine and Roosevelt's Corollary were actually quite different. Monroe sympathized with Latin American revolutions. Roosevelt (and the Reagan administration) opposed such upheavals to the point of being willing to use military force to destroy them. Monroe declared that all nations, including the United States, should refrain from intervening in the internal affairs of those Latin American states. Roosevelt (and the Reagan administration) justified the use of direct U.S. intervention in Latin American affairs. Monroe did not seize the war-declaring or related powers from Congress, because he had no intention of going to war or even temporarily intervening. Roosevelt (and the Reagan administration) acted on the belief that the chief ex-

[24] The classic analysis is Dexter Perkins, *The Monroe Doctrine, 1867–1907* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1937), esp. 427.

[25] George W. Ball, *Diplomacy for a Crowded World: An American Foreign Policy* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1976), 208–209.

[26] U.S. Department of Defense, Transcript of "Newsmaker Saturday," 17 November 1984, 2–3.

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ecutive had the right to support the use of United States force (in Reagan's case covert as well as overt), regardless of congressional opposition. In Roosevelt's policy toward Santo Domingo, the United States formally redefined its right to act, militarily if necessary and at the president's sole discretion if the Senate balked, in the internal affairs of Latin American states. Roosevelt's (and the Reagan administration's) actions had little to do with the original Monroe Doctrine, but much to do with the post-1898 view of what constituted the common defense in the United States.

To defend the new, global American interests, Roosevelt built on McKinley's precedents to create a more centralized and powerful presidency. He placed power above law, although he usually did so with more caution than some scholars have thought. In separating Panama from Colombia in 1903 and taking over the Santo Domingo customs houses in 1904–1905, he nevertheless removed the "constitutional lion in the path" through sheer force. Roosevelt agreed with his friend Mahan, who had written in 1897 that "men are apt to forget that law is the servant of equity, and that while the world is in its present stage of development equity which cannot be had by law must be had by force, upon which ultimately law rests, not for its sanction, but for its efficacy."[27] The two men also agreed that neither Congress not public opinion was well fitted to determine foreign policy. "I can conceive few more pitiful sensations than that of fretting about what the public thinks," Mahan told a friend in 1898, for in "current questions of the day" the public was "a good deal of a fool."[28] Roosevelt put it more delicately when he considered that his policies might be moving against public opinion: "This people of ours simply does not understand how things are outside our own boundaries." As for Congress, it "in the nature of things can know nothing whatever of the totally different conditions of India, or the Philippines, or Egypt, or Cuba . . . "[29] Theodore Roosevelt believed in a "stewardship theory" that assumed the president could take any action he deemed necessary to the general welfare and common defense unless it was expressly forbidden by the Constitution or Congress. As already noted, he was not always willing to abide even by congressionally imposed limits. Given both the new world into which the United States was moving and the latitude offered presidential initiative by McKinley's and Roosevelt's expansion of the commander-in-chief clause of the Constitution, the stewardship theory justified historic centralization of decision-making power. Nor was it simply a temporary, emergency centralization, as had occurred with Andrew Jackson's assumption of power to block South Carolina nullification or Lincoln's breathtaking view of presidential authority in 1861. After 1898, the centralization was becoming systematic, institutionalized, and long-lasting.

[27] Mahan, *Interest of America in Sea Power*, 227–228.

[28] Mahan to George Syndeham Clarke, 24 May 1898 in Alfred T. Mahan, *Letters and Papers of Alfred Thayer Mahan*, Robert Seager II and Doris D. Maguire, eds., 3 vols. (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1975), II: 556.

[29] Howard K. Beale, *Theodore Roosevelt and the Rise of America to World Power* (New York: Collier Books, 1962), 388–389.

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Contemporaries understood this historic change was taking place, and they also realized the reasons for the change. In 1908, Woodrow Wilson, whose lectures and writings in political science drew large audiences, explained why the turn had been taken in 1898. "From 1865 to 1898," he wrote, "domestic questions" had been paramount and consequently Congress "came once more to the front." But after 1898 foreign relations were of primary importance and consequently the president's authority rapidly increased. "Our new place in the affairs of the world has since that year of transformation kept him at the front of our government, where our own thoughts and the attention of men everywhere is centered upon him." Wilson announced that "Our President must always, henceforth, be one of the great powers of the world, whether he acts greatly and wisely or not, and the best statesmen we can produce will be needed to fill the office of Secretary of State."[30] That Wilson, on becoming president four years later, appointed William Jennings Bryan as his own secretary of state indicated that here was another historian-political scientist who refused to follow his own good advice. It did not mean, especially in Bryan's case, that the advice was wrong.

The new U.S. foreign policy of 1898 to 1905 transformed the nation's conception of the common defense. That post-1898 turn culminated a long post-Civil War change in United States economic power and the nature of the country's expansion from a quest for territories to a search for overseas markets, preferably of the stable, nonrevolutionary variety. The new type of expansionism and internal consolidation (exemplified by the growth of the corporation and the post-1897 merger movement) had not been accompanied by marked centralization of political power until McKinley entered the White House. His talents and willingness to seize the opportunities offered presidential prerogative by the country's movement into the Caribbean and western Pacific-Asian theaters created an explicit extracontinental definition of the common defense. Overseas expansion and the McKinley-Roosevelt development of presidential power removed the "constitutional lion in the path" that Mahan had feared would stop necessary overseas American expansion. New, centralized powers emerged, powers legitimized by the Supreme Court in the Insular cases and exercised most notably by McKinley in dispatching troops to China in 1900, and by Roosevelt when he ordered U.S. naval units to put down revolutionary disturbances in Santo Domingo and then control the major source of the country's revenue. Wilson followed these precedents in 1914 when he sent an army into Mexico despite the Senate's refusal to give its consent. Wilson had earlier clearly explained how an expanded overseas empire and centralized political power were coming to work in tandem. His successors, both in academia and in Washington policy-making circles, were to spend the twentieth century trying to control—or, more often, to expand—the awesome power inherent in that partnership.*

[30] Wilson, *Constitutional Government in the United States*, 58–59, 77–80.

* The author wishes to thank the U.S. Constitution Council, which sponsored a conference at which an early draft of this paper was given and discussed.

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The Common Defense and Great-Power Responsibilities

INIS L. CLAUDE, JR.

When the people of the United States ordained and established their Constitution, they gave prominence to the aim of providing for the common defense. In Article I, Section 8, the Constitution assigns to Congress the authority to raise money for that purpose, and in Article IV, Section 4, it lays upon the United States the obligation to protect each of the states against invasion. For the United States, as for other states in the global system, providing for the common defense is a responsibility owed to its people. Do the United States and other states also have international responsibilities? Do they have obligations not merely to their own people but to the world, or parts of it, outside their boundaries? This is, of course, a normative question, in replying to which one expresses one's convictions about how states *ought* to behave. It leads immediately to a set of empirical questions: Do most people think that states have external responsibilities? Do states acknowledge such obligations? Is the behavior of states significantly affected by their concern to meet what they deem to be their international responsibilities?

Responsibility of States in International Theory

The conventional wisdom that has been developed and absorbed by students of international relations in the United States since World War II inclines us toward negative answers to these questions, if not by denying the notion of international responsibility then by neglecting it. "Political Realism" has taught us almost unani-

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mously to expect that states will—and, with less unanimity, to believe that they should—make national interest the determinant of their foreign policy.

The proposition that states do and should focus on the national interest is most prominently associated with that extraordinarily influential figure, the late Hans J. Morgenthau. He certainly did not repudiate the view that states have responsibilities beyond their own domains; indeed, he sometimes affirmed that position. In his classic textbook he characterized the position of the United States in today's world as one "of predominant power, and hence of foremost responsibility."[1] In *In Defense of the National Interest* Morgenthau treated the Truman Doctrine, which called for assistance to Greece and Turkey, as the American response to the fact that "Great Britain was no longer able . . . to shoulder the over-all responsibility for the maintenance of the balance of power in Europe . . . ," and stressed the point that "nations differ in power and, hence, also in influence and responsibility. . . ."[2] Elsewhere, he wrote of America's responsibility toward mankind, and in particular of its "responsibility to help other nations which were threatened with economic disaster and, beyond it, its responsibility for a functioning international economic system."[3] One might argue that, while advocating self-interested behavior by states, Morgenthau always, implicitly or explicitly, advised states to pay due respect to the interests of others and thereby to fulfill their obligation to contribute to the orderliness of the global system.

All this having been said, it remains true that Morgenthau gave scant attention to the idea of states' international responsibilities. National interest was supreme in his conception of the actual and desirable performance of states. For Morgenthau, concerns such as global peace and security and the general welfare of humanity were distinctly secondary to national interests and were not to be pursued at the expense of the latter.[4] He was occasionally explicit in rejecting the notion of external responsibility: "American foreign policy ought not to have the objective of bringing the blessings of some social and political system to all the world or of protecting all the world from the evils of some other system. Its purpose—and its sole purpose—ought to be . . . the security of the nation. . . ."[5]

In 1959, addressing the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Morgenthau argued that the United States had acquired allies indiscriminately and had so neglected its leadership role that the interests and preferences of weak allies sometimes prevailed over those of the United States. Senator Frank Carlson of Kansas asked whether he intended to insist that the United States ought not to give assistance to weak states; Morgenthau replied that he was not dealing with hu-

[1] Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations*, 5th ed. (New York: Knopf, 1967), 24.

[2] Morgenthau, *In Defense of the National Interest* (New York: Knopf, 1951), 115, 146.

[3] Morgenthau, "The Crisis of American Foreign Policy," The Brian McMahon Lectures, University of Connecticut, 22 February 1969, 7; see also *A New Foreign Policy for the United States* (New York: Praeger, 1969), 244.

[4] See Morgenthau, *A New Foreign Policy for the United States*, 241; *In Defense of the National Interest*, 114, 136.

[5] Ibid., 88.

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manitarian problems and simply reiterated the charge that certain American alliances brought advantage to other states but not to America. Agreeing, Carlson suggested that the United States had made such alliances "because we are a nation interested in preserving the freedoms of people who are in danger of losing their freedoms to a greater power." He did not succeed in eliciting from Morgenthau an acknowledgment of the propriety of America's engaging itself for any reason except to promote its own advantage.[6] In this instance Morgenthau neither affirmed nor denied the proposition that the United States had a duty to protect humane values in the world at large. His reiteration of the primacy of the national interest masked his refusal to comment on the issue. In effect, however, he denied that America had any responsibility beyond that of looking after itself.

This episode is illustrative of the difficulty experienced by "Realists" and their intellectual descendants in dealing with the notion of responsibility. They are comfortable neither in repudiating it nor in admitting it to their theory of international behavior. They—and the pronoun includes most of us—tend to treat responsibility as a kind of intellectual loose end, kept on hand but never woven into the fabric of systematic thought about international relations.

The discomfort of the theorist confronted with the necessity of doing something with the idea of states' having external responsibilities is exemplified by Arnold Wolfers in his classic volume, *Discord and Collaboration*. Wolfers introduced the concept of milieu goals, suggesting that one of the possibilities open to states is to forgo the pursuit of immediate and direct national interests in favor of promoting conditions in the international economic, social, or political environment that they deem favorable to their own welfare. This concept appears to be an eminently suitable device for incorporating the notion of national responsibility into a theory of state behavior that emphasizes national interest; one might argue that states sometimes find the acceptance and carrying out of external responsibilities an intelligent way of protecting or promoting their national interest. As I pointed out in a review of *Discord and Collaboration*, however, Wolfers refrained from using the concept in this fashion. When the opportunity arose to treat a policy aimed at environmental reform as an example of a state's attempting to serve its national interest by pursuing a milieu goal, the author almost invariably passed it by in favor of describing—and criticizing—the policy in question as an instance of self-abnegation. In a personal letter responding to that review, Wolfers thanked me graciously for a criticism that he deemed a valuable stimulus to his further thought, but went on to express doubt that milieu goals "would ever win out in competition with traditional vital national goals," and ended by saying that he was "probably too much convinced of the continued need for stable nation-states to be ready to express a general preference for the pursuit of . . . transnational milieu goals."[7] One must conclude that even the inventor of the concept of milieu

[6] Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 86th Congress, 1st sess. 15 April 1959 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1959), 4, 10–11.

[7] For the concept of milieu goals, see Arnold Wolfers, *Discord and Collaboration* (Baltimore: Johns

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goals had a significant bias against them. His approval of the reluctance of states to pursue milieu goals indicated a lingering skepticism about the validity of his own proposition that such pursuit represented not the neglect or abandonment of national interest but an alternative way of serving that interest. When the chips were down, even Wolfers could not quite find a place for responsibility alongside interest in his thinking about how states act, and how they should act, in the international arena.

Theorists of the more idealistic variety, for their part, differ from Realists on this issue mainly not in that they deny, but in that they deplore the tendency of states to give first place to national interest and to play down the idea of their having external responsibilities. Some "Idealists" hope that states can be induced or required to behave more responsibly, while others, regarding states as incorrigibly self-interested, insist upon the necessity of replacing them. Both groups start from the premise that the acknowledgment and fulfillment of external responsibilities by states is a project for the future rather than a reality of the present.

Expectations and Pretensions of States

Theoretical preoccupation with the self-interested behavior of states and awkwardness in accommodating the idea of states' responsibilities can be misleading. At the very least, that idea has long had a prominent place in discourse about international relations and in assertions by statesmen about the policies of their governments. Colonial powers talked about the white man's burden and the civilizing mission. They may have exploited their colonies, but they never gave up affirming their obligation to protect and promote the welfare of the peoples over whom they ruled. Anthony Trollope had one of his fictional characters assert that: "the highest duty imposed upon us [the British people] as a nation is the management of India."[8]

When the United Nations Charter was being negotiated at the San Francisco Conference of 1945, the major powers defended their insistence upon permanent seats and veto rights in the Security Council by pointing out that they bore primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security. President Harry Truman, addressing the closing session, said of the United States and other powerful states: "they have no right to dominate the world. It is rather the duty of these powerful nations to assume the responsibility for leadership toward a world of peace."[9] In his inaugural address on 20 January 1949, Truman introduced his Point Four plan of assistance to underdeveloped countries with the comment that "Events have brought our American democracy to new influence and

Hopkins University Press, 1962), 73–77. My criticism appeared in a review article, "National Interests and the Global Environment," *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 8 (September 1964): 292–296. Professor Wolfers' response was in a letter addressed to me, dated 30 November 1964.

[8] Anthony Trollope, *Phineas Redux*, vol. I (London: Oxford University Press), 389.

[9] Harry S. Truman, *Memoirs*, vol. I, *Year of Decisions* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1955), 291.

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new responsibilities. They will test our courage, our devotion to duty, and our concept of liberty." When he declared a national emergency during the Korean War, he told the American people that "No nation has ever had a greater responsibility than ours at this moment. We must remember that we are the leaders of the free world."[10]

Dean Acheson, who had a distinguished career as Secretary of State under President Truman, wrote eloquently of America's moral responsibility to serve as leader of the western coalition, noting the heavy "costs of responsibility" but insisting that "Our responses to them are tests of maturity." He defended America's acceptance of a leading role even though "the responsibilities of leadership inevitably draw the United States into matters not of direct concern to it when they affect the whole alliance and the whole free world." Speaking of American assistance to newly liberated colonies, Acheson asserted: "The burden, though heavy, was shouldered as an obligation of responsible leadership. . . . It is proper and right that young nations should develop, and a responsibility of their elders in any acceptable half-world system that this should be possible."[11]

It has become a matter of routine for American leaders to recognize that the United States government has external responsibilities and to claim that it works seriously at meeting them. Here, for example, are excerpts from speeches by Secretary of State George Shultz:

> For the world's leading democracy, the task is not only immediate self-preservation but our responsibility as a protector of international peace, on whom many other countries rely for their security. (9 December 1984)
>
> As the most powerful country in the world, we have recognized our responsibility for helping to ensure international peace and stability . . . as the world's greatest economic power, this country has a special responsibility for the health of the world economy. (23 May 1985)
>
> As nuclear superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union share a special responsibility to seek to reduce the danger of nuclear war. (17 July 1985)[12]

The notion of external responsibility is not alien even to lesser states. Canada's Secretary of State for External Affairs, Joe Clark, asserted in the House of Commons on 15 September 1985 that expressing outrage concerning South Africa's apartheid system is "part of our duty," and that "Canada has a responsibility to provide both moral and practical leadership" in an international campaign to put pressure for change on the offending government.[13] In an editorial referring to his assassination, the *Washington Post* attributed to Prime Minister Olof Palme of Sweden "the view that Sweden's responsibilities in the world required it constantly to press more powerful countries toward arms control, and to press the

[10] Ibid., vol. 2, *Years of Trial and Hope*, 228, 428.
[11] Dean Acheson, *This Vast External Realm* (New York: Norton, 1973), 25, 101, 151–152.
[12] Texts provided by Bureau of Public Affairs, Department of State, Current Policy Nos. 642, 709, 724.
[13] Text provided by the Canadian Ministry for External Affairs.

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rich countries toward greater generosity to the poor."[14] It is perhaps significant that the editorialist betrayed neither surprise nor disagreement concerning Palme's conviction that Sweden and other countries have obligations beyond the mere promotion of their own national interests.

The idea of international responsibility is generally associated, primarily if not exclusively, with great powers. Indeed, it might be argued that a great power or a world power is by definition a state that has interests and responsibilities beyond both its own boundaries and its immediate neighborhood. In admitting that it has such responsibilities and in justifying some of its policies as measures to meet its responsibilities the United States merely asserts its great-power status. The bearing of international responsibility is expected of great powers. Our theories may tell us that all states, great powers emphatically included, are driven by devotion to their own interests; but we manage somehow to assume that it is necessary and perhaps even possible for states, especially the major ones, to mix the fulfillment of international obligations with the pursuit of national interests. We may concede that states are unlikely to subordinate their interests to their responsibilities, and may admit that interests should be preferred in the event of conflict, but we nonetheless base our thinking about international relations on the expectation and the demand that great powers will carry responsibilities appropriate to their status.

Great powers are singled out, because it is presumed that their capability, unlike that of lesser states, is not likely to be exhausted by the requirements of national interest; they are expected to have a surplus of resources that can be devoted to the needs of the system at large. Great powers are regarded collectively as surrogates for the central government that the multistate system needs but does not have. If the United States should bear no heavier burdens than Burma, it would be universally convicted not merely of neglecting its interests, but of shirking its responsibilities. One would not note this behavior as an interesting confirmation of Realist theory, but would condemn it as disastrous irresponsibility. We firmly believe that states have responsibilities. We hope—albeit with varying degrees of skepticism—that they will recognize and fulfill them.

The special burden attaching to great-power status became a matter of direct interest to Americans in the twentieth century. World War I demonstrated that America had the power appropriate to the position, but the aftermath indicated that it was not yet willing to play the role of a leading member of the international system. Woodrow Wilson's vision of the United States as a reliable carrier of major international responsibility seemed to be realized after World War II, when official rhetoric, legal commitments, and institutional initiatives combined with popular abandonment of isolationist sentiment to put the United States at the center of world affairs. Consciousness of power came to be accompanied by sense of responsibility; Americans faced the necessity of learning to play the role of great power.

There is room for debate as to whether American leaders, or some of them,

[14] "Olof Palme," *Washington Post*, 1 March 1986.

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actively sought great-power status for their country: was America thrust into, or did it propel itself into, that status? Did it accept, or attain, the standing and privileges of a member of the system's elite? However eager or reluctant Americans may have been for their country to gain the *rank* of great power, with its attendant rights and privileges, there can be no doubt that they approached the *duties* of that station with some degree of apprehension. It fell to the political leaders of the United States to explain that history had contrived to bring America to the forefront of international politics, and to insist that our moral obligation and self-interest coincided in requiring the faithful performance of major international responsibilities. As Secretary of State George C. Marshall put it in his famous speech of 5 June 1947, launching the idea of the European Recovery Program, the situation required "a willingness on the part of our people to face up to the vast responsibility which history has clearly placed upon our country."[15] America had become, inexorably or intentionally, the most powerful state in the world, and it could not escape the responsibilities inherent in that position.

The Nature of Great-Power Responsibilities

The responsibilities commonly attributed to great powers have to do, first of all, with the protection of allies and clients—affiliates that are, for the most part, less powerful than themselves. Great powers are doubtless self-interested in forming alliances, and the care and feeding of allies is partly a matter of sustaining and increasing their usefulness. But building alliances is also a system-maintaining function expected of great powers; the balancing-of-power process, which is the conventional means of attempting to keep order in a multistate system not otherwise organized for that purpose, relies upon great powers to serve as nuclei of such groupings of states. It may be that by serving its allies a great power also serves the global system, thereby ultimately serving its own interests. In any event, presiding over an alliance is *de rigueur* for great powers.

Having chosen its lesser partners, the great power senses a need and is generally regarded as having a responsibility to defend them against external enemies. Moreover, this sense of obligation may extend to the governing regimes of allied states, leaders whose past loyalty and potential usefulness to the alliance may suggest entitlement to support against internal challenges to their rule. In its role as guardian of allies, the great power may choose to strengthen as well as to protect its partners; learning to contribute from outside to the economic, social, political, and military effectiveness of client states is a major task of the great power. To neglect or to abandon its allies, to fail to give them effective support as required, damages the reputation of a great power and thereby handicaps it in the international competition.

Guardianship, in international as in domestic affairs, entails responsibility *for* as well as *to* the ward. The alliance leader is answerable for the behavior of the

[15] Text in David A. Baldwin, *Foreign Aid and American Foreign Policy* (New York: Praeger, 1966), 59.

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lesser ally as well as its security, for its virtue as well as its welfare. Great powers ought not to dominate their allies, but they are expected to be in charge of them. Their managerial duty requires them to restrain foolish and reckless allies, as does their own self-interest; fairly or not, the actions of their allies are certain to be attributed in some measure to themselves. This applies to the domestic as well as to the international behavior of allies. To condemn a great power because it is allied with a state whose government is oppressive and brutal is generally regarded not as indulging in unacceptable guilt by association but as assigning guilt by sponsorship. Assuming responsibility for the internal character and the external behavior of allies is an inescapable element of the role of great power. In this sense, being the leading member of an alliance is not altogether different from being a colonial power. The minor ally is entitled to a status far superior to that of a colony, but the alliance leader bears a responsibility to and for the ally that is less sharply distinguishable from that borne by the colonial power with respect to its dependencies.

In recent times the idea has taken root that great powers as representatives of the affluent and fortunate minority of states have a particular responsibility for ministering to the needs of the poor and miserable majority. This obligation is emphasized in the case of poor states that have accepted special ties with a great power, but it is not confined to such states. More and more, great powers are thought to have an obligation both to provide short-term assistance and to promote long-term economic development of the poorer states as a class, the proletariat of the global system. Generous and constructive contribution to the survival and improvement of the Less Developed Countries (LDCs) is considered a humanitarian gesture that great powers can make without detriment to their own welfare and an investment in the creation of a world order that is essential to their own interests. Withholding of such a contribution is increasingly regarded as ill-advised and improper conduct for a great power.

More broadly, we take it as axiomatic that great powers are fundamentally responsible for the international system as a whole. Because their conduct so determines the state of the world, we impute to them the duty of looking after global well-being; responsibility in the sense of causation implies responsibility in the sense of obligation. As I suggested above, obligation to the system of states is an inseparable element of obligation to selected categories of states. Serving allies and assisting underprivileged states are ways of contributing to the stability and welfare of the global system. Great powers also have responsibilities to each other, especially to their most conspicuous rivals and antagonists, that form a crucial part of their global burden. The United States and Soviet Union, for instance, owe it to each other to provide information about capabilities and clarification of intentions so as to facilitate the operation of a scheme of deterrence. Each serves its own interest and that of the world at large when it helps its antagonist to avoid misjudgments that might lead to disastrous conflict. To negotiate with each other in good faith, to keep the lines of communication open in tense situations, to re-

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frain from backing each other into corners, to avoid reckless driving in heavy diplomatic traffic—these are the grave obligations of the superpowers to each other and no less to humanity at large.

Singly and jointly, the great powers are responsible for managing the international system. Like it or not, they constitute its board of directors, as has been clear at least since the 1815 Congress of Vienna. They bear the burden of restraining the unruly—a category that may include themselves or each other but is not limited to their own ranks. It is their task to protect the weak and to feed the poor. The prospects of political freedom, human rights, and social justice—indeed, the future of human civilization—depend largely upon what they do and refrain from doing. The nature and composition of the international system, the rules of its operation, and the way it is organized are determined in considerable measure by their policies. Credit or blame for the state of the world devolves largely upon the great powers.

America's Burden

The United States has functioned as a self-conscious player of the role of great power for little more than a generation. On the whole, it seems fair to say of Americans that, although they may welcome the status, they do not enjoy the role. Americans have often been accused—and have accused themselves—of being excessively avid crusaders, exulting in the work of reshaping the world to American specifications. On balance, however, it seems to me that the experience of bearing a superpower's share of the world's burdens has produced more weariness and disillusion in the United States than exuberance and ambition.

The American distaste for great-power responsibilities is attributable in part to their sheer weight—the difficulty, the cost, and the risk of bearing them. Such tasks as controlling recalcitrant states, defending feeble ones, stabilizing chaotic societies, and democratizing tyrannical regimes often seem beyond the capacity of even the most powerful member of the global system. Why should America not concentrate on solving its own problems? When Hans Morgenthau advocated that America focus exclusively upon its own security, he warned that diversion to systemic goals might jeopardize American security and social values and produce the very results that we sought to avoid in the external sphere.[16]

Fear of over-extension—of trying to do too much, of becoming entangled in a spreading web of commitments, of frittering away resources that ought to be devoted to unambiguous pursuit of the national interest—derives from America's experience in the great-power role. Involvement in Vietnam was the climactic event; the United States entered that conflict talking about American responsibilities, but left it invoking the concept of American national interest. In Vietnam, Americans became convinced that proclaimed responsibilities collided with clear

[16] Morgenthau, *In Defense of the National Interest*, 88–89.

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interests, and they welcomed the assurance that the United States was required by its interests to curtail the costly engagement that its responsibilities had been deemed to demand. Americans discovered that they much preferred negative to positive obligations. This perhaps accounts for a revival of legalism in discussions of international relations, for international law is best known as a litany of "thou shalt nots." Virtuous inaction is far less demanding than responsible action, and a great power is less likely to feel strained by honoring an obligation to abstain from intervention than by meeting a responsibility of a more active sort. Once the costliness of the American engagement in Vietnam became apparent, the defense of South Vietnam, which had been proclaimed a responsibility that coincided with a fundamental national interest, became first a responsibility that conflicted with American interest, then an "alleged" responsibility, and, finally, a violation of the responsibility to refrain from interference in Vietnam. The so-called Vietnam syndrome is in part a vote of protest against the burdens of great-power responsibility.

Under the best of circumstances the control of the multistate system by the great powers is a difficult task. Some would argue that such a system is inherently and incorrigibly unmanageable; sovereign states need and want order, but they both exhibit the disposition and claim the freedom to indulge in disorderly behavior. Even some states that fall well below the great-power bracket are virtually impossible to control. The capacity of the great powers to destroy them does not necessarily entail the capacity to control them, for fate-control and behavior-control are quite different matters.[17] There are also states whose protection and sustenance present insuperable problems; the phenomenon of "unhelpability" limits what great power patrons of lesser states can accomplish. The efforts of great powers to assist other states may, indeed, prove not merely ineffective but even counterproductive, doing damage where good is intended. Moreover, the exercise of the responsibilities of the great powers in regard to the management of the global system is complicated by the fact that those leaders of the system are less likely to work at the task cooperatively or even harmoniously, than they are to work separately, and even competitively. The preoccupation of the great powers with controlling each other all too often eliminates any possibility of their collaborating in the execution of a collective responsibility to maintain an ordered international system. Thus, in the current situation the United States is inclined to regard the Soviet Union as a contributor more to the problem than to the solution—as an obstacle to world order rather than a partner in its promotion. Americans have felt lonely in undertaking what often seems an impossible task.

The burdensome quality of international duties is increased for Americans by the sense that they require exertion and even sacrifice on behalf of peoples—or at least of regimes—who frequently seem undeserving of such aid. The attractiveness of national interest as a guide to policy lies in the fact that one's nation, the

[17] See J. W. Thibaut and H. H. Kelley, *The Social Psychology of Groups* (New York: John Wiley, 1959), 102-104.

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people with which one presumably identifies oneself, is its beneficiary. The notion of bearing international responsibility, which can be translated as serving mankind, has a ring of nobility that may provide higher moral gratification than the pursuit of national interest. Unfortunately, however, when the abstraction of international responsibility is reduced to concrete terms, it means acting on behalf of clients whose virtues are not always impressive. The glory of serving one's country and the grandeur of serving humanity are considerably more satisfying than the ignominy of giving aid and comfort to an oppressive dictatorship of the right or the left, or a cabal of corrupt politicians, or an incompetent bureaucracy, or a majority that is indifferent to the rights and needs of minorities in its midst, or a population that has grown too lazy and complacent to look after its own security and welfare.

More often than not, Americans believe that the people of the states to which the United States gives assistance of one kind or another are more admirable than their governments. The rub lies in the fact that it is extremely difficult to help people without helping the government that rules over them, or to hurt a government without hurting its people. Can one feed starving Ethiopians without strengthening their Marxist rulers? Can one damage the racist regime in South Africa without increasing the privations of the blacks whom it oppresses? A regime need not be popular or democratic to have the fate of its people so tightly tied to its own fate that external actors will be unable to separate them for the purpose of conferring benefits or exerting pressure. In any case, it is sometimes the populations at large, rather than or as well as their ruling elites, who appear to be undeserving beneficiaries of the exertions of great powers.

American reservations about the worthiness of recipients of assistance, whether it takes the form of economic, diplomatic, or military measures, have frequently centered upon questions of ideology and the moral legitimacy of governments. One of the most familiar criticisms of United States foreign policy during the past generation, from without and within the country, has been the charge that the United States inveterately supports unsavory dictatorial regimes of the purportedly anti-Communist variety, thereby managing—deliberately or not—to inhibit the rise of governments more responsive to the popular will. In this view many of the governments to which the United States has given aid have not only been undeserving of support but have deserved opposition. Critics of American involvement in Vietnam stressed the iniquities of the Saigon regime as evidence that the cause could not justify the sacrifice of American blood and treasure; Americans have been urged to feel positively guilty about their country's aiding and abetting a long procession of undemocratic rulers in the postwar era.

Under what circumstances does the responsibility of the United States as a great power require it to lend support to an undemocratic government, even one that tramples heavily on human rights? Under what circumstances should a great power withhold support or promote the overthrow of such a regime? Does the obligation of a great power to protect its allies extend to allies that prove uncooperative and refuse to make reasonable exertions even for their own security? These are diffi-

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cult questions, and Americans have certainly reached no firm consensus on the answers. Americans have learned to expect, but not to accept with equanimity, the discomfort that accompanies the exercise of the external great-power responsibilities that are to the advantage of governments or peoples whose just deserts are open to question.

Some Americans appear to have expected that the bearing of the burdens of great-power status would bring the reward of gratitude; the United States might at least be praised as a good and faithful servant of a system that demands of its leading members that they not confine themselves to selfish pursuits. But great powers rarely receive credit for effort or even for successful performance. At best their dutiful behavior is likely to be taken for granted. If they ask for approbation or indulge in self-praise, they are convicted of self-righteousness. Failure to act may expose them to the charge of neglect of duty. When Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak called on the United States in early 1985 to lend its support to his government's negotiations with Israél, he said, "The United States is a superpower. The United States cannot continue to sit with its hands folded."[18] Great powers are likely to be damned if they do and if they do not. If they act assertively, they are accused of arrogating to themselves a position for which they have no warrant. If they shrink from leadership, they prove themselves unworthy of great-power status. They must expect to encounter the cynical view that their strength inevitably corrupts their international behavior. Robert Purnell was being gentle when he suggested that "it is an occupational hazard of great powers to behave dictatorially and of small powers to behave irresponsibly."[19] Academic specialists in international relations have a well-established tendency to assert, without recognizing the need for evidence, that great powers – all of them, always, equally – try to dominate the world. If the United States is not only a great power but a superpower, it follows by assumption that it has undertaken to transform the world in its own image and to fasten its hegemony upon other states. Given dogma of this sort, the expectation of gratitude for what Americans may regard as faithful performance of onerous duty is utterly unrealistic.

No great power can expect to be exempted from the standard accusation of abusing its power, exploiting its position, and masking its self-interested behavior as the fulfillment of responsibilities. Some of its critics will be sincere and others will not; but all of the criticism will be irksome to those who, like many Americans, are less inclined to revel in the glory and privilege of hegemony than to worry about the dangers and costs of doing what great powers are expected to do in the world. Enthusiasm for the role of great power is difficult to sustain when what one conceives as accepting responsibility is construed as grasping for control, when willingness to carry burdens is interpreted as the urge to acquire booty, when economic assistance is castigated as neoimperialism, and when providing protection

[18] Christopher Dickey, "Mubarak Urges U.S. to Back New Mideast Peace Efforts," *Washington Post*, 28 February 1985.

[19] S. Robert Purnell, *The Society of States* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1973), 293.

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is put down as seeking domination. The sacrifices demanded of Americans as citizens of a major power have produced not only weariness and a sense of being unassisted and unappreciated but, worse, a sense of being maligned.

The indignity of being subjected to what they consider unfair and even malicious criticism is not, however, the worst that can befall citizens of a great power. The ultimate difficulty in great-power status for Americans is the unavoidable sense of guilt—the self-accusation, the uncertainty as to whether they can trust themselves to use power responsibly, the lack of clarity as to the merits of America's record of performance. Did the United States provide indispensable leadership to the United Nations in its early years, or did it dominate and exploit the organization in shameless fashion? In the Korean War, did the United States act to uphold the principles of the United Nations and to prevent that fledgling organization from going the way of the League of Nations, or did it use and abuse the organization to uphold American interests? Was the Marshall Plan a contribution to the survival of the free world or a move to fasten American hegemony upon western Europe? Has the United States promoted decolonization or, behind a rhetorical facade, acted imperialistically? American mistrust of American pretensions has proceeded so far that the suggestion that the United States entered the Vietnam conflict with honorable intentions is now considered an embarrassing gaffe.

While Americans may or may not be more self-righteous than other people, they undoubtedly place a high value on having—not merely on being thought to have—clean hands and a pure heart; the discomfort of a guilty conscience, or even of nagging uncertainty about one's virtue, is not an easy thing to bear. American abstention from an active role in the central arena of international politics before the twentieth century was motivated in part by the dread of dirty hands. Functioning as a great power is incompatible with such moral fastidiousness. Americans have discovered that isolationism was correct in its warning that playing the game of power politics unavoidably entails becoming sullied, and it is no accident that those who have most loudly deplored the loss of American innocence have tended toward neoisolationism. If the United States is tempted on occasion to neglect its responsibilities, that may be explained in part by its inability to trust itself to refrain from abusing them; nonfeasance is the surest antidote to malfeasance. The morality of responsibility—of choosing the lesser evil, of causing as little damage as possible and hoping that good may ultimately result, of doing what one thinks has to be done—is the great power's necessary substitute for the isolated state's morality of purity. Americans have not found it notably satisfying.

Leaving aside the issue of the merits of America's performance, it is clear that having states, great and small, dedicated to the fulfillment of their international responsibilities is not a formula guaranteed to produce a more orderly world. A state that is resolutely undertaking to do what it believes to be its duty may be more disruptive of international harmony than one frankly devoted to securing its own advantage. If the United States erred in involving itself in Vietnam, the error derived from a mistaken sense of international obligation rather than from

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an excess of self-interested zeal. Just wars all too readily become holy wars, and conscientiousness degenerates into pigheadedness. The emphasis of international law on the negative duty of nonintervention perhaps reflects the fear not only that great powers may deliberately abuse the claim of responsibility to interfere in the affairs of other states, but also that their blundering efforts to set things right may make things worse. Similarly, the international organization movement of the twentieth century, in espousing the concept of multilateral responsibility, has expressed caution about the possible consequences of leaving great powers to act in what they unilaterally consider to be the execution of their global responsibilities. If Hans Morgenthau avoided emphasizing the responsibilities of states, this may well have been an expression of the Realist conviction that states in pursuit of their national interests are likely to act with greater moderation and circumspection than states intent upon meeting their responsibilities.

In the final analysis, it is not clear that the United States really has the option of renouncing its status as a great power, or that it would in fact exercise that option if it were available. The fantasy of retreating to the sidelines from which Americans could resume their old habit of judging the iniquities of states engaged in the political arena has its attractions, but in truth most Americans recognize it as an exercise in nostalgia. It is not the destiny of the United States to be a Belgium or a Paraguay. Having attained the stature of a great power, the United States has unavoidably acquired the responsibilities that accompany that status. The common defense and welfare of the United States and the world depend in large measure upon the way in which it understands its external obligations and seeks to honor them. In undertaking to meet its responsibilities, the United States, like other great powers in all eras, is likely to receive more criticism and less credit than it deserves. Americans must not look for their reward in praise or sympathy or appreciation but in the creation of a world more conductive to their safe and happy existence than it might otherwise be. And they must remember that a state's devotion to doing its duty neither exempts it from suspicion nor emancipates it from the danger of destroying what it seeks to preserve and promote.

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Dilemmas of Common Deterrence

GEORGE H. QUESTER

Discussions of nuclear strategy typically include extensive discussions of the credibility or incredibility of extended deterrence, the process by which the United States somehow deters attacks on itself and also on its most valued allies by the prospect of an escalation to nuclear retaliatory attacks on the Soviet Union. It is in such debates about the credibility and the appropriateness of extensions of the nuclear umbrella that we find the most interesting and controversial portions of all the arguments about nuclear strategy.[1] Has the common defense become "common deterrence"? And with whom is such deterrence being maintained in common?

It is remarkable how deterrence is almost automatically assumed to be credible for the deterrence of attacks on the United States itself. The logic by which the rationality and the believability of massive retaliation is to be questioned on behalf of South Korea or of West Germany might, after all, be applied just as directly to responses to a Soviet conventional or nuclear attack on the home territory of the United States. If Soviet conventional ground and naval forces were invading Alaska or Arizona, or Soviet nuclear forces had destroyed some, but not all, of the targets inside the United States, would it really make sense for the United States to respond with a full-fledged version of a thermonuclear World War III? Indeed, if all the targets the U.S. values were destroyed and all Americans were killed, what would be the point of "getting even" by inflicting any parallel destruction on the Soviet Union?

Some questions have been posed so often that we sometimes feel that we are seeing

[1] For some classic examples, see Pierre Gallois, *The Balance of Terror* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1961); and Henry Kissinger, *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy* (New York: Harper, 1957).

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the "nth remake of *Beau Geste*," as doubts are outlined and then rebutted, and then outlined again, about whether a U.S. government or people would ever run great risks for western Europe.[2] But questions about whether the United States is such a credible unit for a common deterrence, the natural follow-on to a "common defense," hardly ever get posed. And one senses that such questions are being posed even less in the fourth decade of the nuclear age than in the first decade after Hiroshima. What are we to make of all of this?

In this article we will probe the degree of identification Americans feel with each other, in light of major changes in military risks and military doctrines, as compared with the earlier periods of union or disunion America has experienced. We will draw comparisons with the degrees of identification Americans feel with their allies abroad, perhaps most importantly with their allies in western Europe.

Trends in the Political Environment

Before we turn to some concrete issues and examples, what are some major trends that affect the American citizenry's sense of "commonness" in the "common defense"? The following might be proposed as the relevant series of secular trends to which we have all had to respond.

First, so obvious and so central that it risks becoming trite, the United States has become physically vulnerable to nuclear attack. There is nothing that any American can do to prevent one or more foreign powers from devastating all American cities by missile or bomber raids. The contents of a single Soviet submarine, or for that matter a single French or British submarine, could inflict damage on North America that could not have been dreamed of before 1945.

Second, working in the opposite direction, the United States is probably now more secure against conventional attack than it has typically felt in the past—so secure that the question rarely arises in analysis or even in popular fiction (the movie *Red Dawn* being an interesting exception). Some might fondly recall the days when two wide oceans protected the United States, but the decades of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries were never so fully free of worries about possible European invasions repeating the British attack on Washington and Baltimore of 1814. There were German and Japanese agents in Mexico before World War I, Lufthansa-affiliated airlines in Colombia before World War II, and threats to the Monroe Doctrine in general. The Reagan administration may still get some mileage out of noting that El Salvador is closer to Texas than Texas is to Washington, and it is often noted that Cuba is only ninety miles from Key West; but the years since the defeat of the Japanese have seen very few Americans worry about invasions of their homeland.

[2] Recent examples would include Paul C. Warnke, "The Illusion of NATO's Nuclear Defense" in Andrew J. Pierre, ed., *Nuclear Weapons in Europe* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1984), 75–97; Samuel P. Huntington, "The Renewal of Strategy" in Samuel P. Huntington, ed., *The Strategic Imperative* (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1982), 1–52.

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As a third element of the picture, Americans in the 1960s and 1970s have had many more encounters with terrorism than in the past. The incidents of German-sponsored sabotage from 1914 to 1917 outraged Americans,[3] as did earlier and later bombings associated with various radical movements. But the general perception is correct that the vulnerabilities of air transportation and of other ingredients of modern life have opened up a wave of new opportunities for terrorists to strike.[4]

Fourth, related importantly to our national vulnerability to terrorism, the changes in the form and power of the news media have probably enhanced the identification Americans feel with each other, if only because NBC or CBS will race in to interview the spouse or parent of any American who is held hostage anywhere in the world.[5] If an American government, or Americans in general, were ever able to be callous about the suffering of someone so threatened abroad (a capability which indeed would be quite useful for discouraging and frustrating terrorists), this capability has been lost. If we identify with other individual Americans, the same news media have probably knitted together the regions of America. Anthropologists and others may deplore the standardization that is afflicting America, as local speech patterns and customs are washed together, as the tangible differences between the North and South, or East and West, are washed away by the styles and tones of television and radio. There was once a time when Americans were not certain whether they would wish to defend Hawaii. There were times in history when New England would be indifferent to fighting the wars welcomed in South Carolina, and vice versa. Rather than thirty-five states identifying more loosely with each other, or even forty-eight states identifying loosely, we now have fifty states identifying with each other so much that a foreign observer can find the lack of differences among them altogether boring.

Fifth, as another trend in an opposite direction, if regional divisions within the United States have faded, it is at least possible that class differences have instead been exacerbated. Whether American politics has become more polarized than in earlier decades, with the political parties being less "Tweedledum, Tweedledee," is a question only partially related to foreign policy. At the end of the Vietnam war, many of those opposing the war had convinced themselves that capitalism was somehow to blame for the violence being inflicted in Southeast Asia, with Ho Chi Minh presumably being more worthy of anyone's support than President Ngo Dinh Diem.[6]

As a sixth related, but importantly different, secular trend, Americans may be

[3] On the World War I experience, see Walter Millis, *The Road to War: America 1914–1917* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1935).

[4] For a discussion of the recent surge of terrorist activities impinging on the United States, see Brian Jenkins, *Terrorism In the United States* (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, 1980).

[5] The crucial role of the media is analyzed in Yonah Alexander, "Terrorism, the Media, and the Police," *Journal of International Affairs* 32 (Spring-Summer 1978): 101–115.

[6] The significance of the Vietnam experience is discussed in Leslie H. Gelb, "The Essential Domino: American Politics and Vietnam," *Foreign Affairs* 50 (April 1972): 459–475.

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more or less willing to identify with "fifty-first states" abroad, particularly in western Europe, but perhaps around the world. The factors that would enhance or diminish identifications here may work in opposite directions for some decades, thereby rendering any predictions somewhat more tentative.[7] Enhancing the identification is the closeness of our societies achieved through media contact and also through jet air transportation. Most Americans now get to visit Europe, and many are slightly disappointed at how much Europe has become Americanized, as American music and American blue jeans command so much respect among young Germans or Frenchmen. The identification is reinforced as our television evening news rarely gets through thirty minutes without some on-the-spot reportage from Paris or London or Rome.

Also strengthening the ties is the simple shared experiences of keeping the NATO countries from being invaded since 1945 and the experience of the Berlin blockade and various subsequent Berlin crises. Americans will tend to feel close to whatever they have already invested energies in protecting. An important part of their identification with South Korea stems simply from the fact that American blood was shed in repulsing an invasion of that country in 1950; it would seem a shame to let it fall to communism in later decades, thereby negating support already given.

But countering the trends of identification with the European NATO countries is the drop in migration from Europe to the United States since World War II. While many Americans in earlier decades were "hyphenated Americans," identifying with Germany or Poland or Greece or Ireland, there are no waves of migration to renew this closeness of contact. At least a few Americans are now analytically asking why the United States should continue to be ready to risk conventional or nuclear war for Europe, contending that this is a departure from the U. S. national interest. Why should not the rich Europeans be left to provide for their own protection? While such questions may be quite premature, phrasing national interest in a way that suggests no identifications abroad, no "fifty-first states," the mere emergence of such thought is often regarded as a warning that the NATO links cannot remain as strong as they have been in the past.

If we have fewer European immigrants, however, we have far more immigrants from other corners of the world.[8] Is it possible that in a decade or two the United States will feel as close to Korea, for its own sake, as it has felt to Britain or Germany? Korea is prospering, but is hardly yet democratically governed; so such an identification linkage may seem far-fetched. Yet one could argue that Americans already have a very extensive identification with democratically-governed Japan, something that almost no one would have predicted in the summer of 1945. Who also would have predicted before the Berlin blockade and the U.S. airlift in re-

[7] For a longer argument about the factors working in either direction, see George H. Quester, "The Future of the American NATO Commitment" in William A. Buckingham, ed., *Defense Planning For the 1990s* (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1984), 109–138.

[8] The changing demographic and ethnic makeup of the United States is discussed in Robert L. Bach, "Immigration: Issues of Ethnicity, Class and Public Policy in the United States," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 485 (May 1986): 139–152.

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sponse that Americans would so soon stop thinking of the West Germans as Nazis, and instead see them as people for whom the U.S. might risk nuclear war?

These are surely some of the background factors that affect and shape the national transition from "common defense" to "common deterrence." We will now proceed to look for evidence of a greater or lesser common spirit in U.S. military policy, examining a variety of concrete issues that have emerged in the decades since 1945.

The Collocation Issues

Some of the most important weapons in the U.S. national arsenal, the strategic bombers and intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) now have to be based in the home territory of the United States itself. This inevitably raises strategic issues, political and philosophical issues, because of the proximity of such bases to the homes in which ordinary American civilians live. Strategists have thus developed some interesting arguments in both directions about the location of ICBM silos (force targets) vis-à-vis the cities of the United States (value targets). If the two were kept widely separated—that is, not collocated—a future war in which each side was only striving to disarm the other might not have to impose casualties on millions of innocent civilians. But if the ICBM's would be located far from cities, it might be more tempting for a Soviet leader to attempt a disarming first strike, the nightmare of the Committee on the Present Danger and its "window of vulnerability." The Soviets would welcome the separation of counterforce and countervalue targets, so the logic goes, because they could thus continue to deter an American president from retaliating against Soviet cities. If much damage had not yet been inflicted on the American people, damage could always be inflicted in the future.[9] This would almost suggest that one should have sought to deploy U.S. missiles *within* cities in order to deny the Soviets any hopes of disarming us without totally angering us. The more casualties that have to be inflicted during any Soviet partial counterforce attack, the more dangerous it would be for Moscow to experiment with such an attack.

As an early indication of a surprising unity of the American people in face of the threat of nuclear war, no serious debate on the collocation issue emerged in the 1960s when the ICBMs were deployed.

The actual locations of missile silos, bomber bases, and the support facilities for submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) submarines have been dictated more by the internal needs of the air force and navy (where are there usable and cost-effective support facilities and housing for the people involved?). Locations are also dictated by the pork-barrel spending inclinations that have always divided Americans, but which hardly amount to a division in face of external menace, merely a scrambling for employment and local prosperity. The result, in the case

[9] The Committee on the Present Danger scenario is in effect outlined in Richard Pipes, "Why the Soviet Union Thinks It Could Fight and Win a Nuclear War," *Commentary* 64 (July 1977): 21–24.

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of the locations of ICBM silos, amounted implicitly to an unwitting splitting of the difference between collocation and noncollocation. Many cities of the United States could escape any Soviet counterforce attack, but the cities to the east of the missile sites in western Missouri would suffer heavy casualties, simply because of the radioactive fallout which would be produced in a Soviet attack.[10]

The actual outcome thus raises the casualties for the "window of vulnerability" scenario from anything in the hundreds of thousands to something more in the tens of millions. Ironically, this makes the entire Soviet threat less worrisome, simply because it is that much more preposterous that an American president would fail to respond with anger against Soviet cities after this order of magnitude of American casualties had been reached.

If the U.S. had it to do over again, would it have arranged the collocation outcome just as it came out, avoiding any total exposure of Americans to the brunt of any Soviet counterforce attack, but arranging just enough exposure to make the Soviet attack more likely to draw a U.S. countervalue retaliation? This is not the occasion to debate the strategic importance of the outcome, but rather what it says about political sense of unity in the face of strategic prospects that the United States never had to contemplate before 1945. Does one sense any greater hostility to U.S. foreign policy commitments, or any greater timidity in face of Soviet bluster, in the more exposed cities such as St. Louis, than in such less exposed cities as El Paso? Basically, we are all in this thing together.

Population Defense

When the first proposals for an ABM (anti-ballistic missile) defense were put forward in the 1960s, many Americans feared that it would lead to a divisive and unseemly squabble about who was to be given and who was not to be given such protection. If the system was to be configured to protect forty cities, what would one hear from the mayor of the forty-first city on the list and from the members of Congress representing this first city to be denied such protection? Would there not be an invidious scrambling for ABM coverage?

The actual result was very different from anything along these lines. When the Johnson administration toward the end of the 1960s proposed placing such ABM systems anywhere in the United States, for example around Boston, the opposition came from the cities slated to be protected. The opposition was based on a variety of grounds, including arguments that such ABM systems were likely to malfunction and destroy the city they were deployed to protect and that ABM would amount to a dangerous stoking up of the arms race. Coming at a time of widespread opposition to the Vietnam war, the attacks on ABM also amounted to a surrogate for more general opposition to anything military; if the Pentagon were proposing it, the anti-Vietnam activists of the Boston area would oppose it.[11]

[10] On the location of U.S. strategic nuclear forces around the United States, see William M. Arkin and Richard W. Fieldhouse, *Nuclear Battlefields* (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1985), chap. 3.

[11] The actual response of some of the greater Boston community to the Johnson Administration's

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Totally missing were recriminations from other cities that Boston had unfairly been jumped to the head of the list. The sheer magnitude of what a nuclear war would be like had again imposed a certain communality by which particularist arguments about relative regional favoritism tended to be wiped out. Even if one came to the conclusion that ABM somehow made sense, and would reduce the damage of a thermonuclear war, a more general feeling now seemed in place that the remaining destruction would be a national calamity, rather than a calamity for only some.

As the debate about protecting civilian targets in a nuclear war has shifted from ABM to SDI (Strategic Defense Initiative) and the more esoteric technologies it proposes to employ, the style of support or opposition to President Ronald Reagan's enthusiasm for such weapons has again hardly been particularist or regional. One does not see mayors or newspaper editors or members of Congress carefully calculating whether their particular neighborhoods are targeted by Soviet missiles for any war scenarios, or whether SDI would be good for their districts or would only serve some remote districts at the expense of local taxpayers who would not get anything for their money.

It is ironic, but also totally consistent with the pattern we are describing here, that one of the strongest supporters of President Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative has been Republican Senator Ted Stevens from Alaska. *If* SDI could shield a city like St. Louis, it might still be far less able to shield Anchorage or Fairbanks, because the Soviet launching pads and bases of a nuclear strike would be so much closer to Alaska. The enormity of the expense and the projected scope of the SDI systems somehow suggests that the country will go up or down together on the decision. Before this, the enormity of the destructive power of Soviet nuclear weapons had suggested the same.

SDI is sometimes rationalized as protecting cities against Soviet missiles, with skeptics questioning whether any antimissile defense can ever be effective enough to offer American population centers a meaningful relief from destruction.[12] Other arguments for SDI stress instead how it may protect American missile silos against any attempt by Moscow to apply the accuracy of Soviet ICBMs to a counterforce first strike.[13] This would, of course, convert SDI into nothing more than a reinforcement for mutual deterrence or mutual assured destruction (MAD), with the major question then being whether such an enhancement of the survivability of U.S. second-strike retaliatory forces could not be achieved more cheaply and easily by other means. In this latter argument, Americans are all the more likely to buy or reject SDI on national grounds; we all sink or swim together on the basic ques-

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ABM proposals is discussed in Anne Hessing Cahn, *Eggheads and Warheads: Scientists and the ABM* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Center for International Studies 1971).

[12] For President Reagan's original statement of what SDI is intended to accomplish, see his television address of 23 March 1983, text in *New York Times*, 24 March 1983.

[13] The somewhat contradictory explanations of the goals of SDI advanced by other administration spokesmen are discussed in Peter A. Clausen, "SDI in Search of a Mission," *World Policy Journal* 2 (Spring 1985): 249-269.

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tion of whether Moscow will continue to feel deterred by the retaliatory capability of U.S. ICBMs, bombers, and SLBMs.

One might adduce the *common* nature of American reactions about nuclear weapons decisions as evidence that most Americans are more resigned and accustomed to mutual deterrence, to "mutual assured destruction," than public opinion polls and other kinds of opinion indicators sometimes show. Because nuclear war is indeed "unwinnable," because the entire exercise has now become one of keeping the adversary convinced of this, the American public has developed an overwhelming sense of being in this all together. What is good for New York is also good for Nebraska. This is enhanced by the fact that bombs falling on Nebraska could actually impose radioactive fallout on New York; even more, missiles and bombers commanded from Nebraska are essential to deterring Soviet nuclear warheads from hitting either Nebraska or New York.

It is trite to report that Americans have done very much less about civil defense preparations for surviving an enemy attack than the responsible U.S. government officials in organizations like FEMA (Federal Emergency Management Agency) would like. It is often contended that Soviet civil defense preparations are far superior to those of the United States, perhaps thereby imposing a disadvantage on Washington in the event of a future crisis.[14] Skeptics can point to the failure of the Soviet leadership to stage any rehearsals of evacuation and civil defense plans. If there is good reason to wonder whether Soviet civil defense would work very well (in light of the on-time record of Aeroflot, for example), we might take the civil defense preparations of Sweden and Switzerland as a model of what American planners would like to attain; these nonaligned European democracies have undertaken much more in the way of preparations for surviving a future nuclear war than any part of the United States.

What then does the U.S. failure to prepare seriously for civil defense suggest about the common defense and about how much community there is in our country as we must think about the possibilities of nuclear war? It must, first of all, again be noted that the short bursts of enthusiasm for civil defense in the United States, followed by long hiatuses of inaction in the fulfillment of plans, have hardly been an issue of regional or intercommunity dispute. One has not seen "threatened" portions of the country demanding civil defense spending, while "less threatened" portions have opposed this as some kind of income transfer. Rather there has been a more pervasive American common sense that civil defense preparations may not help enough in the event of a nuclear war to be worth the cost, with this being a national calculation across the board, matched by a governmental and private inactivity. Very few Americans have installed fallout shelters, even when their government was recommending that they do so. The number of shelters may have been greater per capita in staunchly anti-Communist Orange County, California, than in "left-leaning" New York City; but other factors besides regional political orientation would explain these differences, and the owners of shelters have been

[14] An evaluation of Soviet civil defense preparations being quite advanced is offered in Leon Goure, *Civil Defense In the Soviet Union* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1962).

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a distinct minority even in Orange County and to some extent the butt of their neighbors' ridicule.

Yet we cannot leave the assessment simply at noting such ridicule. There is indeed a case to be made in favor of fallout shelters and evacuation schemes, since such preparations could definitely reduce the number of Americans killed in a future nuclear war. What then has kept the United States from acting? At least one of the arguments against shelters and other U.S. civil defense preparations says a great deal about how Americans feel about the unity of their communities and their country. A first argument against such preparations has already been noted: the number of lives saved in face of Soviet thermonuclear warheads cannot be very great; the destruction inflicted will be so enormous in any event that the survivors may envy the dead; any money spent on civil defense could be better spent on other uses.

A second argument would probably be recognizable only to those Americans well-versed in the logic of mutual deterrence and strategic stability, namely that civil defense is potentially destabilizing and frightening to an adversary, since American preparations to shield people against Soviet missiles might look like the preparations for American first-strike attack.

A third argument against the individual purchase of fallout shelters or even preparations for civil defense by entire villages does not relate at all to strategic stability, however, and does not presume that such preparations would be so ineffective if a nuclear war occurred. Rather the concern here is with the unevenness with which such preparations would be undertaken in the individualistic and decentralized United States. A fallout shelter might protect me and my family if I had installed such a shelter and if nuclear war had produced a pattern of radioactive fallout. But what if my neighbors had failed to install similar shelters for themselves? If the preparations are undertaken so unevenly, will not those who are prepared have to purchase arms to protect their shelter space and food stocks from less farsighted neighbors? It is this fear of neighbor pitted against neighbor, more than the fear of being ridiculed by one's neighbors, that has done so much to make these ventures look unattractive.

In Sweden and Switzerland the decisions to provide fallout protection are taken by the government, and such protection is in effect forced upon each individual whether he wants this investment to be made or not. This assures those who welcome such protection that they will not have to purchase rifles to hold away those who saw the need for such provisions only too late.

The ridicule directed against those few who followed the advice of President John Kennedy or Governor Nelson Rockefeller and purchased fallout shelters has often fastened on the antisocial preparations—not so much on the water and the food that were being stockpiled, but on the weapons that would be needed to preserve this food and water from neighbors, for whom one has a very strong feeling of trust and cooperation in normal times.[15]

[15] For a good example of the analyses ridiculing any enthusiasm for civil defense, see Robert Scheer, *With Enough Shovels* (New York: Random House, 1983).

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The experience of U.S. responses to natural disasters, or even of British or German responses to conventional air raids in World War II, has sometimes been cited as an encouraging model and source of hope for what the United States government could provide the victims of a nuclear war.[16] Yet it is a very misleading source of hope. The worst of natural disasters and the worst of the air raids of World War II struck only a limited area; it would have been impossible for the British and American air forces to induce firestorms in more than one or two separate German or Japanese cities in a single night. It was thus always possible for the rest of these countries to steer resources to a particular needy area. But what if as many as one hundred cities are destroyed in a single night? Even the dictatorial police authorities of Nazi Germany would have had difficulty in marshaling relief supplies for Hamburg or Dresden if the same fate had befallen many other cities in the same time period; and the central authority of the United States government will happily never come close to that of the Third Reich.

Yet there may be less paradox than meets the eye in the way we share our advance perceptions of nuclear war and would cease to share perceptions very much thereafter. A part of the horror Americans anticipate in a nuclear exchange is precisely in the divisions and rivalries that would result, the competition for shelters, food, and access to highways getting away from cities. Virtually every analysis of what life will be like in the United States *after* a nuclear war suggests tremendous fragmentation, as money becomes worthless, the promises of central authority become similarly worthless, food and medical supplies become scarce, and local leaders put their communities ahead of the country as a whole.

One discovers an almost dialectical relationship here: disunity is not the way of things before any such a war happens; but it is what we must look forward to after such a contingency. The mere exercises of speculating about such division and anarchy may be an important factor in making Americans less inclined to "war-fighting" and "war-surviving" analyses. The United States looks ahead to nuclear war in normal periods of peacetime or even during a period of crisis surprisingly united. It would look back on any burst of nuclear warfare extremely divided.

War Fighting and War Termination

Right-wing critics of the normal U.S. strategy of nuclear deterrence or mutual assured destruction have often commented on the lack of planning and theorizing about a failure of deterrence, about war fighting and war termination. The peace movement, they charge, is very eager to tell us how much they hate war, but what if a war had already begun? If one hates the prospect of nuclear war in peacetime, would one not also have to hate the prospect of an unnecessary prolongation of such a war once it had somehow been initiated? The difference between war and

[16] For a widely-read example, see Herman Kahn, *On Thermonuclear War* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1960).

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peace on "day three" may not be as stark as the difference on "day one," but the difference may still be very real in human terms.[17] Opponents of planning for war termination can respond by questioning the motives and sincerity of those who raise these issues, noting that "war termination" is often used to justify the same weapons procurements and strategic plans as are justified by a quest for "victory."

Many Americans would claim to be indifferent to victory if nuclear war began. The achievement of such a victory can be illusory, as we underestimate the likely damage and casualties that will be suffered and thus run risks that would not have made sense. More generally, the prospect of victory promises to be too partial. With so many dead on each side the prospect draws us together only in horror, rather than in any kind of celebration. Others will oppose any emphasis on victory, because the preparations for winning such a war—for example, extremely accurate ICBMs—might make such a war more likely in the first place by frightening an adversary who had been thrust into a position of "use them or lose them" with regard to his missiles or by tempting someone to try to use such missiles in a splendid first strike.

John Herz, in an early assessment of the impact of nuclear threats, argued that the penetrability of societies to nuclear destruction would erode separate national sovereignties, forcing a more international form of thinking onto all the publics that matter.[18] This would have been a prediction not so much that the commonness of defense would be undermined by what Americans know as deterrence, but rather that nations would transcend the competition of international anarchy if no defense force could protect their home cities and populations.

Herz's prediction hardly seems to have been borne out, as limited wars continue, large sums get spent on military weapons, and the number of separate states jealously guarding their sovereignties has grown to more than 150. Perhaps a portion of the Herz projection was more real, however, in the ins and outs of an awareness of the requirements of deterrence, sometimes captured in a substitution of the phrase "international security" in place of "national security" or in an acknowledgment that peace and stability may require that the other side have secure strategic retaliatory forces. Americans resign themselves to the penetrability of home areas, which Herz used as a starting point. Because an adversary can destroy American cities, Americans have to reassure that adversary of this ability, because Americans must fear what the adversary's fears would be if he were about to lose this ability. All of this is a complicated and paradoxical logic. Only at the edges is it a logic that draws the world together. But it may indeed be a logic that draws a country together, because a strategic instability or a deterrence failure could destroy an entire country all at once.

[17] An argument for greater planning for the fighting and negotiating that must be contemplated during a nuclear war can be found in Colin S. Gray, "Targeting Problems for Central War" in Desmond Ball and Jeffrey Richelson, eds., *Strategic Nuclear Targeting* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1986), 171–193.

[18] John H. Herz, *International Politics In the Atomic Age* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959).

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If preparations for winning a nuclear war might make war happen, so might similar preparations for terminating such a war after it had broken out. Yet this does not explain all of the barrier to war termination analysis here. We also again encounter a form of "all-of-us-together" psychology at work. A majority of Americans have probably concluded that nuclear war is a disaster for all concerned. It may be moral and rational to contemplate the image of two days of war followed by a negotiated peace; but it requires us to juxtapose those who get killed with those who get spared—all as the price of human folly, a most unpleasant exercise in triage.

Identification with "Fifty-first States"

Do Americans identity with the West Europeans to a degree comparable with how they identify with each other? This is the question that has been much more debated, with some pessimistic conclusions at the core of Pierre Gallois's arguments for a separate French nuclear force and at the core of broader doubts about extended nuclear deterrence extending back to Henry Kissinger's first writings on the subject in the mid-1950s. Yet it is important to remember how this question has been double-edged in the past. As the Kennedy administration assumed office in January 1961, it was disclosed that there was no "missile gap," because Soviet ICBMs had indeed not come off the assembly line "like sausages" as Nikita Khrushchev had bragged they would. There might now be a "missile gap in reverse," with U.S. intercontinental missiles far outnumbering the total of Soviet ICBMs.[19] Yet the same year saw the discovery that the Soviets had invested in quantity production of the SS-4 and SS-5, intermediate-range ballistic missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads to any city in western Europe.

Why did the Soviets choose to invest so heavily in nuclear threats against western Europe when they had fallen so far short in the production of missiles capable of threatening U.S. cities? Was it that all along they had intended to move forward to bases in Cuba, from which the SS-4 and SS-5 could hit targets in the United States?[20] The problem with this version of Soviet planning is that Fidel Castro did not even seize power in Cuba until January 1959. In retrospect it is perfectly plausible that Moscow also saw western Europe as a "fifty-first state," an area whose suffering in a Soviet retaliatory strike might be just as unpleasant and as deterring as nuclear destruction within the United States itself.

Yet this analysis cuts both ways. If the Soviets saw that the United States would be deterred by nuclear threats against Frankfurt, Brussels, and London, they would also face a strong probability that Americans would be totally angered if Soviet missiles had already struck London or if Soviet tank forces were overrunning

[19] The conversion of the "missile gap" into a "missile gap in reverse" is outlined in Desmond Ball, *Politics and Force Levels* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980).

[20] The possibilities of Soviet planning in the deployment of missiles to Cuba are outlined in Arnold L. Horelick and Myron Rush, *Strategic Power and Soviet Foreign Policy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965).

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Brussels or Frankfurt. If the fifty states are tied in with fifty-first states in terms of being deterred, they may be equally tied in terms of deterring the aggressions of Moscow.

The threat posed by Soviet SS-4 and SS-5 missiles to western European cities was thus of great importance, at least until Moscow at last acquired missiles that could reach the United States itself. The abortive deployment of such medium-range missiles to Cuba may have signaled that Moscow had its doubts about whether the NATO cities were really reliably part of a fifty-first state. Or this deployment may have been intended to extend Soviet nuclear deterrence to protect Cuba against any repetitions of the Bay of Pigs attack, making Cuba "the sixteenth SSR."

It is not so easy to see this kind of a role for the Soviet SS-20 missiles that now have attracted so much attention as the Soviets finally replace the aging SS-4 and SS-5.[21] Because all the cities of the United States can now be definitely destroyed, it is far less important for the USSR to be able to threaten a retaliatory strike against NATO partners. And it makes no sense at all for the USSR to destroy West European cities by nuclear attack under any other circumstances, because it is these cities that presumably would have been the prize of any Soviet aggression and because the prevailing winds of this world blow eastward from the NATO countries into the Warsaw Pact, rather than the other way around, dousing the cities now governed by Communist regimes with radioactive fallout produced by Soviet missiles.

One can thus make too much of national boundaries, as well as too little. Discussions of SDI (if such a system indeed could protect cities in North America) too often become very abstract on issues of "decoupling." West European analysts who should know better conjure up such decoupling visions of the United States shrugging off the future of the European NATO countries, so long as the United States itself is safe; or they paint an opposite decoupling picture of the United States merrily fighting a nuclear war confined to Europe, with Soviet and American cities escaping punishment while those of western and eastern Europe are incinerated.[22] American defenders of SDI conversely argue that the shield over U.S. cities would free the United States to escalate more readily and credibly to the use of nuclear weapons in defense of the NATO countries, thus renewing and enhancing the deterrent to Soviet aggressions.[23]

Any and all of these arguments understate how much Americans have to care about the physical safety of European cities. They also understate how much the Soviets have to care about the physical survival of these cities. If American cities were secure while those of western Europe were threatened, we would in most aspects

[21] On the real significance of the SS-20, see Raymond L. Garthoff, "The Soviet SS-20 Decision," *Survival* 35 (May/June 1983): 110–119.

[22] Some of such possible European arguments about the impact of SDI are cited in Jim Hoagland, "'Star Wars' Plan Worries Envoy: French Ambassador Says It Might Lessen Concern For Europe," *Washington Post*, 30 October 1984.

[23] Some parallel American arguments about SDI are noted in Colin S. Gray, "Deterrence, Arms Control, and the Defense Transition," *Orbis* 28 (Summer 1984): 227–240.

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be returning simply to the situation of 1960, which hardly saw the United States withdrawing from its commitments, but also never saw the United States callous and unworried about the execution of its commitments. It will continue to be almost as much a disaster for Americans if Mannheim is destroyed by a Soviet nuclear-tipped missile as if Middletown is destroyed. The biggest difference in the situation has been that the Soviets have means of physically seizing and occupying Mannheim (also a disaster from the viewpoint of most Americans), while they lack such a capacity for Middletown. Finally, the saving grace has all along been that it could be a disaster for the Soviets if anyone's nuclear warheads destroyed Mannheim, making it worthless as a conquest and threatening the safety of *all* the world's cities.

It is thus very difficult to know and predict whether the internal bickering that so often appears inside the NATO community amounts to a lack of commonalty and identification, or whether these are proof of a common sense of political democracy and free discussion.[24] There are many families in this world that tolerate more frank and harsh language in discussions among siblings or between parents and teen-agers than they would ever use with outsiders. Newspapers have been editorializing about "NATO in disarray" almost since the treaty was signed, but it is very possible that the significant differences of national interest conjured up by strategists do not reflect the intuitions that have fallen into place ever since the Berlin blockade.

Conventional Threats to North America

As noted, the logical questions about whether an escalation to the use of nuclear weapons is "rational" or "credible" after a Soviet attack on Europe set the stage for similar questions about the United States. What if the Soviets invaded only Alaska and used only conventional weapons in the attack? What if there were an invasion of the rest of the United States, with Soviet conventional forces threatening to conquer the continent, but with nuclear weapons still not having been brought into action by Moscow? Would not every rational American president have to be reluctant to initiate the use of nuclear weapons to retaliate against Soviet cities as long as American cities remained intact and American citizens had a good prospect of surviving?

One rarely sees any discussion of such issues, if only because the Soviet forces that would be deployable to North America by sea or air are minimal, certainly as compared with their forces that can roll into western Europe or as compared with the ground forces the United States and Canada could muster in a continental defense. Another part of the nondiscussion of such issue stems, however, from the elementary wisdom of avoiding strategic speculation where such speculation might open opportunities for an adversary. The country that sticks together deters together. If the implicit message is that any invasion of the fifty United States

[24] On the general "disarray" within NATO, see Stanley Kober, "Can NATO Survive?" *International Affairs* 59 (Summer 1983): 339–348.

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would surely bring an all-out use of all American forces (just as any Soviet crossing into France would presumably bring the French nuclear *Force de Frappe* into action against Soviet cities), then the various portions of the United States will not need to feel separately threatened.

It is not easy to uncover any exceptions to this pattern of solidarity. One that might be cited (composed largely for setting the stage for an entertainment product) is the script for the movie *Red Dawn*, where Cuban and Soviet forces have somehow reached Colorado. By the offhand dialogue of the movie script, the Soviets had initially used nuclear warheads in a disarming counterforce attack against U.S. land-based missile silos. But each side had then returned to limits avoiding nuclear warfare, because the American side did not want to destroy its own country and because the Soviet side did not want to destroy the prize it was seeking to capture. Or the Soviets did not want to see nuclear retaliation inflicted on the USSR itself. One must presume from this film script that the initial Soviet counterforce attack had not inflicted enough countervalue destruction on the U.S. population to anger the U.S. leadership into any total retaliatory strike against Soviet cities, or else there would be no point in reinstituting such restraints.

For a more real example, we might turn to a 1975 posture statement by Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger designating a brigade of the U.S. Army for the defense of Alaska (mislabeled here the "fiftieth state"):

> Two of the five active separate brigades will be absorbed by the new divisions to be activated in FY [fiscal year] 1976. The remaining three active separate infantry brigades are all deployed for special missions—Panama, Alaska and Berlin.
>
> It would also be unwise from a strategic standpoint to ignore the proximity of Alaska, our fiftieth state, to the mainland of Asia. All in all, then, there appears to be a limited number of key areas where we would want to deploy forces and a relatively small number of contingencies for which we should size our forces.[25]

What indeed should we make of this statement? Is Alaska somehow to be open to a Soviet conventional invasion without triggering all-out war? Is what is chronologically actually the forty-ninth state somehow given away as the fiftieth in importance? Is Alaska less integral to the United States than Alsace-Lorraine is to France with regard to triggering the *Force de Frappe*? An NBC 1982 made-for-television film, *World War III*, was about a nuclear war *preceded* by a Soviet conventional invasion of Alaska. The film implied that further escalation to all-out war would take some time, just as it would take some time after a Soviet invasion of West Germany.

Movie scripts are written to entertain, not to reflect real feelings about strategy. And they surely do not reflect preexisting feelings or preferences of the broad American public. Even though Alaska is physically close to Siberia, it would hardly be easy for the Soviets to launch a major conventional force into that state. The additional troops proposed by Schlesinger might have been intended for the con-

[25] *Annual Defense Department Report of Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger FY 1976 and FY 1977*, 5 February 1975, III-9, III-43.

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tingency of terrorism directed against the pipeline, a terrorism that could be directed from Moscow or from one hundred other locations.

Americans worry more about a Soviet nuclear attack than about any Soviet conventional attack on North America. This reinforces the common in the U.S. posture, even while it makes the policy more deterrence than defense. If there were any plausible threats of a Soviet conventional invasion, this shared nature of deterrence would probably give Moscow pause about using its capabilities, even as it has forced Moscow to hesitate about invasions of the NATO countries.

Comparisons with Earlier History

In the days when "conventional war" was all that there could be to war, this country was hardly a model of unity in face of possible foreign enemies.[26] Tories supported George III even while the United States was coming into being. The New England states were lukewarm about the War of 1812, with cattle regularly being driven north to feed the Canadians during that war. The New England states were similarly very unenthusiastic about the Mexican War, because they saw it as serving southern interests in extending slavery.

The Confederacy, during its own bid for independence in the Civil War, sold out on the Monroe Doctrine, basically inviting the French and British to stay in Mexico and suggesting that the European states could extract benefits and power positions throughout Latin America by seeing the United States broken up. The Spanish American War and World Wars I and II were not beset by as many internal divisions as had occurred in the nineteenth century; but the question is whether these wars displayed a commonness of purpose that is lessened in the transition to nuclear deterrence or whether that commonness is enhanced.[27]

The Vietnam war certainly saw major divisions, of course, aligned more on an ideological or class basis than on a regional basis, but the Vietnam divisions tell us little about how we would feel about the stakes in any nuclear crisis. Americans between World War I and World War II inclined to a self-conscious isolationism, regretting their commitment to the Allied side in the World War and determined not to be seduced into such a commitment again.

Some of the benchmarks of "willingness to defend" were measured in public opinion polls at the end of the 1930s. One of the questions pertained to a willingness to defend Hawaii. The fraction supporting such a defense was quite low, especially as compared with the percentage already endorsing statehood for the Islands:[28]

[26] A useful overview of the degrees of U.S. domestic unity on foreign policy can be found in Merlo J. Pusey, *The Way We Go to War* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1969).

[27] The changes in U.S. foreign policy attitudes in the twentieth century are outlined in Foster Rhea Dulles, *America's Rise to World Power* (New York: Harper, 1955); and William G. Carleton, *The Revolution in American Foreign Policy: Its Global Reach* (New York: Random House, 1963).

[28] Poll data is to be found in Hadley Cantrill, *Public Opinion: 1935–1941* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1951), 781; and "The Quarter's Polls," *Public Opinion Quarterly* 12 (Summer 1948): 544.

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20. (US Jan '39 and Jan '40) If a major foreign power actually threatened to take over any of the following countries by armed invasion, would you be willing to see the United States come to its defense with armed forces? The 1940 question substituted the word "rescue" instead of "defense" (Aug '40). If a major foreign power actually threatened to take over any of the following places by armed invasion, would you be willing to see the United States come to the rescue with armed forces? (FOR)

Hawaii	Yes	No	Undecided
Jan '40	55%	25%	20%
Aug '40	74%	13%	14%

Would you favor or oppose having Hawaii admitted as the forty-ninth state in the Union?

	Favor	Oppose	No opinion
Jan '41	48%	23%	29%

Nuclear War vs. Conventional War

Nuclear war is more horrible and frightening than conventional war. Yet Americans have done a much better job of sticking together in the face of nuclear war than in past and present conventional wars. Why should such a seemingly paradoxical result have emerged? The logic of nuclear crises could be compared with the logic of certain kinds of conventional wars that become contests of who will quit first. Guerrilla wars in particular tend to become such contentional endurance contests, with each side feeling that life would be better as soon as the war ended, but each hoping that the other will quit first: whoever quits second becomes the winner of the war.

In a nuclear confrontation such as the Cuban missile crisis, the message among Americans is that the risk of nuclear war must be run, but that no such war will actually have to be experienced if the other side sees that we will definitely stick it out to the end. The paradoxical advice here is that if we show willingness to get into a nuclear war, the other side will back off, and we will not have to undergo such a war.

In a prolonged guerrilla war, the advice might be the same. Who would regard the suffering imposed on Vietnam and the young Americans sent to fight in Vietnam as justified by any gains that might be won if Hanoi were the first to quit? Yet at the outset of such a contest, an American leader might have plausibly contended that the bulk of such suffering would never have to be experienced if only Hanoi, Moscow, and Beijing could be convinced that the United States was willing to endure and impose it in the conviction that all Americans were in this commitment together.[29]

The United States held together in the Cuban missile crisis without mobs of

[29] On the endurance contest logic of the Vietnam War, see Guenter Lewy, *America in Vietnam* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978).

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people beseeching the White House to "give peace a chance" or moving their families out of cities to places of presumably greater safety. Yet there was no such commonalty of approach in the Vietnam guerrilla war. What are the differences? To begin, the shortness of time encompassed in the 1962 crisis or especially the sheer enormity of the nuclear war threat suggest that there would be little point in breaking ranks. One might escape service in a Southeast Asian jungle by going to Canada, but one could not escape a nuclear war if it happened. While crises are short-lived, nuclear deterrence commitments remain in place decade after decade, so that the enormity of thermonuclear destructiveness is probably the more important factor—not the time urgency of the crisis. Nonetheless, we deal not with the actual incidence of nuclear warfare, but with the hypothetical prospect that again and again is kept from becoming reality.

In a war of endurance like Vietnam, however, one deals not merely with an ongoing risk of nuclear war, but a continuing accumulation of casualties and destruction. One begins with a core of Americans who sincerely question whether the war is worth fighting or even whether the United States is backing the better side. Should the United States not have intervened to back Ho Chi Minh against Ngo Dinh Diem? Or today support the Sandinistas against the Contras? The existence of such a view point at odds with the common view may reflect the peripheral nature of the issues at stake or some ideological or regional disagreements within the American public—disagreements that become livelier because the overall stakes for the United States as a whole cannot be as high.

Yet the existence of dissidents on the American side inevitably had some impact in encouraging Hanoi to persist in the contest; and the persistence of Hanoi then led some other Americans to conclude that the contest could not be worth the risks and the damage that would have to be undergone as the contest persisted. Given that Americans at large are not able to conceal their debates or hide their feelings, another round of encouragement was delivered to the adversary. The end result was that the United States lost a war that was primarily a test of mutual endurance.

What we call "limited war" is basically what one must also call "deterrence failures," the adversary attacks which our nuclear escalation threats could not credibly deter. Limited war is also what used simply to be "war." By the addition of nuclear arsenals, we have added a deterrence of wars that would have otherwise occurred. And we have added a psychological tone to American preparations for such deterrence that differs from American attitudes in more traditional warfare situations.

Americans have generally reacted badly to the phenomenon of limited war. The Korean War, supplying the model, was unpopular in the United States. Americans regarded it as immoral to fight "with one arm tied behind your back." One did not communicate and trade with the Communist world, while dispatching one's sons to fight against that world.[30] Some of this stemmed from earlier United States

[30] Popular reactions to the Korean War are discussed in John Spanier, *The Truman-MacArthur Controversy and the Korean War* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1965).

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traditions, whereby war was generally immoral and horrible, something one entered only to get it over with as quickly and totally as possible. World War I saw a great American enthusiasm after an initial period of neutrality to make this "The War to End All Wars."

Europeans have been more attuned to limited wars over the decades and centuries, in part because wars in the days of Frederick the Great were concerned more with dynastic interests than with the interests of nations as a whole. It might be that democracies are always inclined to demand too much totality of foreign policy and ventures into armed conflict. They have difficulties when a conflict like the Mexican War or War of 1812 turns out to serve the interests of one region or faction. The important point about nuclear deterrence and nuclear war, however, is that it may more easily satisfy the needs of democratic constituencies that everything be tied together at stake for all concerned.

In the crucial 1968 New Hampshire Democratic primary that persuaded Lyndon Johnson to give up running for reelection, public opinion polls conducted after the event among people who had voted for antiwar candidate Eugene McCarthy came up with some surprising results. Individuals were asked to rank three options—continuation of the war at its current pace, escalation to bombing of North Vietnam, and a withdrawal of troops from South Vietnam. Not surprisingly, the option of continuing the limited war did very poorly among McCarthy voters. But a greater number favored an escalation to bombing Hanoi as their first choice and withdrawal as their second. This would have been anathema to McCarthy himself. The voters of New Hampshire were less opposed to war than to the halfway divisions of the war as it was being fought.

When the only casualties of American participation in the Vietnam war were among volunteer professional pilots of the U.S. Air Force and Navy, the war was more acceptable to the American public at large. It is arguable that if Nixon had not become handicapped by the Watergate scandal, the United States could have maintained the threat of conventional air attacks directed at Hanoi for years and years into the future, a threat to deter any massive tank attack against the south. The North Vietnamese launched such an attack in 1975 to finish up the Vietnam war after Richard Nixon had been driven from office and Congress had passed bans on future participation in the shielding of South Vietnam. Without an incapacitated U.S. presidency, there might still be a non-Communist regime in Saigon.

Ordinary Americans are more ready to disaggregate the costs of a conventional war by letting professional soldiers run the risks of their professions, as long as the nonprofessionals are not forced to share these risks. What is peculiarly different from the model of conventional war, in both nuclear war and terrorist threats, is that there is no way for any of us to escape these risks.

Nuclear War, Conventional War, and Terrorism

If conventional war has threatened the cohesiveness of our common defense compared with nuclear war situations, what of the increasing incidence of terrorist

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attacks on individual Americans within the United States and especially abroad?[31] If we were not ready to pay the larger price of defending Vietnam, would we be willing to commit any great resources and resolve to the protection of a planeload or shipload of tourists or an embassy staff? Yet the extent to which Americans' attention becomes consumed by the plight of the relatively few hostages in such situations works very much in the direction of commonalty. This may discourage terrorism at some points and encourage it in others, but it surely does not suggest that terrorism is the best way to divide the United States against itself. It may be that the mere prospect of terrorism is so all-pervasive that the danger seems to grip the entire United States. One could concede the loss of Vietnam without anticipating any change in the life style of Ohio. By contrast any nuclear attack on the United States, or any acceptance of terrorism as normal within the United States, would directly affect the life style of Ohio. One compounds this by the identifications produced by the television media for hostage situations, whereby the families of the victims quickly come to look like our own families. The fates of embassy personnel or captive tourists bother Americans almost as much as the plight of their own children, and the United States suddenly becomes more unified than previously in its commitment to a common defense.

Conclusions

The threats since World War II, together with the other trends noted in our nation and in the world, have drawn Americans into a more common effort in deterrence—more common than in the past when "defense" was the phrase and "deterrence" was a much more esoteric concept. Given the magnitude of the threats, one might hardly greet this with relish. Given the wars that may have been prevented by the harnessing of such threats in reverse, however, one can not respond to all these changes only with regret.

The more difficult and important question to resolve is whether this commonalty of deterrence and shared taking of risks will persist for the "fifty-first states." Abstract arguments that such extended deterrence cannot work fly in the face of our practical experience. Moreover, the theoretical doubts about the cohesiveness of NATO are echoes and reflections of the questions at the core of the United States' own experience.

[31] On public reactions to the terrorist menace, see Donald M. Kerr, "Coping With Terrorism," *Terrorism* 8 (Spring 1985): 113–126.

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The United Nations, International Conflict, and American Security

GEORGE L. SHERRY

When the United Nations came into being in 1945 "determined to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind," few people in this country doubted that the fledgling organization would play a major role in creating an international environment of peace and security. It would not, of course, provide fully for the common defense of the United States. It would, instead, make that task vastly less difficult and burdensome by establishing principles and machinery that would resolve dangerous conflict situations by peaceful means or suppress aggression by collective enforcement action and—in view of the veto—always subject to United States consent.

For the past forty-one years this expectation has been tested against the hard facts of international politics. The outcome of the process has been a wide-ranging reassessment of the role of the organization, culminating this year in a major crisis in U.S.-UN relations. The United Nations may emerge from its present ordeal a leaner, stronger, and more efficient organization; alternatively, its effectiveness may be irreversibly impaired. The question is, of course, whether this process will extinguish the dream of preserving international peace and security through a world organization of governments. The United Nations was never meant to be or to become a world government; it was intended as the institutional framework for developing a new peaceful and civilized world order that would enable governments—if they were so minded—to provide security and prevent war even while

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retaining the established system of independent, sovereign states. If this hope were dashed as well, the United States would have to take on unilaterally much of the burden of maintaining the essential structure of order—however inadequate—that the United Nations system helps to carry multilaterally. This would be a daunting task indeed.

The United Nations and the Bipolar System

The workings of the anarachic order in which sovereign states endeavour to survive and, to this end, engage in balance-of-power politics and intermittent organized large-scale violence have been generally known for centuries.[1] War has been considered an acceptable instrument of state policy. War or the threat of war was also the only instrument available for the unilateral enforcement of international legal and political obligations and for self-defense.[2] Not until the Napoleonic wars and especially the carnage of World War I did it dawn upon politicians, diplomats, and even soldiers that, in view of the growing destructive capacity of modern weaponry, wars could no longer be relied upon to regulate the state system without incurring intolerable costs, while in most cases proving ultimately incapable of achieving the policy objectives for which they had been launched. And since the introduction of nuclear weapons in 1945, full-scale war between powers possessing such weapons has been bound to result in the destruction of victor and vanquished, aggressor and victim alike, to say nothing of would-be nonparticipants whose populations would also be decimated by the environmental effects of a nuclear exchange.

As a consequence of this situation, war between the superpowers has been carefully avoided and remains unlikely as long as a stable balance of mutual deterrence is maintained by their governments. The bipolar subsystem—U.S. and U.S.S.R.—is relatively stable, despite continual turmoil in areas where the great powers' spheres of influence are in close contact. It obviously has its ups and downs and has been generally conducted at a high level of tension, danger, and noise and a low level of efficient and orderly management. Moreover, there is no external guarantee that this stability will endure. Wars—including wars among the great powers, such as World War I—have broken out that were not intended by some or all of the major participants, but were brought about by the ostensibly "rational" behavior of sovereign states caught in the toils of the security dilemma.[3]

In the nuclear age, the superpowers have been conspicuously incapable or unwilling to extend the relative stability of their bipolar subsystem to the international system as a whole. International conflicts not directly involving the nuclear powers or between a nuclear power and non-nuclear states, to say nothing of civil wars, liberation movements, and separatist conflicts, have continued to proliferate.

[1] Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1979), 121.
[2] Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977), 186–189.
[3] Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, 199–209.

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These are the conflicts that pose a constant danger of escalation and consequent destabilization of the nuclear powers' relatively stable bipolar arrangement.

It is ironic that this arrangement, characterized by a grossly disproportionate preponderance of power in the hands of the superpowers, has had the effect of reducing and sometimes cancelling the superpowers' ability to control non-nuclear regional or civil conflicts, precisely because of this determination to avoid nuclear confrontation with one another. Hedley Bull has argued that where the nuclear great powers support opposite sides in a local conflict they will try to control it in such way that the ground rules of their own relationship will be respected.[4] They have often succeeded in imposing restraint, but the danger of failure through escalation is ever present, as is the temptation for each superpower to seek marginal advantage, to resist perceived threats to its sphere of influence, and to prevent an opposing great power from exploiting a local dispute to gain direct or indirect advantage for itself. If recent conflict situations have taught us any lesson, it is that regional disputes tend to be extraordinarily intense, durable, and difficult to resolve even if the nuclear powers are not directly involved on opposite sides; examples such as the Iran-Iraq war and the Arab-Israeli disputes readily spring to mind.

The United Nations had had to come to terms with the cohabitation and interpenetration of two subsystems. Of these, one embodies the relatively stable strategic balance between the nuclear powers—that is, the five Permanent Members of the Security Council: the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, France, and China. The other represents often unstable regional balances involving non-nuclear states or relations between nuclear and non-nuclear states in which the use of nuclear weapons by the former is precluded by the fear of nuclear escalation.

It has been remarked that the United Nations has been unable to address the superpower confrontation. In view of the stability of that particular subsystem, this may not constitute a serious complaint. I can see no particular advantage and considerable danger in having a nonsovereign organization of sovereign states seek to intervene in superpower disputes, except by way of legitimizing universal standards of behaviour, providing a forum in which governments can put forward their views before the international community, and promoting conciliation through impartial good offices (as in the Afghanistan situation).

What was the United Nations to do about the Soviet intervention in Hungary in 1956? Assuming for a moment that the veto had not prevented enforcement action by the Security Council under Chapter VII of the Charter, should the United Nations, including the United States, have marched to war against a superpower? Would it have been sane to attempt this? Would United States interests have been served? As it happens, the United Nations did precisely what the United States needed it to do—namely, get the Eisenhower administration off the hook politically when the American public was clamoring for it "to do something."

[4] Bull, *Anarchical Society*, 197.

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On the other hand, the common defense of the United States would be well served if the United States could focus its efforts on the political and military stalemate in relation to the Soviet Union, and if United Nations machinery could be relied upon to take care of regional conflict situations and thus stabilize the nonnuclear side of the international system. The veto in the Security Council indicates that this is precisely the purpose that the Charter was designed to achieve. In the words of one of the men who helped to draft that document, "the United Nations, in so far as its enforcement activities are concerned, is an organization for the enforcement of peace among the smaller states."[5]

United Nations Purpose and Performance

It would seem easy and almost comforting to take the position that the United Nations could be made to fulfill its appointed purpose of maintaining international peace and security if only its member states could be induced to make the mechanism provided by the Charter function as intended. Unfortunately, this is precisely the problem, not the solution. Like so many institutions wrought by human skill and moved by human purposes, the United Nations is inherently politically ambiguous. In the first place, the fact that an institutional mechanism is established for a stated purpose does not guarantee that it will be employed to fulfill that purpose at a given future time and under an unforseen specific set of circumstances. Indeed, ingenious statesmen may contrive to use it to secure a different and even the opposite purpose. In the second place, the determination of the action required to fulfill an abstractly stated purpose is in itself a political issue, since each of the actors operating in the given institutional framework will invariably define the required action in terms of its own interests. Where conflicts of interest are brought before an organization of states, the parties involved will often seek to utilize the United Nations as an arena in which to fight their quarrels rather than as an instrument to control or resolve them. They will also try to get other states to join the fray, thus globalizing the scope of the dispute instead of restricting and insulating it.

In such circumstances the process of dealing with disputes, including those that threaten international peace, bears a suspicious resemblance to the very act of engaging in such disputes. It would of course be idle to expect governments faced with difficulties that affect their vital interests, including their survival, to refrain from promoting those interests in the United Nations framework by venting their wrath on their foes at the conference table and making every effort to enlist the support of other governments to obtain decisions favouring their causes. Nor would there seem to be an immediate prospect of avoiding the problem of politicization as long as the United Nations deals with the world's political conflicts. Where such problems are discussed in an adversarial way, linkages are bound to develop,

[5] Leland M. Goodrich, "From League of Nations to United Nations," *International Organization* 1(1947): 17.

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since it is a fact of politics that the introduction of unrelated issues may be used to strengthen the position of one side or weaken that of its opponents. There are no agreed objective criteria for determining whether any given linkages help to fulfill the stated purposes for which the organization was set up.

In order to analyze the gap between United Nations purposes and performance, it will be necessary to address the following points: the extreme difficulty of settling or resolving serious political disputes or conflict situations, and the hitherto insufficiently appreciated role of impasse as a key ingredient of peace; impasse management and conflict control as the most important political function of the United Nations; the distinction (and tension) between the United Nations as a forum of parliamentary diplomacy and the United Nations as provider of impartial third party functions that serve international stability.

The Difficulties of Peaceful Settlement

Serious disputes that come before the United Nations normally approach a zero-sum game situation in which the gains of one side necessarily cause losses to the other. Nothing is further from the truth than the assumption that governments stumble into disputes against their will, consider such disputes to be a calamity, or are necessarily eager to settle them on a "reasonable" basis that would take some sort of balanced account of the interests of both parties. Quarrels are mostly picked by states that want to challenge the status quo for a variety of reasons—fear for their security in relation to unfriendly neighbours, historical grievances, attempts to divert or defuse internal political pressures, desire for territorial and economic expansion. The objectives sought at times involve demands for the surrender by the other side of genuinely vital interests, such as survival as a nation, maintenance of independence and sovereignty (including authority over one's own foreign defense or domestic policy), political legitimacy, territorial integrity, and unity. It is not merely a question of the observance of accepted rules (though this aspect frequently exists and is much made of in public debate), but of life or death, survival or extinction. Of course, these extreme fears may be exaggerated or mistaken because of misperception or falsification, but the fact remains that governments tend to act as if their worst fears might come true.[6]

It is idle to expect issues involving vital interests to be negotiated out of existence, especially when violence has broken out or the threat of it looms in the background. Furthermore, parties to such disputes want to win, not settle; those who use the negotiations to win enjoy a vast advantage over those who are willing to settle. And so do those that play the game of "Chicken" to the hilt.

Within sovereign states, conflicts of interest are dealt with pursuant to an established body of rules and procedures that provide an authoritative standard for measuring the relative validity of conflicting claims. This presupposes the ability

[6] Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976), 343–380.

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of the central government to assert its authority, enforce its laws, and secure the support of the national community, including the parties to disputes, for the proposition that the preservation of the given state is a value of supreme importance. When this is not the case within a state, the result is anarchy, civil war, or both (as in Lebanon). In the international system there is no sovereign authority that can or will enforce laws; the United Nations can legitimize standards of conduct but—with the special exception of Korea—has been unable or unwilling to enforce such standards. Moreover, the Korean exception proves the rule, since it involved the use of United Nations machinery by the United States and its allies in the absence of the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China, a situation that is most unlikely to recur.

The record indicates that the United Nations has seldom reached agreed peaceful settlements of serious conflict situations[7]—with the great and important exception of decolonization, where the metropolitan countries were gradually led to accept the proposition that keeping colonies under their sway in the face of the sullen resistance of the peoples concerned was an unprofitable enterprise. The disputes to which the decolonization process gave rise mostly concerned the manner and speed of granting self-government and independence, not the fundamental issue whether to do so at all. The key role played by the United Nations in providing a sound political framework for this largely peaceful process has not been sufficiently acknowledged. In the case of decolonization there was in most cases not too much of a problem, because there was no longer a dispute by the time action needed to be taken. One will, on the other hand, recall the difficulties that arose in connection with the decolonization of the Belgian Congo, Rhodesia, and the Portuguese colonies. It is also necessary to bear in mind that South Africa contines to cling to Namibia on the pretext that Cuban troops must be removed from Angola, even while it does everything in its power with U.S. cooperation to make it impossible for the Angolan authorities to survive without those troops.

Some disputes that have recently failed to yield to settlement efforts include the various aspects of the Middle East problem, the Iran-Iraq war, the Cyprus question, and the Falkland/Malvinas dispute. This list does not include conflict situations on the margins of the superpower confrontation, such as Afghanistan and Kampuchea. In each of the above instances, the United Nations has been directly involved either in a peacekeeping role or in peaceful settlement efforts through the good offices of the secretary-general. In some of these, the secretary-general came literally within a hair's breadth of producing at least a partial solution—notably with regard to Cyprus and the Falklands—only to have the desired outcome elude his grasp because of the intransigence of one or both of the parties. Conflict sometimes creates vested interests that seek its perpetuation or aggravation.

Finally, at the risk of appearing cynical, it should be noted that a negotiated

[7] Ernst B. Haas, *The Collective Management of International Conflict* (New York: United Nations Institute for Training and Research, 1986), 44–48.

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political settlement of a conflict situation is bound to reflect the balance of power between the parties at the time of the negotiation. Even if such a settlement is then accepted by the parties, such acceptance may evaporate at a later stage when latent difficulties return it to the surface, or when one or the other of the parties calculates that the balance of power has changed and a new arrangement reflecting the new balance should be sought by negotiation or confrontation. Thus the agreed Iran-Iraq border settlement of 1975 was set aside when Iraq invaded Iran in 1980. The Cyprus constitutional settlement of 1959–1960 was similarly set aside when intercommunal strife broke out in 1963. Of course durable political settlements occur at times. But so do settlements that in changed circumstances become a new grievance. A good example is France's cession of Alsace-Lorraine to Germany under the 1871 Treaty of Frankfurt. The Germans thought they had achieved a formal settlement of a grievance that dated back to the seventeenth century; in reality they were left holding a tiger by the tail. Permanent settlements usually flow from a change in historical circumstances, which in the long run tend to make irrelevant even the most intractable conflict situations. We do not much fear a resurgence of the Spanish-American war, the Russian-Turkish conflict over the Crimea, or the Aaland Islands dispute between Sweden and Finland, which was resolved by the League of Nations in 1921.

Absent such historical changes and with the exception of genuinely successful peaceful settlements (such as those resulting from decolonization), peaceful conditions often amount to a deal or an accommodation, explicit or tacit, for the temporary acceptance of impasse, where the issues in dispute are set aside or kept under control by the parties alone or with the assistance of United Nations or other third party arrangements. There is no guarantee that these issues will not come to the surface again; they may be revived if relations between the parties deteriorate for other reasons; or they may lapse into oblivion over time. Then again, few things are more permanent than temporary arrangements.

In short, there are objective conflicts of interest that are insoluble by peaceful means (or are perceived as such) in a given historical context. Impasse occurs where neither party can win or be compelled to capitulate, but violent resolution is not resorted to. The conflict for the time being remains in suspense—for example, because the parties are uncertain of the outcome of any showdown and fear its consequences; or because they have reassessed the significance or urgency of the grievance; or because of pressures to keep the peace exerted by other countries, through the United Nations or outside UN channels.

There are a host of disputes in the international arena that have been found to be objectively insoluble and are kept in a state of impasse, accompanied by more or less tension between the parties. Conflict of interest is not an exceptional state of affairs; it is as ubiquitous as life itself. The question is whether those concerned will seek to resolve it by force, or attempt a negotiated solution, or accept the impasse until changed circumstances restore saliency to the issue. To suggest an ad hoc definition that may invite controversy, peace is not the absence of conflict and disputes between states. It is the acceptance of impasse as one ingredient

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of a complex web of relationships that may range in different areas from friendly cooperation to conflict maintained and controlled at various levels of tension that are modified and adjusted over time.

Collective Security

A major function of the United Nations is to adjust or settle conflict situations peacefully. The Charter says so in Article 1, and Chapter VI is entirely devoted to this essential but all too often unpromising quest. It is interesting that Chapter VI harks back in part to the Covenant of the League of Nations, which called for third party procedures leading to terms of settlement, but left the members free to take individual action if unanimity could not be achieved concerning terms. The Covenant tied the process of devising terms of settlement to a system of collective security based on the utterly implausible assumption that all other members of the League would be willing to go to war to preserve the status quo, even if some of them were less than enthusiastic about it.

In the United Nations Charter, the League concept of collective security is replaced by the broader concept of the "maintenace of international peace and security," which moreover is clearly separated from the process of pacific settlement. This immediately suggests that peace and security may be maintained (or restored, if breached) without necessarily first resolving the underlying political problem. The Security Council is responsible for suppressing threats to or breaches of the peace, and is empowered, under Chapter VII, to take enforcement action to achieve that end. But nothing in the Charter empowers the Council—let alone the General Assembly—to impose or enforce substantive solutions to conflict situations against the will of the parties. In the last analysis, pacific settlement remains the responsibility of the parties. The Security Council or the General Assembly may of course recommend procedures of adjustment or terms of settlement. They have seldom done the latter, except in special circumstances: for example, when the sovereign power concerned specifically referred the matter to the United Nations for solution, as did the United Kingdom in 1947 on the Palestine question, or in certain decolonization questions.

The use of enforcement measures—waging a "collective security" war for the legitimate purpose of suppressing a threat to or breach of the peace—has as a practical matter been rendered obsolete by the East-West conflict and would be highly questionable even if the superpowers were not at loggerheads. What would a combined army of the great and not-so-great powers under the United Nations flag do to stop the Iran-Iraq war? Where would it deploy? Who would provide military planning, intelligence, and logistic support? Who would order it to shoot, and if so, in what direction? Also, who would pay the bills? Above all, who would be willing to sustain the casualties and face other possible dangerous consequences? In a war or enforcement action, either party can win; the "wrong" party almost won in Korea.

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What the United Nations Can Do

Short of the unrealistic notion of enforcement action, the Security Council can do extremely useful work by providing the setting for complex negotiations on principles and procedures for the settlement of major international problems—provided the circumstances are right. Resolutions 242 (1967) on the Middle East and 435 (1978) on Namibia come under that heading. Accomplishments of this kind are, unfortunately, as rare as they are invaluable. They depend for follow-up and implementation on the parties and on such pressures as the great powers and others can effectively apply to promote minimum standards of conduct and preserve the peace. The adoption of a resolution, as recent secretaries-general have repeatedly pointed out, should not be considered the end of discharging the responsibility of the Security Council, but as the beginning of concerted political action. Implementation has not as yet materialized in either of the above cases. Impasse continues, since a resolution will not cause the dispute to go away.

The Council has been often blocked from taking effective action on conflict situations by disagreement among its members. It has been fashionable to blame this situation on discord among the permanent members; in fact, other members have often been no less responsible for inaction, as in the initial stages of the Iran-Iraq war. When the Council is deadlocked, it tends to lapse into the pattern of the General Assembly by engaging in recriminatory debates for which scores of nonmembers of the Council are trotted out to demonstrate their support for one or another position. In view of the veto, these exercises do not often result in resolutions. Nor is the process particularly helpful to the parties concerned. A great deal of posturing occurs.

The Security Council can address the immediate danger far better than it can debate the merits of one side or another or press the parties to accept specific solutions of insoluble conflict situations. The task at hand is to preserve the peace, prevent the outbreak of hostilities, and stop the fighting if it has broken out. It is conflict control, not conflict resolution. In effect this amounts to an acknowledgment that the conflict cannot be "settled" for the time being. The Council should use its authority, that of its members, and the impartial good offices of the secretary-general to induce the parties to accept the existence of an insoluble conflict of interest, to learn to live with it, and to control the resulting impasse politically and militarily. Provided it is not blocked by great-power discord or by the frequent reluctance of some of its non-permanent members to do anything about conflict situations within the nonaligned movement,[8] the Council is perfectly capable of taking effective action to preserve the peace. Such action cannot and need not be imposed on the parties. It is based on the acceptance of political impasse and on the maintenance of peaceful conditions through impartial conflict control, while keeping the door open for eventual third-party settlement efforts, normally through the good offices of the secretary-general.

[8] Ibid., 37.

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PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

In this context, the Security Council may call for a cease-fire and a return to normal conditions pending efforts toward peaceful settlement. The cease-fire reflects the political impasse in military terms. The difficult long-term search for a way to "resolve" the conflict—that is, to cause it to disappear—is left to a later stage. The Council may authorize setting up United Nations peacekeeping forces or observer missions—that is, international conflict control machinery in the field to supervise the cease-fire impartially with the consent of the parties and without the use of force (except in self-defense as a last resort). In the words of Article 40 of the Charter, such operations are carried out "without prejudice to the rights, claims, or position of the parties concerned." They set aside for the time being the mirage of settlement in favour of the practical reality of impasse management and conflict control.

It has generally been assumed that by fostering peaceful conditions in an area of conflict United Nations peacekeeping operations would create the setting in which the search for peaceful settlement could be more fruitfully pursued. That search is normally entrusted to the good offices of the secretary-general. However, in view of the impasse underlying these operations, the solution of the underlying political problems has proved extraordinarily elusive.

Peacekeeping operations, too, are fragile creations. In the absence of determined third-party political action, including pressure by the great powers to induce the parties to live with their impasse, the effectiveness of such operations may gradually erode. The parties may feel compelled to return to the use of force for a variety of political and military considerations, especially the dream of winning the victory that eluded their grasp the last time round. When this happens, peacekeeping operations, with their buffer zones, their interpository deployment, and their impartial reporting on developments, may prove a nuisance and an obstacle to be removed or penetrated. Without the consent and cooperation of the parties involved, the system cannot work. Witness the difficulties encountered by the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), both during the 1982 Isreali invasion and the current period of fragmentation of governmental authority in Lebanon, and its replacement by factional armies and private or quasi-religious gangs in a Hobbesian setting.

When the necessary conditions prevail, peacekeeping operations have been remarkably effective and long-lived. A few miles east of UNIFIL, the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) has continued to function quietly, virtually without a hitch, with the cooperation of Israel and Syria, even while war engulfed the rest of the Middle East. In Cyprus, the United Nations Peacekeeping Force (UNFICYP) has been deployed since 1964. Since 1974 it has been manning the buffer zone between the lines of the Cyprus National Guard and those of the Turkish and Turkish Cypriot forces, in addition to fulfilling a variety of administrative and humanitarian functions that no one else would be in a position to dis-

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charge. The situation has been kept peaceful (though far from friendly) even while political strife between the parties rose to a new crescendo after the failure of the 1985 high-level meeting and the near collapse of the secretary-general's good-offices efforts in 1986. While the Turkish Cypriots have objected to the terms of reference of UNFICYP on political grounds, they have with some recent exceptions continued to cooperate with the Force, as has the Cyprus Government. There seems to be some feeling, especially on the Greek Cypriot side, that the status quo under United Nations control is preferable to any conceivable settlement that would be acceptable to the other side.

A recent United Nations survey of United Nations peacekeeping lists thirteen operations, including such major efforts as the United Nations Operation in the Congo (1960–1964) and the two United Nations Emergency Forces in the Sinai (1956–1967 and 1973–1979). Quite properly, it does not include the United Nations involvement in the Korean war, since the unified command established by the Security Council on 7 July 1950 was explicitly placed "under the United States" and was never under United Nations control.[9] The Korean operation was not based on the consent of the parties; it was a response to the North Korean invasion, which it had to use force to repel. The circumstances precluded any effort at managing the impasse or controlling the conflict impartially; the United Nations Force was an ally of the South Koreans in a full-fledged war. The operation was a *sui generis* enforcement action (made possible by the absence of the Soviet Union from the Security Council for weeks after the invasion), which eventually, after China's intervention, settled for a modified return to the previous status quo.

Much has been written about the alleged propensity of peacekeeping operations to perpetuate disputes by the very act of pacifying the situation, fostering tolerable conditions, and thus removing the main source of pressure for a settlement. This argument is based on the dubious proposition that a settlement would always be possible if only enough pressure were applied, perhaps by continuation of the fighting, which in many cases would promptly break out if a United Nations operation were withdrawn. The argument implicitly endorses the aggressor's assumption that conflict can bring victory and a desirable solution of a dispute. Whatever Karl von Clausewitz may have thought about the subject, a look at recent events demonstrates the fallacy of the argument, even where the strengths of the parties are disproportionate: for example, Vietnam, Lebanon in 1982–1984, Iran-Iraq, and the Falklands. When there is political impasse, the thing to do is to recognize the facts of life and keep the conflict under control. If the possibility for a settlement exists, such settlement will readily emerge from a conflict-control situation. Thus the establishment of UNEF II in 1973 led to the second (1975) disengagement agreement and later made possible the conclusion of the Egyptian-Israeli peace accord of 1979.

[9] United Nations, *The Blue Helmets* (New York: U.N. Department of Public Information, 1985), 8.

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Good Offices of the Secretary-General

The good offices of the secretary-general are a very useful and flexible device for bridging the gap between conflict control in the field (peacekeeping forces and military observer missions), adjustment of the political impasse, and the search for peaceful settlement. Acting personally or through special representatives, the secretary-general is in a position to suggest a variety of modifications of the political status quo that are designed to improve the situation and relieve tensions. For example, in dealing with Cyprus, the secretary-general has since 1979 urged the parties to accept a preliminary "mini-package" involving the resettlement of Varosha (the empty Greek Cypriot quarter of Famagusta, now occupied by Turkish troops) and the reopening of Nicosia International Airport with unimpeded access for both sides. Concerning the Falklands dispute, the secretary-general similarly proposed the establishment of a transitional regime involving military and naval withdrawals and a temporary United Nations administration pending negotiations for a diplomatic settlement. The Argentine junta, which in its folly rejected the scheme, had occasion to rue that day.

Even where a good-offices mission ostensibly deals with a final settlement, the fact that a negotiating process and communications between the parties are maintained acts as a brake on the spread of violence and a reliever of some tensions. This applies in particular to the current talks on the situation in Afghanistan, for which the secretary-general provides the only negotiating channel. In this sense, good-offices missions are an important element of impasse management.

The Difficulties of Impasse Management

Impasse management and conflict control are not a second-best choice to be used as a last resort when the preferred outcome, peaceful settlement, proves unattainable. In fact, impasse management may in practice be the optimum available outcome in most situations. The alternative to it is not peaceful settlement and the disappearance of the dispute; it is rather uncontrolled hostility and war. There are of course exceptions; it is the task of statesmen to determine what kind of United Nations action the international system will support and the parties will accept in a given set of circumstances.

The answer, unfortunately, is clear: very little. After all, impasse is not what the parties seek; they seek victory, and will accept conflict control only when they realize that they may face defeat. When that happens, the other side may smell victory and spurn outside intervention altogether. Most peacekeeping operations are the result of military stalemate as well as political impasse. In the day-to-day conduct of such operations one can sense the hidden resentment of governments that feel they are being prevented from "prevailing" in the future after having been robbed of victory by the intrusive blue helmeted peacekeeping force in the past.

Furthermore, there is the question of the relationship between the policies of United Nations deliberative organs and those of the United Nations in its conflict

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control mode. The General Assembly frequently passes one-sided resolutions concerning conflict situations that are dealt with through United Nations peacekeeping or the good-offices missions of the secretary-general. Not only do such resolutions stir resentment on the part of the countries targeted, they also damage the credibility of the organization's impartiality and of the secretary-general in conducting conflict-control functions. Well-informed persons realize, of course, that the secretary-general will not and is not expected to allow his impartiality and objectivity to be impaired, even by an Assembly resolution. But the distinction is difficult to explain publicly.

For these and other reasons, governments have displayed increasing reluctance to use United Nations conflict-control machinery.[10] No peacekeeping operations have been established since the initial deployment of UNIFIL in 1978, which was set up in response to United States insistence in the face of serious misgivings by the Secretariat. It has turned out to be one of the less successful endeavours of its kind, having been unable to fulfill its mandate fully. No agreement was reached on expanding UNIFIL's responsibilities and its area of operation during the 1982–1983 war and subsequent civil strife, and the security of UNIFIL soldiers has been placed at risk by uncontrollable private militias and religious fanatics ever since.

The Iran-Iraq war was brought before the Security Council in 1980 by Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim despite the reluctance of many Council members, including the non-aligned. The Council's resolutions were rejected by Iran as biased; the peacemaking efforts of two successive secretaries-general and of Sweden's late Prime Minister Olof Palme as the secretary-general's personal representative have proved unavailing, and United Nations activities in the field have been limited to marginal aspects of the conflict, such as complaints of attacks on civilian targets, the use of chemical weapons, and mistreatment of prisoners.

The United Nations Transition Assistance Group for Namibia never got off the ground, despite Security Council authorization in 1978 and a seemingly successful effort in 1981 to overcome South African objections. The secretary-general's efforts to resolve conflict situations by the exercise of good offices came tantalizingly close to success with regard to the Falkland Islands in 1982 and to Cyprus in 1985, but failed because of the intransigence of the parties.

The present secretary-general, Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, gave eloquent testimony to this situation in his annual report for 1982:

> We have strayed far from the Charter. . . . Governments that believe they can win an international objective by force are often quite ready to do so, and domestic opinion not infrequently applauds such a course. The Security Council . . . all too often finds itself unable to take decisive action to resolve international conflicts and its resolutions

[10] Brian Urquhart, "International Peace and Security," *Foreign Affairs* 60 (Fall 1981): 12; see also Haas, *Collective Management of International Conflict*, 19ff; J. A. Finlayson and Mark W. Zacher, "The United Nations and Collective Security" in Toby Trister Gati, ed., *The US, the UN and the Management of Global Change* (New York: New York University Press, 1983), 163–166.

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> are increasingly defied or ignored . . . even when these are taken unanimously. . . . We are perilously near to a new international anarchy. . . . one symptom of which is the crisis in the multilateral approach in international affairs and the concomitant erosion of the authority and status of world and regional intergovernmental institutions. . . . Such a trend must be reversed before once again we bring upon ourselves a global catastrophe and find ourselves without institutions effective enough to prevent it.[11]

The Two United Nations

The foregoing observations lead us to further reflections on the functions, capabilities, and limitations of the United Nations. The job at hand is to ensure that the United Nations, a very political organization, will, at the end of the day, help to fulfill the objectives set out in its Charter. The complaint—and it is a serious one—is that the United Nations has at times failed to do so, at least from the American point of view, and has in the process tended to function as a sounding board for anti-Americanism and for hostility to basic American interests and values.[12]

As in the case of most political institutions, the United Nations presents divergent facets to the world. This may be frustrating, but it suggests that we may have been looking at the wrong facet. In short, there is not one United Nations; there are at least two. There is the United Nations of the deliberative organs, the forum for multilateral diplomacy, for public debate, and for grinding out resolutions. This is the United Nations shown on television screens, which most people rightly consider to be politicized and wrongly identify with the organization as a whole. Then there is the United Nations of quiet diplomacy, the institution that can perform impartial third-party functions of impasse management and conflict control, as well as a host of important operational or technical tasks. It provides protection and relief to uncounted millions of refugees, extends technical development assistance on a world-wide basis, and mounts large-scale humanitarian operations that range from the work of the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) to the vast emergency program for Africa that was set up in 1984 on the initiative of Secretary-General Pérez de Cuéllar. It is this second United Nations that has developed quietly into an indispensable stabilizing factor in the management of the international system and is of great value to the United States in dealing with global problems that "defy unilateral solution."[13] Both United Nations are necessary, and neither could exist without the other. The major problem in devising United States policy in relation to the United Nations is to restrain and moderate

[11] Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, *Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization* (New York: United Nations, 1982), 4–5.

[12] See Edward Luck and Peter Fromuth, *Anti-Americanism at the United Nations* (New York: United Nations Association-USA, 1984).

[13] Donald J. Puchala, "American Interests and the United Nations," *Political Science Quarterly* 97 (Winter 1982–83): 573.

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the "first United Nations," to cultivate the "second United Nations," and to manage the checks and balances that hold the two United Nations together in a precarious state of tension.

As an organization of sovereign states, the United Nations naturally has to provide its member governments with authoritative forums in which they can voice their views and aspirations in the context of an organized political process. This the United Nations does through the well-known public drama of parliamentary diplomacy that involves setting agendas for international consideration, articulating negotiating positions, forming voting blocs, engaging in debates and speechmaking, negotiating drafts and adopting (or defeating) resolutions, and similar quasi-legislative or declarative decisions.

Like other governments, the United States participates in this process in order to obtain from the United Nations support of United States interests, affirmation of the legitimacy of United States behaviour, and a sounding board for United States views on a variety of international problems. The United States may further seek political and operational action that the United Nations is best qualified to perform, ranging from conflict-control functions to international action to combat desertification (encroachment of the desert, especially the Sahara, on previously fertile areas), from promotion of human rights to economic development, and from population planning to international control of narcotic drugs. The United States also seeks, from time to time, changes in the practices of others that conflict with the principles that it espouses and, failing this, condemnation of the behavior of its antagonists on the international scene. In this process, the usual methods of persuasion, log-rolling, diplomacy, propaganda, and economic or political pressures are par for the course. Above all, this is a political process: governments may disagree; adversaries will take counteractions that the United States deprecates; votes are lost and won. It is not a show that the United States can run, but it is a process in which the United States can provide imaginative leadership and engage in skilled diplomatic bargaining. Americans are supposed to be good at this game and at striking pragmatic deals.

The United States in the Minority

On many issues involving important interests, the United States and its friends form a distinct minority in the United Nations deliberative organs—as they do in the world—and are at times reduced to damage-limitation tactics. Actions of governments that vote against United States interests, its principles, or its friends in the United Nations are a matter bearing on United States bilateral relations with those concerned. It is naive and counterproductive to blame the United Nations for postures struck by governments in its deliberative organs. It is, on the other hand, perfectly natural and realistic for the United States to respond in an appropriate manner to friendly or unfriendly initiatives that governments may take in those bodies and to make it unmistakably plain that action hostile to United States interests in the United Nations is no different from, and entails the same

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political costs as, hostile action outside the organization. The United States can and should object when governments pursue double-track policies, vociferously opposing the United States in the United Nations deliberative organs even while using bilateral channels to assure the United States of friendship and affection.

This requires, of course, a subtle and careful assessment of what actions are important, which are less so, and where United States interests lie. In a matter as quintessentially qualitative as political relationships, the last thing the United States would want to do is to "zap" governments indiscriminately on the basis of computer vote counts. Are we entitled to demand of governments which loyally worked with this country—as in the Law of the Sea negotiations—to follow the United States blindly as it careens into 180 degree policy turns based on the latest election returns? It is one thing to use rational persuasion when we change our minds. It is another matter altogether to exact unquestioning obedience. There are subtler and more effective ways of ensuring that America's weight in the world balance of political, economic and ideological power is duly reflected in United Nations proceedings.

Are United Nations Resolutions the Answer?

Is the public process of negotiating, debating, and adopting resolutions in the deliberative organs of the United Nations always a suitable method for dealing with complex international problems? The method has worked reasonably well in cooperative situations[14] for quasi-legislative institution-building, standard-setting, technical and rule-drafting matters, such as the preparation of a convention against torture, the establishment of a permanent commission of good offices, the codification of international trade law, or the support of the United Nations Emergency Operations in Africa.

On the other hand, increasingly serious doubts have been voiced about whether the resolution method is the best way to deal with international disputes. The parliamentary structure of the United Nations deliberative organs at times tends to inhibit genuine negotiations on the substance of disputes. It fosters posturing and rhetoric and hardens positions. The adoption of resolutions becomes an end in itself. Countries that would otherwise remain uninvolved feel compelled to adopt positions. The dynamic of parliamentary procedure tends to generate majorities and minorities for or against party A or B, each side endeavoring to score political points by enlisting the support of as many governments as possible. This process does not necessarily encourage the search for mutual accommodation, since the main thrust of debates in a deliberative organ is toward framing a resolution that will command majority support among governments that are not direct parties to the conflict. These governments will be determined to assert their own interest, which may be served as readily by widening the differences between the positions

[14] Richard E. Bissell, "*United States Participation in the United Nations System*" in Gati, ed., *The US, the UN and the Management of Global Change*, 98.

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of the parties, not necessarily by reconciling them. The outcome, as often as not, puts the United Nations in the position of acting as the ally or the captive of one side and as the antagonist of the other. Instead of being part of the solution, the United Nations becomes part of the problem, and former Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick complains that the process tends to exacerbate serious international controversies.[15]

Of course, the resolution process can perform useful functions by letting governments off the hook politically with regard to frustrating situations that may not lend themselves to conflict control. It is no doubt comforting for the United States to bask in the warm glow of majority support on Afghanistan or Cambodia—or for the Arab countries to do so when they get the Assembly to adopt anti-Israel resolutions on the Middle East. But neither triumph on the former issues nor discomfiture on the latter will do much to resolve the problems of Afghanistan, Cambodia or the Middle East. While little can be done in the United Nations about a problem, which is almost invariably the case when one of the superpowers is directly involved or when the dispute concerns two or more nonaligned countries, there is some consolation in being able to blame either one's antagonists for failing to heed United Nations resolutions or the United Nations for failing to endorse one's positions. More importantly, the process helps to focus public attention on outstanding issues that might otherwise become a *fait accompli.*

The main theoretical consideration in this matter concerns the points that we took up in our discussion of international conflict, insoluble disputes, and peace as the management of political impasse. In short, the unstated premise of parliamentary diplomacy is that a settlement of a conflict situation (as distinct from impasse management) is possible and that the content of such settlement is ascertainable by majority vote in an inter-governmental organ. For the most part this is almost as wrong as the assumption that the content of a settlement is ascertainable by confrontation or war. The understandable attempts of parties to disputes to capture the General Assembly in support of their positions have seldom yielded lasting political dividends.

The Second United Nations in U.S. Policy

In dealing with conflict situations, the deliberative organs have functioned most effectively by supporting the role of the United Nations as an impartial, objective third party. This has required the adoption of carefully balanced resolutions that authorize a process of impasse management, conflict control, and the search for negotiated adjustments and, in rare cases, settlements. These are essentially executive functions; none of them can be carried out by means of political debates in deliberative organs. At the same time, all require the authority and support of those organs, in addition to the consent of the governments and parties concerned.

[15] Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, *The Reagan Phenomenon and Other Speeches on Foreign Policy* (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1983), 96–97.

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In addition to authorization, it is for the member states to furnish the requisite political and material backing to the official primarily responsible for making the process work—the secretary-general.

In performing his task, the secretary-general, as has been noted by many observers, tends to become a quasi-autonomous actor on the international scene.[16] Having secured the authorization of the appropriate deliberative organ and the consent of the parties, the secretary-general is given a virtually free hand in formulating and implementing policies designed to give effect to his task. He is expected to act as the sparkplug in bringing and holding together the governments interested in actually controlling a dispute on a realistic and feasible basis. The secretary-general has to make sure that his activity—unlike the occasional resolutions of the deliberative organs—does not turn the United Nations into the instrument of one of the parties. His policies, to be effective, will endeavor to be independent and impartial—a hard row to hoe, but not necessarily an impossible one. Policies should be independent in the sense of being initiated by the secretary-general and his staff, having in mind the positions of the parties and others, but avoiding identification with either side or with any of the power blocs. These policies should also be impartial in the sense of downplaying, even ignoring to the extent possible, the majority support for one party or another that may emerge from the workings of the deliberative organs. Impartiality is an essential requirement, since the bearer of good offices or peacekeeper knows he would be out of business the moment he lost the confidence and support of the authorizing organ, or allowed himself to become the instrument of one or another of the parties. Would-be non-United Nations peacekeepers who forgot this requirement in Lebanon in 1983 found themselves paying a terrible price in human lives for their oversight.

By the same token, few things are more devastating for the United Nations than efforts by majorities in the deliberative organs to mandate flagrantly one-sided activities by the Secretariat or to apply a double standard to countries on opposing sides of conflict situations. Nothing has done more to alienate large and influential United States constituencies that used to support the United Nations. Nothing has provided more grist to the mill of extemist groups that are intent on weaning the United States from the multilateral approach to international problems and from respect for the rule of law in world affairs. Hence the present crisis in U.S.-UN relations that has led to the withholding by Congress of a large part of this year's U.S. financial contribution to the U.N. budget, in violation of treaty obligations.

The implications of the above analysis are of importance in framing United States policy towards the United Nations. The executive functions of the "second United Nations" that are carried out impartially are not directly subject to the vagaries of wayward majorities in the deliberative organs. They are, however, an

[16] See especially Thomas M. Franck, *Nation Against Nation* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985), chap. VII.

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invaluable factor of stability and can greatly facilitate the smooth operation of the international system, which in turn can serve American security interests well. The potential of the "second United Nations" is great, but it will not work by itself. It needs the support of, and the occasional exercise of pressure by, the great powers, including the United States, while avoiding the taint of identification with the policies of the United States, the Soviet Union, the nonaligned, or any other power or group of powers. It presupposes a readiness on the part of the major power groups to cooperate through the United Nations organs concerned—usually the Security Council—and to refrain from attempts to drag the "second United Nations" into the political morass of the "first United Nations." Where the major or minor powers are unwilling to curb their propensity for confrontation, direct or by proxy, the "second United Nations" will work no better than the first. Nothing else will, either. But when they are prepared to use rational methods to sustain a peaceful and civilized world order, the "second United Nations" is a handy instrument to use. Instead of being mesmerized by the endless quest for majority votes and popularity polls in the deliberative organs, policy makers would be well advised to focus on the United Nations as an instrument that can actually work and where there is much work to be done.

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Defense Against Terrorism

BRIAN M. JENKINS

"The Third World War has started," the notorious terrorist Carlos told his hostages in Vienna in 1975.[1] A French soldier in Beirut, a survivor of the suicide terrorist bombing that killed fifty-eight of his comrades, made a similar observation: "Our 58 comrades are perhaps the first deaths of the Third World War." Unlike the wars of the past, this war did not begin with one identifiable event. Indeed, no one can say for certain when or where it began.

International terrorism is not the kind of threat the Founding Fathers conceived of when they enjoined America's new government "to provide for the common defense." Nor is it the war the U.S. military has trained for. There are no massed armor formations pouring across a central front, no divisions on the march, no scramble of fighter aircraft. It is, rather, a hundred wars waged by elusive and ruthless foes. They operate under diverse banners: the Red Army Faction, the Red Brigades, the Armed Forces of National Liberation, the Revolutionary Armed Forces, the Revolutionary Army of the People, the Popular Front, the Holy War.

It is a conflict for which the United States is inadequately prepared, according to a distinguished panel of generals. American embassies have been destroyed, citizens have been kidnapped and killed, and jet fighters have been blown up on the ground. The U.S. attempt to rescue countrymen held hostage in Iran ended in failure, with eight dead rescuers left behind in the burning wreckage of their aircraft. American military headquarters have been damaged by bombs. Caught off guard, 242 U.S. Marines died when a single suicidal fanatic drove his explosives-laden truck into their barracks. Terrorists hold Americans hostages in Lebanon.

[1] The declaration made by Carlos was related to the author by one of the hostages held in Vienna.

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If American losses are numerically small compared with those suffered in more conventional combat, they are nevertheless symbolically and politically significant. It has been demonstrated repeatedly that by using terrorist tactics, small groups of extremists—or the states that sometimes direct them—can achieve disproportionate effects. Terrorists have attracted attention to themselves and their causes, they have caused worldwide alarm, and they have provoked crises that the U.S. government is obliged to deal with.

More seriously, terrorists and their state sponsors have altered American foreign policy and affected the ability to implement that policy. They have demonstrated that the United States has difficulty in striking back. They have provoked the United States into taking military action, thereby straining relations with its allies. They also have compelled the United States to divert increasing resources to protect itself and its facilities against their attacks. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, the secretary of defense, the secretary of state, and even the president live behind concrete barriers, visible reminders of American vulnerability.

In a speech made in February 1985, Secretary of State George Shultz said, "International terrorism has rapidly become one of the gravest challenges to American interests around the world. In the Middle East, in Latin America, and in Western Europe, we have suffered heavy casualties, and the threat has not diminished!"[2] In an earlier speech, he warned that in response to further state-sponsored terrorist attacks, the United States might be compelled to resort to military force, possibly "before each and every fact is known or on evidence that would not stand up in an American court."[3] He further warned that such military action could result in casualties among American service personnel and even among civilians.

The secretary of state's warnings seem to have popular approval. A public opinion poll completed in April 1986, little more than a week before American planes struck Libya, showed that 72 percent of Americans agreed that "the United States should use military force against terrorists and their state sponsors even if it risks civilian casualties."[4] Hyperbole on the part of the secretary? Hysteria on the part of the American public? Or a predictable and appropriate reaction to the growing threat posed by international terrorism? How did this come about?

The Increasing Impracticality of Conventional War

The contemporary wave of international terrorism arose from a confluence of political circumstances and technological developments in the late 1960s. Many factors were involved. The weapons developed during and immediately after World War II made the kind of war that was formally declared and openly fought between nations an increasingly impractical way of attaining national goals. Modern

[2] George P. Shultz, "U.S. Government and Business: Our Common Defense against Terrorism," address before the American Society for Industrial Security, Arlington, Va., February 1985.

[3] George P. Shultz, "Terrorism and the Modern World," address at Park Avenue Synagogue in New York, N.Y., 25 October 1984.

[4] Public opinion poll conducted by the Simon Wiesenthal Center, Los Angeles, Calif., 6 April 1986.

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weapons were too costly, too destructive. World opinion (and in some countries domestic public opinion), the cumbersome international machinery for limiting war, and the interest of the superpowers in avoiding direct confrontations all imposed constraints. This is not to say that war is obsolete or that the world is at peace. Our planet remains a violent place. More than a hundred armed conflicts have been waged since World War II. At present, forty wars involving the armed forces of forty-five nations—more than one-quarter of the globe—are being fought.

But most of the recent conflicts have been limited in their military aspect. In the conventional wars the belligerents have generally refrained from bringing all of their might to bear and have restricted their targeting. The self-imposed and externally imposed constraints that have operated in these wars have not extended to the lower registers of conflict. Of the eighty armed conflicts that occurred between 1945 and 1967, forty-six were civil wars, insurgencies, and guerrilla contests.[5] Of the forty armed conflicts being waged in 1986, twenty-seven are guerrilla wars. And in addition, terrorist campaigns are being waged in many countries. Many of the guerrilla wars are seen as indirect confrontations between nations unwilling to mount conventional challenges on the battlefield. It is in this environment that modern terrorism arose.

Present-day terrorism derives largely from twentieth century theories of guerrilla warfare, for which Mao Zedong deserves the most credit, despite the fact that his paramount concern—winning the support of the masses—would probably have made him reject the tactics of contemporary terrorism. During the civil war in China, Mao formulated a series of relationships that differed both from conventional military strategies and from earlier Marxist theories of revolution. He placed greater emphasis on military power than did the earlier Marxists, who relied primarily on political organization, seeing the military portion of the revolution as a final assault on government buildings. The Marxist formula had not worked in China. Mao had to wage a long war with forces that were numerically and technologically inferior to those of his opponents. Therefore, he had to enhance his military power with political motivation. Mao reasoned that guerrillas strengthened by the support of the Chinese peasants could survive military reverses and wage a protracted military campaign that would wear down their opponents.

Mao's concept of a "people's war," elaborated in the insurgent movements of the 1950s and 1960s, freed strategists from thinking about warfare exclusively in terms of soldiers and armaments. It allowed determined revolutionaries who lacked conventional military power to challenge militarily superior forces, with some hope of ultimately defeating them. Perhaps it accorded too much weight to political motivation and determination—both very subjective factors—because it has convinced later revolutionaries that a few pistols and their own political convictions (which they invariably judge superior to those of others) could guarantee them eventual victory.

[5] David Wood, "Conflict in the 20th Century," Institute for Strategic Studies, Adelphi Paper No. 48 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1968).

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Mao suggested that guerrillas must aim for and depend upon the political mobilization of people who would be mere bystanders in a conventional military conflict. He introduced a relationship between military action and the attitude and response of the audience that added a new dimension to armed conflict: instead of gauging success primarily in terms of the physical effect that military action had on the enemy, strategists could now say that the effect of a violent action on the people watching may be independent of and may equal or even exceed in importance the actual physical damage inflicted on the foe. Terrorism is that proposition pursued to its most violent extreme.

Modern terrorism also draws on a legacy of World War II: the concept of *total war*, in which virtually every aspect of human production was harnessed to the war effort and virtually every aspect of human production became a legitimate target. Modern terrorists extended this concept. The planners of the strategic bombing campaigns of World War II recognized in theory the existence of civilian bystanders; in practice, of course, the violence was indiscriminate. Today's terrorists recognize few innocent bystanders either in theory or in practice. However, they have less capacity for violence than did the bombers of World War II.

Terrorist tactics have generally been adopted when other modes of conflict or peaceful means have failed to attain political goals. By the late 1960s, it was clear that the rural guerrilla movements in Latin America, inspired by the success of Fidel Castro and patterned on the Cuban model, had failed. Leftist revolutionaries began to devote more attention to combat in the cities, and urban guerrilla warfare led almost automatically to the use of terrorist tactics. Whereas rural guerrillas might win battles that nobody would ever hear about, dramatic acts of violence in a major city were certain to win national, even international, attention. It was an easy step from killing or kidnapping local officials to killing or kidnapping foreign diplomats.

Meanwhile, frustrated by the failure of the Arab armies in 1967 and unable to wage guerrilla warfare in Israel, Palestinian extremists launched a global campaign of terrorism against Israel and its supporters. When hijacking airlines provoked worldwide outrage, the Palestinians turned to seizing hostages at places like Munich, Bangkok, and Khartoum. Terrorist tactics were adopted by radical students in Europe, the United States, and Japan when the mass protest movements of the late 1960s failed to bring about the changes they sought. Once the utility of terrorist tactics was demonstrated, terrorism became an imitative mode of behavior that spread throughout the world.

Contemporary international terrorism is well suited to the technology of our era. Modern jet travel provides terrorists with worldwide mobility. Conflicts need no longer be local—terrorists can strike on any continent. Radio, television, and communications satellites provide almost instantaneous access to a global audience. Weapons and explosives are increasingly available, and modern industrial society presents many vulnerable targets.

These developments have contributed to a long-range trend toward the privatization of violence. The power to publicize, to alarm, to coerce, to disrupt, to de-

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stroy is declining. The capacity for violence once monopolized by armies is coming into the hands of gangs. Small groups of determined extremists have in our era become an increasingly potent force to be reckoned with.

A Frustrating Paradox

Governments threatened by terrorist violence have fought back. Physical security has been increased around the most likely targets of terrorist attack. It has become more difficult, although it is still possible, to smuggle weapons aboard airlines. Hijackings have declined from their high point in 1969 and 1970. Embassies have become virtual fortresses. The seizing of embassies, a fashionable terrorist tactic in the 1970s, has all but ceased. Diplomats and top executives travel in armored cars with armed guards. The kidnapping of diplomats has declined. The collection and analysis of intelligence has improved, with the result that many terrorist attacks are thwarted. Most governments have adopted no-concessions policies in dealing with hostage situations. Although occasional deals are still made behind the scenes, terrorists find governments more resistant to their demands. International cooperation has progressed, although more could be done. Research has improved our knowledge of terrorists, identifying psychological vulnerabilities that governments can exploit. As a result of these efforts, hundreds of terrorists are in jails worldwide. Some groups have been virtually destroyed, and others are hard-pressed by authorities.

Yet despite these undeniable achievements, the total volume of international terrorism has increased. Figures vary according to their sources of information, collection criteria, and procedures, but the trajectory of terrorism continues upward. At the same time, terrorism has increased in volume; it also has become bloodier. Since 1977, the number of international terrorist incidents resulting in fatalities has increased each year. Terrorists seem less and less reluctant to inflict casualties. The most alarming trend in the 1980s is the growing number of incidents of large-scale indiscriminate violence, as terrorists detonate car bombs on city streets and set off bombs in airports, train stations, restaurants, department stores, and discotheques—actions carried out without warning, calculated to kill in quantity.

Terrorist tactics have remained relatively unchanged over time. When terrorists do innovate, it is only to overcome a specific countermeasure. Terrorists, unlike armies in conventional warfare, have virtually unlimited targets, and this reduces the requirement for tactical innovation. When confronted with security measures, terrorists merely alter their tactics to obviate the security measures or shift their sights to other vulnerable targets. Because terrorists can attack anything, anywhere, any time, and governments cannot protect everything, everywhere, all the time, terrorists always retain a certain advantage. Over the years the spectrum of targets attacked by terrorists has expanded. This asymmetry also means an inequality of effort between terrorist attackers and antiterrorist defenders. The amount of resources required for defense against terrorism is determined not by the very small

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number of terrorists, but rather by the virutally unlimited number of targets to be defended. This makes terrorism a cheap way to fight and a costly kind of threat to defend against.

Another disturbing trend is state sponsorship of terrorism. A number of governments are using terrorist tactics themselves or employing terrorist groups as a mode of surrogate warfare. These governments see in terrorism a useful capability, a "weapons system," a cheap means of engaging in war against domestic foes or other nations. Terrorists offer a cheap, deniable alternative to open, interstate armed conflict. Some nations that are unable to mount a conventional military challenge see terrorism as an "equalizer."

Growing state sponsorship of terrorism has serious consequences. It puts more resources in the hands of the terrorists: money, sophisticated munitions, intelligence, and technical expertise. It also reduces the constraints on terrorists, permitting them to contemplate large-scale operations without worrying about alienating perceived constituents or provoking public backlash, since they need not depend on the local population for support.

Without the need to finance themselves through bank robberies or ransom kidnappings and without the need to carry out operations just to maintain group cohesion, state-sponsored terrorist groups operate less frequently than groups that receive little or no state support, but they are many times more lethal and have far greater operational reach.

A New Kind of Warfare

We may be on the threshold of an era of armed conflict in which limited conventional warfare, guerrilla warfare, and international terrorism will coexist, with governments and subnational entities employing them individually, interchangeably, sequentially, or simultaneously—and having to defend against them. Warfare in the future may be less destructive than that in the first half of the twentieth century, but it may also be less coherent. Warfare will cease to be finite. The distinction between war and peace will dissolve. Armed conflict will not be confined to national frontiers. No contest will be local. Local belligerents will mobilize foreign patrons. Terrorists will attack foreign targets both at home and abroad.

Governments have achieved the greatest success against domestic terrorist groups. Terrorists who operate internationally, retreating to asylum in patron states, are harder to defeat. The same governments that vigorously pursue domestic terrorists often treat terrorists from abroad, especially those with powerful Middle East sponsors, as a political problem; in these cases, considerations of diplomacy and trade constrain government action.

Although the United States is not immune to terrorist violence from ideologically motivated fanatics and extremist elements within ethnic and émigré communities, domestic terrorists do not pose a major problem here. A few incidents occur each year, but they are eclipsed by the enormous volume of ordinary criminal violence. However, terrorist violence directed against American citizens and facilities

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abroad is a major problem. Except for the possible rescue of hostages or military action against a state sponsor of terrorism, the United States has few opportunities for responding directly to terrorists abroad. It has to depend on international cooperation to combat terrorism.

In attempting to combat terrorism, the U.S. operates in a difficult international environment. Five countries are on the receiving end of half of all international terrorist attacks: the United States, France, Israel, the United Kingdom, and Turkey. Ten countries bear the brunt of three-quarters of all international terrorism. Thus, not all countries feel equally threatened by terrorism or share the United States's sense of urgency about the problem.

Nor do all countries agree on the definition or the illegitimacy of terrorist tactics. Many reject the idea that there is a distinction between driving a truck bomb into an embassy and dropping a bomb on a city. Others argue that nobody who stands for a just cause is a terrorist. This further complicates the issue of definition. If cause is the criterion, only to the extent that everyone in the world can agree on the justice of a particular cause is there likely to be agreement that an action does or does not constitute terrorism.

This has led to the cliché that one man's terrorist is another man's freedom-fighter. The phrase implies that there can be no objective definition of terrorism and that there are no universal standards of conduct in conflict. However, civilized nations have through law identified modes of conduct that are criminal. Homicide, kidnapping, threats to life, and the willful destruction of property appear in the criminal codes of every country. True, some of the prohibitions may legally be violated in times of war—the law against killing, for example, may be violated by those we call "lawful combatants." Terrorists claim to be soldiers at war, who are therefore privileged to break ordinary laws. But even in war there are rules outlawing the use of certain weapons and tactics.

The rules of war grant civilian combatants who are not associated with "valid" targets at least theoretical immunity from deliberate attack. They prohibit taking hostages. They prohibit violence against those held captive. They define belligerents. They define neutral territory. These rules are sometimes violated—and those responsible for the violations become war criminals. But violations in no way diminish the validity of the rules.

Some international lawyers see the laws of war as possible solution to the dilemma of definition. They suggest that rather than trying to negotiate new treaties on terrorism that are not likely to be ratified or enforced, nations should apply the laws of war, to which almost all have agreed. Terrorists, they say, should be dealt with as soldiers who commit atrocities. Nearly all countries have agreed to try or extradite soldiers who commit atrocities in international armed conflicts. Why should persons not explicitly granted soldiers' status be given greater leeway to commit violence? Under the laws-of-war approach, terrorism would comprise all acts committed in peacetime that, if committed during war, would constitute war crimes.

Terrorism thus can be objectively defined by the quality of the act, but not by

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the identity of the perpetrators or the nature of their cause. All terrorist acts are crimes, many of which would also be war crimes or "grave breaches" of the rules of war if we accepted the terrorists' assertion that they are waging war. All terrorist acts involve violence or the threat of violence, sometimes coupled with explicit demands. The violence is usually directed against noncombatants. The purposes are political. The actions are often carried out in a way that will achieve maximum publicity. The perpetrators are usually members of an organized group. Their organizations are by necessity clandestine, but unlike other criminals, terrorists often claim credit for their acts. And finally—the hallmark of terrorism—the acts are intended to produce psychological effects beyond the immediate physical damage.

While these criteria do not eliminate all ambiguity, they enable us to draw some limits and answer some questions. Terrorism differs from ordinary crime in its political purpose and in its primary objective. Neither the ordinary bank robber nor the man who shot President Ronald Reagan is a terrorist. Likewise, not all politically motivated violence is terrorism. The Minuteman of the American Revolution and the rebel in Central America both have political motives, but they are not automatically terrorists. Terrorism is not synonymous with guerrilla war or any other kind of war, and it is not reserved exclusively for those trying to overthrow governments.

International terrorism can be defined as incidents that have clear international consequences: incidents in which terrorists go abroad to strike their targets, stay at home but select victims because of their connections to a foreign state (for example, diplomats or the executives of foreign corporations), or attack international lines of commerce (airliners). It excludes the considerable amount of terrorist violence carried out by terrorists operating within their own country against their own nationals and in many countries by governments against their own citizens.

This definition of international terrorism admittedly reflects the particular concern of the United States and the handful of other governments frequently targeted by terrorists abroad. The issue is not the general problem of political violence or terrorism or its causes—these are domestic matters. The unit of measure is the spillover of this violence into the international domain. The terrorists would argue that the established rules of diplomacy and war were contrived by a small group of primarily western nations for their own advantage and that they deprive groups without recognized governments, territory, or armies from exercising their "right" to resort to violence. The above definition of international terrorism is also criticized as being an artificial distinction that encompasses only a narrow slice of the total volume of political violence.

Lack of agreement on definition is further complicated by differing concepts of conflict. Many Third World governments, particularly those in Africa and Asia, may not cooperate with American and European efforts to identify and combat international terrorism, not because these governments approve of terrorist tactics, but because they see the antiterrorist efforts as part of a broader campaign aimed

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at outlawing the irregular methods of warfare that were developed in the Third World during the civil war in China and the anticolonial struggles in Asia and Africa. Not a few of the Third World's insurgent chiefs—today's leaders—were once called terrorists themselves. Their governments, particularly the ones that lack the tools of modern conventional war, therefore deliberately exclude from their definition of terrorism "wars of liberation," guerrilla warfare, other means of struggle that they themselves once employed or which are now being employed on behalf of causes they support.

The position taken by the Third World governments on international terrorism is consistent with the position they took at the Geneva negotiations to revise the laws of war. They sought to extend the rights and protections of the original Geneva Conventions to irregular forces as well as regular soldiers in international wars. They noted that the Geneva Conventions and other treaties regulating war were drafted by Europeans to regulate warfare among Europeans, but that they omitted from "international warfare" military force used by the Europeans in gaining and maintaining colonies. In other words, when Europeans shot at Europeans, it was a closely regulated affair, but when Europeans shot at Africans or Asians, they could do what they wanted. The Third World governments feared that the Americans and Europeans now wanted to brand the irregular methods used by the natives to fight back as "terrorism" and thereby outlaw them.

Americans: The Number One Target

Americans are the number one targets of international terrorism. American citizens and facilities figure as targets in approximately 28 percent of all incidents of international terrorism. However, this unenviable achievement is a product of the artifice of American definition. Terrorists focus much of their violence on the United States for several reasons. Anti-American terrorism is the price paid for influence and presence. The United States is the principal capitalist nation of the world, which makes it a target of various Marxist groups. Radical Moslem groups in the Middle East may view the United States as the principal source of wicked western secular influence. The United States is involved in contentious issues around the world—in Central America, the Middle East, and western Europe. Local terrorists may exaggerate the degree of influence exercised by the U.S. government, thinking that by attacking American targets or seizing American hostages they will indirectly wield leverage over the governments they want to influence. And Americans are ubiquitous. It is hard to find a city in the world where American diplomats or businessmen do not reside, or an airport where Americans travelers are not present. Americans are frequently among the victims of terrorist attacks even when they are not the targets.

The emergence of international terrorism as a major problem in recent years has raised several questions directly relevant to the common defense. In today's world of growing terrorism, what protection can the U.S. government provide for American citizens abroad? Is terrorism a nuisance overblown by heavy media

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coverage and the tough rhetoric of American leadership? Or does it pose a genuine threat to U.S. national security? Should the United States use military force in response to state-sponsored terrorism? For that matter, should the United States ever *choose* to use military force when national survival is not at stake?

The growing volume of violence and the bloodshed produced by international terrorism has not gone unnoticed at the higher levels of government, but despite the tough words coming out of the White House, most American officials, until recently, regarded terrorism more as a nuisance than as a serious threat worthy of sustained national attention. Government interest in the problem tended to be spasmodic, driven by infrequent spectacular episodes. Terrorist attacks provoked occasional outrage. The deaths they caused were, of course, tragic, but between episodes terrorism took a back seat on the government's agenda. Terrorism was deplorable, but it was tolerable.

That perception changed dramatically on 23 October 1983, when a suicide driver smashed his explosives-laden truck into a squat concrete building at the edge of Beirut Airport, killing 240 U.S. Marines stationed there as part of the Multinational Peacekeeping Force that had been sent to prevent further massacres in Beirut. Moments later another truck filled with explosives crashed into an apartment building occupied by the French peacekeeping contingent, killing fifty-eight French soldiers.

The difference was not simply the colossal size of the bomb that destroyed the Marine headquarters, although explosives experts said it was one of the largest explosions they had ever seen. It was not simply the casualties, although they rendered the bombing the deadliest incident in the annals of international terrorism. Nor was it simply that high-ranking military officials were publicly rebuked for neglecting their command responsibilities, although that was embarrassing. And it was not simply fear that terrorism of this type would spread to the United States, although that clearly caused concern, as evidenced by the dump trucks and concrete barriers that soon surrounded buildings in Washington.

Much more than that, the attack clearly demonstrated how governments could effectively use terrorism to achieve their goals. The attack provoked an intense debate in the United States, curtailed the deployment of the U.S. Marines in Lebanon, virtually "killed" the Multinational Peacekeeping Force, destroyed U.S. policy in Lebanon, and undermined U.S. policy in the Middle East. Moreover, it demonstrated American vulnerability to this form of attack, and more importantly, the inability of the United States to retaliate.

There was a powerful appetite for action in this country as the bodies of American Marines were pulled from the rubble in Beirut. The desire for vengeance grew as the intelligence began to indicate, but could never satisfactorily prove, that Syria or Iran, or both, were behind the attack. On the basis of good circumstantial evidence, the United States might still have done something. The French, after all, did not have any better intelligence, and they bombed Baalbek, Lebanon. "In this part of the world, if you don't strike back," one French officer admonished visiting American officials, "you are despised."

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Certainly something had to be done, but what? The cupboard of options was bare. As days turned into weeks, the public ardor for immediate reprisal against anyone connected with the attack cooled. As it did, the requirement increased for better proof and a more precise target. Time passed. The moment was lost. The intense frustration in Washington congealed into a fear that the United States would be seen by its often reluctant allies and always aggressive foes as impotent. They would expect the United States to fold when faced with terrorist attack. Officials feared that this perception would encourage the governments sponsoring the attacks to continue their course of action and might inspire others to do the same. In an age when perceptions have power equal to reality, terrorism that has these results is intolerable.

In a major policy address on the changing nature of power and diplomacy in the 1980s and the particular threat posed by state-sponsored terrorism, Secretary of State Shultz in April 1984 spoke of the "grey area" that falls "between major war and millenial peace" and the contemporary weapons of state-sponsored terrorism, which he described as a new form of warfare. He said it was "increasingly doubtful that a purely passive strategy can even begin to cope with the problem."[6] The United States needed an *active defense*—and that meant the use of military force.

By the time he delivered the speech, Shultz had in effect already won his battle with those in government who opposed a formal military response to terrorism. On that same day, the President signed a National Security Directive dealing with terrorism, which ordered the appropriate government departments to develop military options. Shultz's speech was thus a call to arms, an exhortation to use force if that is necessary to combat terrorism. The speech, together with the National Security Directive, constituted a declaration of war against an unspecified terrorist foe, to be fought at an unknown place and time with weapons yet to be chosen.

There were problems with the "weapons." Shortly after the bombing of the Marine barracks in Beirut, and in the face of growing criticism that the Marines had taken inadequate security measures, the secretary of defense convened a commission of distinguished military officers to conduct an independent inquiry into the attack. The commission, chaired by retired Admiral Robert Long, examined the mission of the Marines in Lebanon, the rules of engagement that governed their conduct, the adequacy of intelligence to support the units, and above all the adequacy of the security measures taken.

Initially, some members of the commission wanted to confine the inquiry to technical issues within their sphere of competence. Indeed, senior military officials had not previously been receptive to discussions of terrorism. Combatting terrorism was outside the realm of their experience or competence, and except for a few specialized units, none had seen combatting terrorism as part of their mission.

In this regard, they were largely right. As long as terrorism was the product of small, autonomous bands occasionally attacking American citizens around the

[6] George P. Shultz, speech to the Tri-Lateral Commission, 3 April 1984.

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world, the role of the military was limited to protecting its own personnel and assets and, in highly unusual circumstances, rescuing hostages abroad. As long as warfare remained conventional and terrorism remained something other than warfare, this lack of interest was understandable and valid. However, as the inquiry progressed, the members of the commission began to see terrorism as an increasing threat, one that the U.S. armed forces were inadequately prepared to deal with. That finding became one of the commission's most important and controversial conclusions.

The commission concluded that both intelligence and security in Beirut had been inadequate and recommended that the secretary of defense take disciplinary action against those in the chain of command, an extraordinary rebuke unparalleled in the annals of recent American military history. The commission also concluded that state-sponsored terrorism was an important part of the spectrum of warfare and that the U.S. armed forces were inadequately prepared to defend against or counter terrorist actions.[7] The commission announced to the American military establishment that terrorism was not simply a problem for the police, the operatives in the intelligence community, and a few specialized units, but that it was part of a kind of warfare that threatened the United States. And it was a kind of warfare that the best trained, best equipped, most powerful armed forces in the world did not know how to fight.

Despite the secretary of state's "declaration of war" and the Long Commission's admonition, American military leadership remained unenthusiastic about the use of military force in response to terrorism for several reasons, some good and some bad. Traditionally, the American military establishment has been unenthusiastic about any type of low-level conflict—that is, anything short of the full-scale conventional war for which the armed forces are primarily trained and equipped. Not only did the armed forces seem to be a poor instrument for combatting terrorism, that task seemed filled with the dangers of imprecise missions, political constraints, and uncertain measures of success.

The U.S. military had learned its lesson well in Vietnam. It has taken nearly ten years to recover from that disaster, and American military leaders were fearful that military action against terrorists, with the risks of highly visible failure, civilian casualties, and potential lack of results would squander the public support that they had only recently regained. The loss of public support would translate into lost support in Congress, and that would mean less money for the costly weapons systems that the Pentagon favored, which in turn would weaken the nation's defenses against the threat that really mattered—the Soviet Union.

In response to the secretary of state's arguments that diplomatic success often depends on perceptions of military power and the nation's willingness to use it, the military countered that before military force could be employed against terrorists or their state sponsors, it was necessary to have proof of their involvement

[7] Department of Defense Commission headed by Adm. Robert L. J. Long, U.S. Navy (Ret.), *Beirut International Airport (BIA) Terrorist Act of October 23, 1983* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, December 1983).

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and to be prepared to divulge that proof. And any actions taken must be legal under international law. If military force were to be used, it must be timely, it must be appropriate, it must have public support, it must have a good probability of success, and it should only be used as a measure of last resort. While one cannot argue with any of these considerations individually, collectively they would make it very difficult to get the green light for any military operation. And that may have been the point. Establishing rigorous criteria as prerequisites made it less likely that military force would ever be used.

The debate within government about a military response to terrorism reflected a larger debate about the use of military force in general: Should the United States ever use military force as a matter of choice, as an instrument of policy, when national security was not at stake? In fact, the United States has employed force on numerous occasions where America's own security was not directly imperiled. Indeed, it could be argued that the only time the United States was directly threatened was in World War II. The issue remains open.

While the debate swirled in Washington, the American public was becoming increasingly bellicose. Part of the anger reflected the growing volume of terrorist attacks against Americans, part of it reflected the news media's coverage of these events, and part of it reflected a change in terrorist targeting. Throughout the 1970s, occasional terrorist attacks had provoked spasms of public outrage, but the threat remained a distant one to most Americans. That changed somewhat during the protracted hostage crisis in Iran. The deliberately insulting behavior of the Iranian captors and the spectacle of blindfolded Americans being paraded before carefully choreographed bloodthirsty mobs that was shown nightly on the television sets in American living rooms aroused strong emotional reactions. Although the homecoming of the hostages in 1981 was a cause for national celebration, there was still a great deal of residual frustration and anger, accurately reflected in President Reagan's warning that in the future, terrorist attacks on Americans would be met with "swift retribution."

The suicide bomb attacks on the American Embassy in Beirut, the American Marines, the American Embassy in Kuwait, and the American Embassy annex in East Beirut in 1983 and 1984 demonstrated that tough rhetoric by itself would not halt terrorism. The real turning point in public attitude, however, came with the hijacking of TWA flight 847 in June 1985, an episode that received tremendous media coverage. In some respects, the incident resembled the earlier hostage crisis in Iran, except for the identity of the hostages. The passengers on TWA 847 were not diplomats or expatriate businessmen, but "ordinary" Americans. Watching the news coverage on television, all Americans became vicarious victims. The TWA hijacking was followed by the hijacking of the cruise ship *Achille Lauro* and the hijacking of an Egyptian airliner. In each case, Americans were singled out from other nationalities and were murdered in cold blood. The terrorist attacks on the Rome and Vienna airports followed. The United States was not the target in these attacks, but among the dead was a twelve-year-old American girl. Then came the explosion of a bomb aboard TWA flight 840, killing a mother and her infant child.

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Americans became frightened. They canceled their plans to travel to Europe for fear of terrorism. They believed terrorists would carry out attacks in the United States. Public pressure for military action was becoming irresistible. Then a discotheque frequented by Americans in West Berlin was bombed, an action blamed on Libya. This attack, combined with intelligence reports that Libya was planning further terrorist operations directed against Americans, the administration's determination to demonstrate that state-sponsored terrorism would not be unpunished, and growing public pressure finally culminated in the decision to attack Libya.

The bombing of Libya did not appreciably reduce the world volume of terrorism in the months that followed; that had not been expected. Middle Eastern groups carried out fewer attacks in western Europe. It is hard to say whether American military retaliation had induced a certain self-restraint or measures taken by the European governments made western Europe a more difficult theater for terrorists to operate in. Alarmed by the American attack and fearful that the United States might order further attacks, thus somehow dragging its European allies into a war in the Mediterranean, a number of European governments took measures calculated to preempt further unilateral action by the United States. They expelled Libyan diplomats and kept a closer watch on suspected terrorists. Fearing retaliation from Arab extremists, they tightened security. The result was an unanticipated benefit of the U.S. action. Whether the bombing of Libya and the threat of further American military action would dissuade Libya from supporting new terrorist attacks was problematical, but the attack has permanently altered the equation. Any nation contemplating terrorist action against the United States after 15 April 1986 had to take into account the possibility of American military retaliation.

From this review of trends in international terrorism and the American response, what can we conclude? First, Americans probably will continue to be popular targets of terrorism around the world. The U.S. government cannot protect them. The nature and degree of the U.S. public reaction will depend greatly on the quality of each incident and, in particular, on the quality of the news media's coverage of incidents. When Americans are attacked or taken hostage by terrorists, the public will demand vigorous government action to secure the release of hostages by whatever means are necessary or to strike back if Americans are harmed.

Second, it seems that, rightly or wrongly, terrorism is increasingly perceived, at least in the mind of the public, as a threat to the common defense. State-sponsored terrorism is increasingly seen, at least in the United States, as a threat to national security, a form of war that must be countered like any other form of war. Accordingly, military force is seen as an appropriate response, not every time, but clearly an option for which the armed forces must be prepared.

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Trade Conflicts and the Common Defense: The United States and Japan

STEPHEN D. KRASNER

For the United States, providing for the common defense has always had a specific and distinctly American meaning. With few exceptions American policy makers have had a Manichean view of the world, a perspective that reflects the profound and pervasive influence of Lockean liberalism on foreign policy.[1] Other countries have been classified as either good or evil, as friends or enemies. The United States has found it difficult to identify common interests with enemies or irreconcilable conflicts with friends. In dealing with enemies American policy makers have been very alert to any alteration in the relative distribution of power and unconcerned with absolute gains. In contrast, in dealing with friends American policy makers have been almost exclusively concerned with absolute gains and have been insensitive to relative shifts in power capabilities.

The precept that a country has permanent interests but not permanent friends is profoundly antithetical to the American perspective. U.S. policy makers have paid little attention to the possibility that a loss of power vis-à-vis friends could present serious and unforeseen difficulties, either because friends can become enemies or because managing the international system may be more difficult in a world in which power is more evenly distributed.

Nowhere has this obliviousness to the potential importance of relative gains

[1] The classic statement of this argument is Louis Hartz, *The Liberal Tradition in America* (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1955), esp. chap. XI.

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among friends been more apparent than in American foreign economic policy in the postwar period. In the years immediately after World War II, the basic American concern was that economic breakdown would lead to political collapse and the "loss" of Europe and Japan. Economic prosperity was thought to be a prophylactic against communism. American policy makers promoted European economic unification even though this was, in the long term, bound to place American products at some comparative disadvantage; and they tolerated explicit Japanese discrimination against American exports and direct foreign investment. Their basic objective was to increase the level of absolute well-being in the western alliance. They were unconcerned with relative power except with regard to the Soviet Union.

In pursuit of their goal of promoting absolute well-being, they fostered a set of norms for the international economic system in which reciprocity, the balancing of concessions, played a central role. But they understood reciprocity in a specific way. American leaders endorsed diffuse rather than specific reciprocity. Diffuse reciprocity implies that negotiations and agreements should be multilateral. Rules are designed to regulate procedures rather than actual outcomes. Specific balancing is eschewed in favor of promoting long-term reductions in trade barriers which, it is inferred, will benefit all countries. Some free riding is tolerated, because the costs of coercion and policing outweigh the benefits provided by greater openness.

In contrast, specific reciprocity requires careful equilibration of benefits. Negotiations and agreements are limited to specific countries. Rules are designed to achieve particular behavioral outcomes. Free riding is not tolerated; tit for tat is a legitimate strategy. Rules can vary across countries and issue areas. Different problems are treated in different ways.[2]

In many ways, diffuse reciprocity was a stunning success for the United States. Formal trade barriers have fallen across the industrialized world. Trade has grown dramatically since the conclusion of World War II. Economic growth rates have been unprecedented. Communist movements, whether legitimate or illegitimate, have been frustrated. Diffuse reciprocity reinforced American conceptions of the common defense, which denied profound disagreements among allies.

The Problem

In recent years, however, the economic consequences for the United States of a global regime based upon multilateral accords and diffuse reciprocity have become more problematic. Nowhere is this more apparent than in American relations with East Asia, especially Japan. Japan has challenged the United States even in the highest of high-technology goods. Moreover, it has been extremely difficult for American producers to secure access to the Japanese market despite the

[2] Robert Keohane, "Reciprocity in International Relations," *International Organization* 40 (Winter 1986), develops the distinction between diffuse and specific reciprocity and analyzes in general terms the costs and benefits of these two approaches.

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removal of virtually all non-agricultural tariff and nontariff barriers in Japan. The difficulty American producers have had in penetrating the Japanese market can no longer be attributed to violations of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) rules. The rules are being followed, but the expected consequences have not materialized.

One explanation for this disjunction between policy change and behavioral continuity is that the structure of Japan's domestic political economy defies external penetration. Japanese institutions, both public and private, are linked in a dense network of reciprocal obligations. Relations are, in Oliver Williams's term, hierarchies rather than markets.[3] It is extremely difficult for new actors to pierce this network, whether they be Japanese or foreign; given the past system of formal closure, almost all foreign actors are bound to be new.

If domestic political-economic structures vary, then similar universal rules, such as those codified in the GATT, can have very different behavioral outcomes. Tariff reductions in a market-oriented system like the United States will offer more opportunities to foreign producers than similar reductions in Japan, because buyers are more likely to consider only the costs and benefits of a specific transaction rather than to also incorporate assessments about past and future relationships with prospective suppliers. Diffuse reciprocity will not work even in the absence of conscious efforts at exploitation by the Japanese. The differences between the domestic structures of these two states guarantees that a universal open system based upon diffuse reciprocity will leave the United States with the "sucker's" payoff.[4]

Given this situation there is a strong incentive for the United States to adopt a policy of specific reciprocity. Such a policy would be economically beneficial for the United States. It would be more sustainable in the long run than the current policy based on diffuse reciprocity. And it could decrease the economic tensions generated by misperceptions in both countries arising from differing understandings of the implications of the GATT regime.

The adoption of such a policy will, however, be difficult for the United States, because its conception of the common defense is so strongly oriented toward enemies rather than friends. The notions that Japan could pose a threat to the United States simply by virtue of its growing power capabilities and that American policies could be contributing to that growth are difficult to assimilate into a Manichean view of the world. Even if Japan is not perceived as a potential military enemy, the creation of an environment in which an effective Japanese-American condominium could be established, or even a transition to Japanese leadership effected, has not been seriously addressed.

[3] See Oliver Williamson, *Markets and Hierarchies* (New York: Free Press, 1975).

[4] For an elaboration of payoff matrices in prisoner's dilemma, see Robert Axelrod, *The Evolution of Cooperation* (New York: Basic Books, 1984). Analyses that emphasize direct state intervention in the control of the Japanese economy would lead to an even more pessimistic conclusion about the prospects for an effective system of diffuse reciprocity. If there is direct state intervention in Japan, it is now at such a subtle level that it cannot adequately be dealt with through the GATT framework, or even through some of its ancillary arrangements such as the Government Procurement Code.

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In some areas Japan is gaining rapidly on the United States. If present trends continue, Japan's manufacturing output would surpass America's in about twenty years. Technological progress is making the absence of raw materials less important. While Japan's relatively small population, at least in comparison with the United States, makes Japanese hegemony unlikely even in the long term, the need to share power is already apparent in some issue areas such as international finance. Past experience as well as collective choice analysis should not make us sanguine about the ease with which a Japanese-American condominium could be established.[5]

Japan's Political Economy

Japan cannot fail to arrest the attention of policy makers and analysts. For the last three decades it has been the world's most dynamic economy. Growth has been coupled with political stability. Japan has become an exemplar, a model for other states to follow. But what remains at issue is what exactly it exemplifies.

Two conflicting interpretations of Japan's economic success have been presented in the United States. The first, which can be termed the market-oriented model, argues that Japanese attainment can be explained in conventional neoclassical economic terms. The most important institution is the private corporation. Japanese firms have vigorously pursued market opportunities. The hand of the Japanese state has been light, particularly at the sectoral and specific company levels. State intervention is only apparent at the macroeconomic level, where government policy has promoted a high rate of savings and maintained a stable overall environment for private business.

The second line of argument, which can be labelled the developmental state model, places great emphasis on the network of relationships between public and private actors and among private firms. Indeed, it questions the appropriateness of even labelling Japanese firms as "private," as if they were equivalent to corporations in the United States or Europe, because their ties with other actors in the polity and their definition of their own objectives are so heavily influenced by nonmarket considerations. Public institutions are seen as playing an important role in Japanese economic success through their intervention at the sector and firm, as well as the macroeconomic, levels.[6]

[5] Bruce Russett has correctly pointed out that despite a decline since World War II, the power position of the United States remains extraordinary. See his "The Mysterious Case of Vanishing Hegemony; Or, Is Mark Twain Really Dead," *International Organization* 39 (Spring 1985); for a discussion of the importance of having one leading power, see Charles P. Kindleberger, *The World In Depression, 1929–1939* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973).

[6] The term developmental state is taken from Chalmers Johnson, *MITI and the Japanese Miracle: The Growth of Industrial Policy, 1925–1975* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1982). In this presentation, however, I have placed somewhat more emphasis on the network of relations between the public and the private sector rather than the directive role of central state institutions such as MITI (Ministry of International Trade and Industry) and the Ministry of Finance. Daniel Okimoto has called this conceptualization the network state. See Daniel I. Okimoto, *Between MITI and the*

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The Market Model

Many scholars, and certainly almost all economists, have interpreted Japan's economic success from a conventional neoclassical theoretical perspective. Japan's performance is not seen as the result of state intervention, or a peculiar configuration of state-private interaction, or unique cultural values, but rather as the product of factor endowments, including managerial skills, residing in the private sector. In what is still one of the most influential interpretations of contemporary Japan, Hugh Patrick and Henry Rosovsky state that "We gently suggest that Japanese growth was not miraculous: it can be reasonably well understood and explained by ordinary economic causes."[7] In particular, they point to Japan's highly skilled labor force, the existence of widespread dualism in the labor market after World War II that provided a pool of workers, and "substantial managerial, organizational, scientific, and engineering skills capable of rapidly absorbing and adapting the best foreign technology."[8] Coupling these labor endowments, which reflected in part the level of industrial accomplishment that Japan had reached before the war, with capital and technology produced rapid economic growth.

The state does not disappear entirely from the market-oriented model, but its role is distinctly secondary. It acts as a facilitator for the private sector. Adherents of the market model generally accept the claim that the government gave private business the first claim on investible resources. This was particularly important after the war, when capital and foreign exchange were both in short supply. The state adopted policies that encouraged high levels of savings. Expenditures on social welfare and tax rates were both kept low in comparison with other advanced industrialized states. (In fact, Japan could hardly be classified as an advanced country in the early 1950s when its per capita gross national product (GNP) was lower than that of Brazil and Chile.) The following quote, again from Patrick and Rosovsky's 1976 study, captures the essential thrust of the markert-oriented model.

> Our view is that, while the government has certainly provided a favorable environment, the main impetus to growth has been private—business investment demand, private saving, and industrious and skilled labor operating in a market-oriented environment of relative prices. Government intervention generally has tended (and intended) to accelerate trends already put in motion by private market forces—the development of infant industries, the structural adjustment of declining industries, and the like.[9]

Market (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1982), esp. chap. 3. I have not tried to resolve the differences between Johnson and Okimoto in this article since my objective is to provide an alternative to the market-oriented model. Both Johnson's more statist perspective and Okimoto's more corporatist one stand in clear contrast with the market-oriented approach, which sees government activity restricted to macroeconomic measures and market structure dominated by strongly competitive firms.

[7] Hugh Patrick and Henry Rosovsky, "Japan's Economic Performance: An Overview" in Hugh Patrick and Henry Rosovsky, eds., *Asia's New Giant: How the Japanese Economy Works* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1976), 6.

[8] Ibid., 12.

[9] Ibid., 47.

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Analysts utilizing a market-oriented perspective see Japan's political system as pluralistic. Power is divided among a number of different groups. There is intense competition within the private sector. Although the Liberal Democratic party (LDP) has won every election since 1950, it is internally split into factions and is better seen as a loose coalition of quasi-independent political baronies rather than a coherent and unified political party. Government agencies are at times forced to capitulate to particular private pressures. While bureaucracies do often develop close relationships with firms in specific sectors of the economy, this does not lead to coherent and centralized direction, because different bureaus have different goals and objectives. Philip Tresize concludes his assessment of Japan's political system with the observation that

> the tidier the model of Japan's political economy, the less it conforms to reality . . . The bureaucracy has indeed had an extensive and active part in economic life, but it has been constantly subject to conflicting pressures, ranging from narrow loyalty to individual ministries to the demands of competing special interest groups. And politics in Japan has hardly been more orderly a process of bargain and compromise than in any other democracy.[10]

For adherents of the market model, economic conflict between the United States and Japan reflects either specific interests group pressures or the failure to adequately coordinate macroeconomic policy. Even with equilibrium exchange rates, Japan would have a large bilateral surplus with the United States: it would run a large deficit with primary commodity producing areas (especially oil exporting states) which it would offset by running surpluses with other areas of the world.[11] The widely-noted lack of manufactured imports into Japan can be explained from the market-oriented perspective by factor endowments. Given an absence of raw materials, high rates of saving, and a skilled labor force, Japan would not be expected to import many manufactures.[12] Periods of economic tension between the United States and Japan have coincided with high American bilateral trade deficits that are related to the dollar/yen exchange rate, which is in turn heavily influenced by macroeconomic policy choices. Greater coordination could lessen or even eliminate conflict.[13]

[10] Philip H. Tresize, "Politics, Government, and Economic Growth in Japan" in Patrick and Rosovsky, eds., *Asia's New Giant*, 810.

[11] C. Fred Bergsten and William R. Cline, *The United States-Japan Economic Problem* (Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics, October 1985), 40.

[12] Gary Saxonhouse has developed this argument at some length. See, for instance, his "Japan's Intractable Trade Surpluses in a New Era," Seminar Discussion Paper No. 178, Research Seminar in International Economics, University of Michigan, n.d.

[13] One formulation is Ronald McKinnon's call for the establishment of stable exchange rates between the United States, Europe, and Japan. See, for instance, his *An International Standard for Monetary Stability* (Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 1984).

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The Developmental State Model

The developmental state model stands in contrast with the market-oriented model. Adherents of this approach reject the notion that the basic impetus, the root cause of Japan's economic performance has been the private market. They argue that market transactions in Japan are conditioned by non-economic factors. The market itself cannot be understood without reference to the larger social context within which it is embedded. Direct action by the state is seen as fundamental for understanding Japan's development. The strongest advocates of the developmental state model contend that the state is the primary cause of Japanese growth. Alternative versions of this argument focus on the involvement of public and private organizations in a dense policy network that blurs the boundary between the state and civil society.[14]

At the core of the developmental state system are a group of interlocked private, political, and public institutions that share core values emphasizing the central importance of aggregate economic performance—large industrial and financial enterprises, the Liberal Democratic party, and the Ministry of Finance and Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI). The strength of these various actors has changed over time. The power of the major ministries—Finance, International Trade and Industry—has slipped in relation to the LDP and the major corporations, because party members have become more knowledgeable about specialized bureaucratic affairs and firms have more direct control over financial and other resources. More actors, with conflicting interests, have become involved in policy making. Nevertheless, in comparison with the United States and most other industrialized countries, the most powerful institutions in Japan are very closely bonded through shared values and personal networks.

The ability to arrive at a shared consensus about basic goals has been a hallmark of Japan's political economy. The survival of the community is the fundamental objective, rather than the interests of particular groups or individuals. At least through the early 1970s Japanese policy makers agreed that perpetuation of the community required rapid economic growth. The national interest was interpreted as recovery from the devastation left by World War II. This goal took precedence over other possible objectives, such as equity, and was shared by the Liberal Democratic party, the bureaucracy, large corporations, and most of the electorate.[15]

In the private sector, the significance of community survival is reflected in the choice of market share and long-term growth as the most important corporate

[14] The two versions of this argument correspond with statist approaches that see public institutions as separate and distinct from civil society and with corporatist approaches that place more emphasis on the network of relationships between the public and private sphere. Two major texts that reflect this distinction are Chalmers Johnson's *MITI* and Daniel Okimoto's *Between MITI and the Market*.

[15] See, for instance, Kozo Yamamura, "Caveat Emptor: The Industrial Policy of Japan" in Paul R. Krugman, ed., *Strategic Trade Policy and the New International Economics* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1986), 169–170; also Johnson, *MITI*.

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goals. Firms are linked by joint stock ownership, which not only reinforces mutuality of interests but also acts as a barrier to outside or hostile takeovers. Seventy percent of the stock of Japan's major companies is owned by other companies and is never traded on the open market.[16] Companies are joined through *keiretsu* (corporate group) ties, among which the provision of finance from the group's bank may be particularly important. Labor unions have been excluded from the policy network in Japan, reducing concern with short-term questions of equity and distribution.[17] Coordination within firms is accomplished through the sharing of information among incumbent employees who, at least in large firms, enjoy permanent tenure.[18]

Decision making requires consensus. No major conclusion is arrived at without extensive discussion among interested parties. Leaders are obligated to adopt an inclusionary style. Any bargaining situation is encumbered with long-term calculations of mutual obligations that have been accumulated in the past and are assumed to extend into the future.[19]

It is difficult to accommodate new actors within established networks, even if they are Japanese. Foreigners are even more problematic, since there is no reason to suppose that they will share national objectives and their sense of commitment even to local objectives (such as those in a specific industrial sector) are likely to be suspect if only because they have competing interests outside of Japan. In a system based on diffuse reciprocity, such as Japan's policy networks, the admittance of new actors would open the danger of exploitation even with the best intentioned participants.

For the developmental state model, public organizations—especially the central economic ministries, the Ministry of Finance, and MITI—are critically important. Daniel Okimoto argues that in Japan "the presumption is that the state is there to do whatever is appropriate and necessary to promote industrial growth and prosperity." Interesting contrasts between American and Japanese attitudes are sometimes provided by small incidents. In March 1986, American and Japanese semiconductor manufacturers met in Los Angeles to discuss their disagreements related to international trade. The Japanese delegation included representatives from MITI. American government officials did not participate. S. Bruce Smart, the under secretary of commerce for international trade, stated that "we

[16] Chalmers Johnson "How to Think About Economic Competition Coming From Japan," paper presented at the West Coast Forum on the Japanese Political Economy, University of Washington, n.d. (c. 1986).

[17] See T. J. Pempel's discussion of the exclusion of labor in his "Japanese Foreign Economic Policy: The Domestic Bases for International Behavior" in Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., *Between Power and Plenty* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1978).

[18] Masahiko Aoki, "The Japanese Bureaucracy in Economic Administration: A Rational Regulator or Pluralist Agent?" CEPR Publication No. 68, Center for Economic Policy Research, Stanford University (March 1986), 34–35.

[19] I. M. Destler, *Managing an Alliance: The Politics of U.S.-Japanese Relations* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1976), 108–111. See also Stephen D. Cohen, *Uneasy Partnership: Competition and Conflict in U.S.-Japan Trade Relations* (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1984), 7.

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don't think we should put ourselves in the middle of private transactions, and secondly we were concerned that our presence there somehow would be interpreted as some form of repeal or absolution from antitrust laws.[20]

While the leverage of the major policy-making ministries has eroded in recent years, their power is still formidable. Even without formal authority in an area, they can exercise influence over firms and sectors through the use of administrative guidance. Ministries do have sanctions that can be used to punish those actors in the private sector that ignore administrative guidance. For instance, a ministry could reject a firm's application for approval of a specific kind of transaction. The ministry might refuse to cooperate with a recalcitrant firm in other issue areas. The ministries retain control over issuing ordinances, licensing, and registration. Even without sanctions, their considerable prestige makes administrative guidance a potent instrument.[21]

The state not only provides a general economic environment that is conducive to economic growth by, for instance, sustaining stable macroeconomic conditions, it also may intervene at the level of the sector or the firm. Japanese policy makers have rejected the dictates of static comparative advantage, which in the 1950s suggested that Japan ought to concentrate on labor-intensive products. Instead they have attempted to identify industrial sectors that are characterized by increasing returns to scale, high income elasticities of demand, attractive exports markets, and extensive technological linkages.[22]

The developmental state model does not reject the importance of the market. Indeed, Japan's focus on export-oriented, as opposed to import-substituting, growth compelled Japanese firms to operate in environments that were completely outside the control of their own government. But the state actively encouraged the redeployment of resources to make Japanese firms more competitive. Japanese economic development took precedence over all other objectives.

Chalmers Johnson has argued that the very conception of the market in Japan is different from that which exists in other polities, especially the United States. For the Japanese the basic function of the market is to promote economic growth. The state acts to create conditions that will elicit the maximal entrepreneurial effort from the private sector. In contrast, Americans see the market as a form of

[20] Daniel I. Okimoto, "Domestic Political Configurations and Trade," mimeo, Department of Political Science, Stanford University, April 1983, 25; *New York Times*, 14 March 1986.

[21] See the discussion in Chalmers Johnson, "MITI, MPT, and the Telecom Wars: How Japan Makes Policy for High Technology," Department of Political Science, University of California, n.d. (c. 1986); Allan D. Smith, "The Japanese Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Control Law and Administrative Guidance: The Labyrinth and the Castle," *Law and Policy in International Business* 16 (1984): 426.

[22] Stephen D. Cohen *Uneasy Partnership*, 64; and Bruce R. Scott, "National Strategies" in Bruce R. Scott and George C. Lodge, eds., *U.S. Competitiveness in the World Economy* (Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1985), 96–100. The most thorough exposition of Japan's industrial policy can be found in Chalmers Johnson, *MITI*, esp. chap. 3. For an analysis of the concept of created comparative advantage see the work of the Berkeley Roundtable on the International Economy (BRIE); for example, John Zysman and Laura Tyson, eds., *American Industry in International Competition: Government Policies and Corporate Strategies* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1983).

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social organization that maximizes efficiency. The only fully legitimate role for the state is regulatory; public action should be limited to promoting conditions that will approximate as closely as possible those of the perfectly competitive market. Other forms of state intervention are counterproductive, even illegitimate, because they distort prices which offer the best guide for allocating resources.[23]

Japan has employed several strategies. Through the rapid growth period that ended in the early 1970s, Japan followed a pattern that Kozo Yamamura has described as "protection and nurture." Foreign products were kept out of the domestic market. Oligopoly pricing was tolerated within Japan. The Ministries of Finance and International Trade and Industry encouraged investment in sectors where declining costs were possible because of the application of foreign technology. Products were sold in foreign markets, especially the United States, at prices far below those in Japan. In more recent years MITI has emphasized the importance of high-technology industries and has organized a number of joint research projects. The role of state bureaucracies in steering the economy or directly promoting the activities of major firms has not been questioned.[24]

Some analysts working with the developmental state model have also been particularly attentive to path-dependent patterns of industrial development, where choices made at a particular moment can have a dramatic effect on the future trajectory of a particular sector or firm. State intervention at a specific juncture can have a decisive impact over the long term. Even if basic economic variables such as interest rates, labor costs, and exchange rates return to some earlier set of values, the effect on production and consumption will not be the same because of earlier choices. With declining cost curves, for instance, there are long-term advantages to seizing larger market shares even if this means reduced short-term profits. By moving quickly down the learning curve, a firm may be able to eliminate its competition for successive generations of products. If economic processes are characterized by path-dependent development and irreversibilities, then future competitive advantages will outweigh the opportunity costs of profits foregone in the present.[25]

One example of the consequences of irreversibilities is offered by the case of computer chips known as 256k DRAMS. In March 1986 the Commerce Department found that the Japanese had been dumping this product in the American market and imposed substantial antidumping duties. By the time of the decision, however, most American manufactures had withdrawn in the face of intense Jap-

[23] Chalmers Johnson, "How to Think About the Economic Competition Coming from Japan," mimeo, 12–15.

[24] Yamamura, "Caveat Emptor," 174–179 and 192–200.

[25] For a discussion of path dependent development, although not one related to long-term profitability or the nature of Japan's political economy, see Paul David, "Clio and the Economics of QWERTY," *American Economic Review* 75 (May 1985); for an analysis of Japan's strategy based on declining costs in the electronics industry in particular, see Michael Borrus, et al., *U.S. Japanese Competition in the Semiconductor Industry: A Study in International Trade and Technological Development* (Berkeley, Calif.: Institute of International Studies, Policy Papers in International Affairs, No. 17).

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anese competition. A spokeswoman for Intel stated that "Our decision to exit the DRAM market is irreversible.[26]

If the developmental state model is an accurate depiction of Japan's political economy, then the appropriateness for Japan's trading partners of a policy based on diffuse reciprocity and generalized rules is questionable. With different economic structures, different policies will not necessarily have the same effect. The removal of tariff barriers would increase imports in a market-oriented system, assuming foreign products were competitive. But it would not necessarily have much impact in a developmental state, either because nonstate actors resisted penetration or because the policy network composed of private and public institutions frustrated new entrants, or because state actors themselves imposed formal or informal barriers.

Evidence

The debate about the nature of Japan's political economy will not be easily resolved. Adherents of the market-oriented and developmental state models do not always look at the same evidence or even understand the nature of actors in the same way. For instance, the market-oriented model assumes that corporations in Japan, like those in the United States, are private organizations with autonomously generated preferences; while the developmental state model views these same entities as so entwined with the state and so imbued with general societal objectives that they cannot simply be understood as part of an autonomous private sphere of activity.[27] The empirical evidence does not weigh all in one direction, hardly surprising given the fact that well-informed analysts have arrived at very different conclusions about the nature of Japan's political economy. Adherents of the developmental state and market-oriented models have frequently interpreted the same empirical data in different ways. This problem arises in its most acute form when trying to assess the significance of changes in Japanese policy. Adherents of the market-oriented model see increasing liberalization as evidence of the basic commitment of Japanese policy makers to an open market-oriented system. Adherents of the developmental state model see Japanese leaders implementing more liberal policies only to assuage pressure from foreign trading partners; should pressure cease, concessions would be eliminated. From one reading liberalization supports the market-oriented approach, from another the developmental state.

Finally, the nature of Japan's political economy appears to be a moving target. Some forms of behavior have changed, and changed rapidly. Many have argued that the 1970s marked a watershed because Japan caught up with the West. The power of the Ministry of Finance and MITI has been eroded by the ability of Jap-

[26] *San Francisco Chronicle*, 14 March 1986.

[27] See, for instance, Chalmers Johnson, "The Institutional Foundations of Japanese Industrial Policy," *California Management Review* 27 (Summer 1985).

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anese firms to tap international capital markets, and the consensus on growth as the overriding objective has been weakened by prosperity.[28]

It is, however, important to recognize that the interpretation of change depends critically on how Japan's initial situation is described. If the developmental state model is taken to mean that the key to understanding Japan's political economy is the directive role of the central bureaucracies, then most commentators would agree that change has taken place. The Ministry of Finance and MITI can do less now than in the past, although their power is still formidable in comparison with bureaucracies in the United States. But if a corporatist interpretation of the developmental state model is employed, in which the defining characteristic is not the directive role of state bureaucracies but rather a dense network of ongoing relationships involving both public and private actors, then it is more difficult to conclude that the basic nature of the system has changed. The specific actors involved in policy networks and their relative standings may have altered, but the formulation of policy within a closed circle places a high emphasis on consensus decision making, the maintenance of long term relationships, and shared goals.

There is substantial evidence for the developmental state model. Japan has a very sectorally skewed pattern of trade. It has relatively little intrasectoral trade and imports relatively few manufactured goods in comparison with other major states. In 1980 manufactures accounted for 2.9 percent of Japan's GNP in contrast with 5.7 for the United States, 12.7 for Italy, and 15.0 for Germany. During the 1970s Japan's manufacturing imports increased less, as a percent of gross domestic product (GDP), than those of any other major industrialized country. Through 1984 there was no change in this pattern.[29]

Adherents of the market-oriented model explain Japan's unique pattern of trade in terms of factor endowments. Since Japan is resource poor, it is compelled to import raw materials and export manufactures. This same line of reasoning, however, would suggest that other resource-poor areas, such as western Europe, would have the same pattern of trade. But this is not the case.

If factor endowments alone do not explain Japan's pattern of sectoral imports, then perhaps a combination of geographical position and factor endowments might salvage the market-oriented model. Japan's relatively small proportion of manufactured imports could be seen as a function of barriers imposed by distance (both geographical and cultural) not just factor endowments. A comparison of Japanese trade patterns with those of South Korea sheds some light on this claim. South Korea is also poorly endowed with resources and in the same geographic and cultural area as Japan. It is the largest of the newly industrializing countries (NICs) with a population of about 40 million in 1984, compared with 120 million for Japan.

[28] See, for instance, Yamamura, "Caveat Emptor," 185–192.

[29] Derived from figures in World Bank, *World Tables*, 3rd ed., Comparative Economic Data, Table 6 and country pages, Economic Data, Sheet 1, using current prices to determine imports as a percent of GDP. For recent trade figures see GATT, *International Trade 1984/85* appendix tables for Japan, the United States, and the European Community.

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While it is smaller than Japan it cannot be simply viewed as an entrepôt like Hong Kong or Singapore. In 1983, however, 47.3 percent of South Korea's imports were accounted for by manufactures compared with 21.1 percent for Japan. Similar disparities have typified trade for these two countries at least since 1955.[30]

One common assertion, consistent with a market-oriented approach, is that Japan's low level of manufactured imports can be attributed to the lack of competitiveness of products from other countries. This proposition is questionable in light of the ability of non-Japanese producers to compete effectively against Japanese products in the rest of the world. American engineering products have sold well in the rest of the world except Japan, even where there is Japanese competition. But the same American products have not done as well in Japan as comparable Japanese products have done in the United States.[31]

Direct foreign investment is another activity that can shed some light on the relative merits of the market-oriented and developmental state interpretations of Japan's political economy. Throughout the postwar period, the Japanese government has actively promoted the transfer of technology to Japan through licensing rather than direct foreign investment. Public agencies effectively intervened between foreign and domestic firms. State agencies prevented competitive bidding among Japanese companies. Chalmers Johnson offers the following observation:

> Before the capital liberalization of the late 1960s and 1970s, no technology entered the country without MITI's approval . . . . no patent rights were ever brought without MITI's pressuring the seller to lower the royalties or to make other changes advantageous to Japanese industry as a whole; and no program for the importation of foreign technology was ever approved until MITI and its various advisory committees had agreed that the time was right and that the industry involved was scheduled for 'nurturing' (*ikusei*).[32]

Japan's policy of promoting the transfer of technology through licenses, patents, and other agreements between Japanese and American firms, rather than direct foreign investment, was effective. After World War II, Europe and Japan were technologically backward relative to the United States. They both had skilled labor and other factors that facilitated the absorption of foreign technology. The form of this diffusion, however, differed substantially. Diffusion may occur as a result of information contained in technical literature, the reverse engineering of products, direct foreign investment, or the purchase of patents or other rights by national firms. Japan secured relatively more technology through licensing than

[30] See figures in United Nations, *Yearbook of International Trade Statistics 1957, 1962, 1963, and 1966*; and United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, *Handbook of International Trade and Development Statistics 1985 Supplement*, Table 4.2.

[31] For a detailed statistical presentation see Stephen D. Krasner and Daniel I. Okimoto, "Japan's Trade Posture: From Myopic Self-Interest to Liberal Accommodation?" mimeo, Department of Political Science, Stanford University, February 1985.

[32] Johnson, *MITI*, 17; see also Michael Borrus, et al., *U.S.-Japanese Competition in the Semiconductor Industry*, 68; and Raymond Vernon, *Two Hungry Giants* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1983), 88.

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did Europe. There has been much less direct foreign investment in Japan than in Europe.[33]

There is, then, a plausible body of evidence that supports the developmental state argument. Whether as a result of formal mechanisms in the 1950s and 1960s or less formal, and perhaps even private, mechanisms in more recent years, it has been difficult for foreign manufactures to penetrate the Japanese market, especially in those areas that have been targeted by the central economic ministries. *Keiretsu* and other long-term ties among horizontally linked firms, visions of the industrial future that are shared by both public and private officials, and close working relationships between the state and private sector create a network of relationships that cannot be penetrated by new actors, especially those from outside Japan.

It is, however, necessary to recognize that the available evidence does not weigh in one direction. The level of direct foreign investment in Japan has increased substantially since 1980. Many American firms have operated successfully in Japan. Since the elimination of capital controls there has been little disparity between Euro-yen interest rates and rates in short-term domestic markets. Such disparities were significant before the mid 1980s; this change does suggest that in the area of finance, changes in policy have changed behavior. Japanese capital markets are no longer insulated from world markets.[34]

This evidence cannot be entirely dismissed by adherents of the developmental state model. The most obvious counter, however, is that direct foreign investment and the elimination of capital controls do not have a negative impact on the fundamental objective of promoting Japanese industrial competitiveness. Such policies may even have positive consequences. By securing access to global capital markets, liberalization may increase the resources available to Japanese firms. Direct foreign investment may make it easier to obtain some types of foreign technology. The dangers of foreign domination are much less than they would have been in the 1960s and even the 1970s because of the growing strength and competitiveness of the Japanese economy and its major firms. Japanese officials may feel compelled to make some accommodations to foreign pressures lest trading partners close their home markets.

I do not want to claim that these arguments for the developmental state model are decisive. Such finality is unlikely. Relations between the United States and Japan are in flux. Japanese policy is changing. Greater involvements in international financial markets may loosen domestic ties. Stories can be offered by proponents of many persuasions. But there is enough evidence, both institutional and behavioral, to support the plausibility of the developmental state model.

[33] See Stephen D. Krasner, "Technology Transfer and Institutional Structures in Japan and the United States," mimeo, Department of Political Science, Stanford University, May 1985, Tables 6 and 7.

[34] For a discussion of the impact of the removal of capital controls see Jeffrey A. Frankel, *The Yen/Dollar Agreement: Liberalizing Japanese Capital Markets* (Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 1984), 22.

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Policy Implications

If the developmental state model is an accurate description of Japan's political economy, then an international economic strategy based on diffuse reciprocity, universal procedural rules, and the assumption that costs and benefits will balance out in the long term will not be optimal for the United States. Similar policies will not have similar behavioral outcomes in a market-dominated as opposed to a developmental state political economy. Decreasing formal trade barriers may have more of an impact on imports in the United States than Japan. American technology may be more available, because a larger proportion of innovations are made by smaller companies that need foreign capital or foreign sales. Market access through direct foreign investment, especially through the takeover of established firms, is more easily accomplished in the United States than Japan. Marketing networks in the United States are more accessible because they are not encumbered by traditional ties. American officials have rarely been sensitive to the benefits that might accrue by intervening on behalf of industries with declining costs; for such an enterprise a small initial advantage can guarantee market dominance as the industry matures. Existing international rules are simply not drawn to cope with most of these situations; and even if attempts were made, it is difficult to believe that general stipulations could have similar behavioral effects in different countries. Given substantial asymmetries in national institutions, specific reciprocity, which is based upon securing roughly equivalent advantage for a delimited set of transactions, is a more attractive option.

Specific reciprocity does not, however, sit comfortably with the basic beliefs of most American policy makers. The United States has been and continues to be the strongest supporter of diffuse reciprocity especially with regard to international trade. This commitment to diffuse reciprocity has a number of sources, one of the most important being the lessons that were drawn from the 1930s.[35] To quote from one recent book, the keynote volume for a new set of studies being conducted by the Council on Foreign Relations: "The experience of the 1930s shows that bilateral agreements cannot provide a stable, consistent and expanding trading system."[36] In a highly uncertain world, vivid historical exemplars have a force that surpasses specific argumentation.[37]

Specific reciprocity is also difficult to incorporate within a view of the common defense, which ignores power shifts among friends. If friends cannot have fundamental disagreements, then the power relations among them will in the last anal-

[35] Judith Goldstein has developed this argument. See, for instance, "The Political Economy of Trade: Institutions of Protection," *American Political Science Review* 80 (March 1986).

[36] C. Michael Aho and Jonathan David Aronson, *Trade Talks: America Better Listen!* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1985), 129.

[37] In the terminology of recent work in cognitive psychology such exemplars may be particularly "available" to decision makers. See Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic, and Amos Tversky *Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1982), part IV.

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ysis be irrelevant. If everyone is becoming wealthier, as diffuse reciprocity suggests they should, then issues of relative gain are not critical.

However, while the general principles and commitments of American policy makers have not changed, both external and internal pressures have led to the adoption of policies that are based more on specific than diffuse reciprocity. Nowhere is this more apparent than in American economic relations with Japan. There is a long history of sector specific arrangements involving the United States and Japan. In 1955 the United States successfully secured Japanese acquiescence to an accord that limited the sale of Japanese cotton textiles in the United States. This settlement ultimately evolved into the MultiFibre Agreement. Other settlements involving major products such as steel and automobiles were negotiated in subsequent years. In the early 1980s the United States and Japan began a series of negotiations known as MOSS (Market Opening Sector Specific). These discussions dealt with several specific commodities including telecommunications equipment, electronic devices, wood and paper products, and medical equipment and pharmaceuticals. The United States has focused its attention on procedural issues such as technical standards, certification requirements, access to MITI advisory committees, and the processing of patent applications. Such initiatives flow naturally from policies based on the norm of diffuse reciprocity, which has informed most American trade policy. But in some cases the United States has also pressed for explicit market shares, an objective much more consistent with a policy of specific reciprocity.[38] The MOSS negotiations implicitly recognize that given the variations in institutional arrangements between the United States and Japan, general rules do not provide either mutually satisfactory outcomes or adequate policy guidance. Different sectors in Japan may require different initiatives to secure access for American producers.

There has been a growing disparity between American principles and American policy. The principles espoused by American top governmental decision makers still reflect diffuse reciprocity. They are based on general rules that can be applied to all countries. They assume that similar policy measures will more or less have similar effects. At the same time the force of circumstances—sometimes domestic protectionist pressures, sometimes glaring difficulties at the international level—have led American policy makers toward specific reciprocity.

Should principle follow practice (in which case American policy makers would begin to espouse specific reciprocity as a first best option) or should some current

[38] A listing of the issues dealt with in the MOSS negotiations can be found in Japan Economic Institute, *JEI Report* No. 2B, 17 January 1986, 3–6. American negotiators did suggest a target level of purchases in the MOSS telecommunications negotiations. See *JEI Report*, 21B, 7 June 1985, 8. Some specific import levels were also informally mentioned in a settlement worked out between Japan and the United States to resolve several anti-dumping suits that had been brought by American firms against Japanese exporters of micro-chips. Both American and Japanese negotiators said that they had discussed a target of 20 percent of the Japanese market for American firms by 1991, but no formal commitments were made. In the mid-1980s American producers accounted for only 8 percent of the Japanese market. See *New York Times*, 1 August 1986. A Commerce Department official who played a major role in negotiations with Japan expressed great skepticism about the impact of the 1986 agreement. See the statement of Clyde Prestowitz in *Business Week*, 16 August 1986, 63.

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practices be regarded as unfortunate departures from the ideal of free trade liberalism? This is a central question for American foreign economic policy. The 1930s seemed to show that specific reciprocity was unwise and that diffuse reciprocity was the only avenue to global economic stability. But the developments of the last two decades, especially in American-Japanese relations, suggest that diffuse reciprocity is not without its difficulties. Persistent high visibility and politically charged trade conflicts often involving heads of state have generated bitterness and resentment. Central decision makers in both countries believe that their counterparts are not playing by the rules.

The sense of injustice experienced on both sides of the Pacific is an inevitable consequence of the tensions arising from the universal principles advocated by the United States, differences between domestic political-economic institutions in the United States and Japan, and Japan's dynamic growth. If Japan had not experienced such dramatic economic achievement, American decision makers would not have been particularly concerned about Japan's domestic practices. If Japan's domestic political economy was like that of the United States, the procedural changes associated with diffuse reciprocity, which have been at the core of American initiatives, would have had more impact. But the ineffectiveness of policies based on diffuse reciprocity and continued Japanese success led American policy makers to adopt specific reciprocity in an ad hoc fashion. And this in turn led Japanese leaders to conclude that their American counterparts were not playing by the rules that had been endorsed by the United States.

If diffuse reciprocity is problematic, can specific reciprocity work? Is it possible to create mutually acceptable rules that vary across countries and issue areas? This is not an easy task. First, it is hard to establish exact equivalents. Second, there is an incentive to increase barriers for bargaining purposes. Third, sequential interdependent decision making can invalidate earlier agreements; for instance, the benefits of a particular tariff concession may be compromised if reductions are later extended to other countries. Fourth, specific reciprocity complicates administrative enforcement and monitoring because different issues are treated in different ways.[39]

These are serious problems, but for the United States and Japan they may be less severe than would be the case for some other bilateral relationships. The problem of equivalencies is mitigated by the large amount of trade between the two countries. This increases the possibilities for trade-offs among a limited number of specific issue areas. The problem of strategic behavior cannot be eliminated, but it also arises in many situations other than bilateral interactions among major economic powers. Even in a multilateral setting governed by diffuse reciprocity there is an incentive for major actors to behave strategically, since their conduct will be noticed and they may be able to influence the choices made by other states. The problems posed by sequential decision making are lessened again by the sheer size of trade between the two major Pacific economies. In areas where the United

[39] Keohane, "Reciprocity," 17–19.

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States and Japan are each other's dominant supplier, subsequent agreements with third parties may not have much impact on prior concessions. Finally, the problem of monitoring is also lessened by size. Given the large volume of transactions between the United States and Japan, the use of different rules and procedures in different issue areas need not create insurmountable administrative inefficiencies or pose overwhelming monitoring problems. If officials had to deal with many small and variegated transactions, each covered by different rules, such problems would be much more substantial.

In a recent essay on Japan's role in the world Hugh Patrick and Henry Rosovsky write: "The central issue is whether the systemic differences between Japan and other modern industrial nations are so deep, profound, intransigent, and unchanging (on both sides), creating an incompatibility so great, that either a new international economic system will have to be created or special rules will have to be devised for dealing with Japan.[40] The analysis in this article suggests that the latter option is the most viable. Specific reciprocity is no panacea. But it does offer the possibility of establishing a more stable relationship between the United States and Japan.

Adopting specific reciprocity as a basic norm would eliminate the growing disparity between principle and policy in the United States by ending even rhetorical adherence to universal procedural rules. This could lead to a more coherent American policy by providing general guidelines that could steer American decisions rather than basing them in an ad hoc fashion on immediate pressures. It would make American policy more effective by making it easier for central decision makers to anticipate needed changes rather than simply reacting to pressures from civil society. In a rapidly changing technological environment such anticipation may be critical, because delay can severely damage American industries. Specific reciprocity as a basic norm would lessen the fragmentation in American policy making that has frequently pitted the executive against the legislature. Greater coherence could make American policy more efficacious by facilitating the use of decisive administrative interventions rather than lengthy judicial proceedings, which must usually be initiated by the private sector and which may provide financial remedies only long after domestic productive capacity has been mortally weakened.

And, although it may appear to be paradoxical, adopting specific reciprocity as the norm guiding American foreign economic policy could reduce the hostility that has been generated by conscious or unconscious American hypocrisy. Japan has conformed to the rules of the GATT system, yet it continues to be criticized by the United States. These criticisms can only be interpreted for what they are—attacks on the basic nature of Japan's political economy, on the way in which the Japanese have interacted among themselves and with the outside world. It may be far easier for public and private decision makers in both countries to agree

[40] Hugh Patrick and Henry Rosovsky, "The End of An Era?" mimeo, paper prepared for the Japanese Political Economy Research Committee (JPERC), 27.

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on desirable outcomes such as specific market shares than it is for them to agree on procedural norms.[41]

Conclusion

The international economic policies adopted by the United States at the conclusion of the World War II were guided more by concerns for the common defense, or more accurately a vision of how international political and economic life should be ordered, than by narrow considerations of American economic self-interest or relative power capabilities. American leaders wanted to create a liberal international system that mirrored political and economic arrangements in the United States. They embraced this vision, because they believed that its realization would create a stable and peaceful international environment.

The war and its aftermath had ruptured older patterns of international economic relations. European colonial empires and the preferential trade arrangements that they entailed disappeared. Many of Japan's ties with the mainland of Asia, especially China, were broken. The creation of the Communist bloc severed long-standing trading relationships in the center of Europe.

American leaders wanted to establish a new order. They supported the creation of international organizations—the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and GATT. They facilitated recovery in Europe with the Marshall Plan. They opened American markets to foreign products but accepted some protectionism in other countries. They tolerated subsidy and dumping practices that were suspect under American law. Some of the policies did have short-term economic benefits for the United States, but many did not. They were understood as part of a long-term effort to create a liberal international economy within which democracy would flourish and individuals would prosper, and outside of which the Soviet bloc might wither.

American leaders were not much concerned with relative, as opposed to absolute, gains within the western alliance. The exceptional postwar power capabilities of the United States elevated them above such conventional considerations, except with regard to the Soviet Union. Yet, for a hegemonic leader there is likely to be a trade-off between maximizing absolute gains by providing a disproportionate share of the collective goods needed to maintain international economic regimes and maximizing relative power capabilities by increasing national economic returns.[42] Relative capabilities might even be enhanced by adopting policies that lower absolute economic benefits, so long as the dominant power experiences relatively less decline.

[41] For a similar conclusion see Gilbert R. Winham and Ikuo Kabashima, "The Politics of U.S.-Japanese Auto Trade" in I. M. Destler and Hideo Sato, eds., *Coping with U.S.-Japanese Economic Conflicts* (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1982), 17.

[42] Arthur A. Stein, "The Hegemon's Dilemma; Great Britain, the United States, and International Economic Order," *International Organization* 38 (Spring 1984).

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The western world has prospered under these American policies, and none has prospered more mightily than Japan. It is too early to say that Japan or East Asia more generally will emerge as the dynamic center of international economic and political life in the twenty-first century. But in the ebb and flow of world history that center has not remained in the same place. Political and economic leadership moved from northwestern Europe to North America at the beginning of the twentieth century. It is likely to move again in the future. The power of the United States has already begun to wane. The international economic policies that were predicated on that power will change. Managing the transition to a new center of world power, or to an American-Japanese condominium, or even an American-Japanese-European triumvirate will be a major challenge for the United States—one that cannot be adequately met by pursuing international economic policies based on diffuse reciprocity and global (at least for the non-Communist part of the globe) liberalism.

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Insurgency In Latin America and the Common Defense

JORGE I. DOMÍNGUEZ

The historical record has convinced the United States government that, on balance, successful insurgencies are likely to have adverse consequences. Therefore, the United States became the leading counterinsurgency power after World War II. Since that war most insurgencies have failed and, therefore, have not threatened the common defense of the interests and values of the United States and its allied liberal democracies. By insurgency we mean the use of violence lasting for more than a few hours against the established government by a substantial number of people who do not occupy formal authority roles. This excludes the more common forms of unscheduled political change, namely military coups or assassinations.

There are great differences among the Naga in India, the Achanese in Indonesia, the Ovimbundu in Angola, the Karen in Burma, the Eritreans in Ethiopia, the Basques in Spain, the Irish Republican Army, the Kurds of southwest Asia, the Palestine Liberation Organization, the South West Africa's People's Organization, or the so-called Saharan Arab Democratic Republic. But they have three things in common. Many of them have engaged in, or have supported, insurgencies against dominant state power for years, and some for decades. They have not yet succeeded. And they are all also the expressions of ethnocommunal protest that in many cases seeks secession toward independence. Their ideologies are otherwise quite varied. These movements threaten the territorial integrity of each respective

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state, but the impact on the United States and its allies (unless one is the government under challenge) is quite varied.

Some post-World War II insurgencies have, however, succeeded. Most of these insurgencies fought against European colonial powers, especially the Portuguese, and to some degree the French. The successor states of the Portuguese empire are all now governed by regimes that do not align with the United States. Some, such as Angola and Mozambique, are governed by political parties that call themselves Marxist-Leninist and that welcome the military cooperation of the Soviet Union and its allies. The successor states of the French empire that emerged from insurgencies are either hostile to the United States and its allies, as in Indochina, or have a relationship difficult at times, as has been the case with Algeria.[1]

The Portuguese, and the French in Algeria, had insisted that their colonies were not really colonies but parts of the one happy multicontinental family; thus they had less flexibility to respond to the demands for self-rule. The British empire was more consciously imperial and, paradoxically, more flexible in its governing arrangements. It typically defeated the insurgencies that it faced, as in Kenya or Malaya, except rarely when it resembled the Portuguese and the French, as in Ulster. The British empire's successor states, except for white Rhodesia, also successfully prevented insurgent victories.[2] The most significant victorious insurgency was, of course, the one that led to the establishment of the People's Republic of China. That result was adverse to the United States and its allies for a long time. The evolution of Chinese foreign policy beginning in the 1970s suggests, however, that the relationship between regimes heir to a major revolution and the common defense is not fixed forever.

Spanish American countries were born from insurgencies in the early nineteenth century. All of them, and even Brazil, have faced insurgencies to some degree in recent decades, but these insurgencies have rarely stemmed from ethnocommunal grievances. From the writings about Latin America of most political scientists, many might mistakingly infer that this is because Latin American countries are ethnically homogeneous. In fact, there are ethnic minorities in every Latin American country, and the majority of the countries are ethnically quite diverse. Latin American societies exemplify how ethnic pluralism does not automatically lead to insurgencies. That does not mean that all is well but that procedures for ethnic subordination and incorporation over the centuries have generally provided for political stability.[3]

[1] Tony Hodges, "Mozambique: The Politics of Liberation" and John Marcum, "Angola: Perilous Transition to Independence" in Gwendolyn Carter and Patrick O'Meara, eds., *Southern Africa: The Continuing Crisis*, 2nd ed. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982); Alf Andrew Heggoy, *Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Algeria* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1972).

[2] Edgar O'Ballance, *Malaya: The Communist Insurgent War, 1948–1960* (Hamden, Conn: Archon 1966); Donald Barnett and Karaji Njama, *Mau Mau from Within* (London: MacGibbon and Kee, 1966); Patrick O'Meara, "Zimbabwe: The Politics of Independence" in Carter and O'Meara, *Southern Africa*, 18–56.

[3] For elaboration see Samuel P. Huntington and Jorge I. Domínguez, "Political Development"

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Insurgencies in Latin America typically pose fewer threats to the integrity of the state but more threats to the nature of the political regime. They are not burdened by the distant colonial past, the need to define identities different from or in opposition to the colonial power, nor are they ordinarily concerned with issues of race, color, culture, or religion. Among the important recent exceptions are the struggles of some indigenous peoples against the right-wing and left-wing regimes in Guatemala and Nicaragua, respectively. For the most part, however, insurgencies in Latin America focus on political issues addressed to the people on the assumption that there are no significant ascriptive distinctions among them and that the independence, identity, and territorial integrity of the state are secure because most people are loyal to the one nation.

Since the consolidation of the state in most Latin American countries in the late nineteenth or early twentieth centuries, in many countries the armed forces have used violence to seize and hold power. In contrast, insurgencies characteristically failed. The most significant exception was the Mexican revolution, though there were a few other cases in the smaller countries. Supporting the view that the best insurgency is a defeated one, it took the United States three decades to come to terms with Mexican governments after the revolution.

In the 1950s, two events changed the relationship between the U.S. government and insurgencies in Latin America: in 1954 the overthrow of President Jacobo Arbenz in Guatemala and in 1958 the overthrow of President Fulgencio Batista in Cuba. The first persuaded some, especially in the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), that certain insurgencies could advance U.S. interests. The second persuaded most that insurgencies not guided by the U.S. Government would typically be adverse to U.S. interests. This heightened U.S. insecurity concerning insurgencies even if they almost never succeeded, and it intensified U.S. intervention to support or oppose insurgencies depending on their ideologies.

The U.S. government's ruling ideology further complicated the policy toward insurgencies in Latin America. The public values embedded in the U.S. Constitution and in long-standing political discourse in the United States have predisposed the United States to favor regimes that resemble the liberal democracies of the North Atlantic world and that organize economic life along market principles and practices. An early version of this tradition was President James Monroe's message of 2 December 1823. He addressed the major European powers: "We owe it therefore to candor to declare that we should consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portions of this hemisphere, as dangerous to our peace and safety." Monroe's conception was not only strategic and geopolitical but also ideological because he also opposed "their system" which was "essentially different . . . from that of America."[4]

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in Fred Greenstein and Nelson Polsby, eds., *Handbook of Political Science* (Reading, Mass: Addison-Wesley, 1975).

[4] Quoted in Samuel Flagg Bemis, *The Latin American Policy of the United States* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1943), 64.

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There has also been a more statist tradition in U.S. foreign policy, however, that has looked the other way when these values are sacrificed by a regime otherwise closely allied with the U.S. government. The Good Neighbor Policy of the Franklin Roosevelt administration was its most solemn formulation: so long as the foreign policy behavior of Latin American governments was within the bounds the U.S. government considered acceptable, the United States would not intervene in their internal affairs and would at times consider them allies, too.[5] The onset of U.S.–Soviet rivalry after 1945 strengthened the statist tradition but did not obliterate the liberal tradition. The U.S. governement has thus opposed dictatorships close to the USSR but has had a mixed record toward dictatorships close to the United States. It has opposed insurgencies deemed to be harbingers of a regime expected to be allied with the Soviet Union, but it has at times promoted insurgencies seeking to overthrow regimes that it considers Soviet allies.

The relationship between insurgencies in Latin America and the common defense, therefore, needs to be examined with reference to four questions. Are insurgencies in themselves adverse to the common defense? Are the regimes heir to successful insurgencies adverse to the common defense for reasons related to their insurgent origins? Does the answer to the first two questions change if the insurgencies, or the regimes that stem therefrom, are backed by the U.S. government? And can U.S. ideological concerns be satisfied without sacrificing the needs that the statist tradition seeks to serve? We will focus on the record since the 1950s.[6]

The Common Defense Versus Left-Wing Insurgencies

Since World War II most insurgencies not guided by the United States have been adverse to its interests even at the insurgency stage. Although the U.S. government cut off arms sales to President Fulgencio Batista's government in Cuba in March 1958, the conduct of Fidel Castro's insurgency brought it into conflict with the U.S. government. In June 1958, rebels led by Raúl Castro kidnapped ten U.S. and two Canadian citizens from the U.S. government-owned Moa Bay Company mining plant as well as twenty-seven U.S. sailors and marines who were returning to the Guantanamo naval base from an outing and who were not engaged in counterinsurgency. The U.S. consul in Santiago negotiated for their release, a first step toward the recognition of de facto belligerency. In October the rebels kidnapped two U.S. and seven Cuban citizens at the Texaco refinery in Santiago. Among other reasons, Raúl Castro explained that the rebels did so to attract world attention to their allegation that Batista was using weapons that the United States had supplied in the past.[7]

[5] Bryce Wood, *The Making of the Good Neighbor Policy* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1961).

[6] See also James N. Rosenau, ed., *International Aspects of Civil Strife* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1964); and Karl W. Deutsch, "External Involvement in Internal War" in Harry Eckstein, ed., *Internal War* (New York: Free Press, 1964).

[7] Hugh Thomas, *Cuba: The Pursuit of Freedom* (New York: Harper and Row, 1971), 1000–1001;

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What began as an occasional assault on U.S. citizens and installations, soon became more systematic in other countries. During the insurgency begun in Venezuela in 1960, acts of sabotage often targeted U.S. firms. U.S. military officers advising the Venezuelan armed forces were kidnapped and the U.S. military mission was attacked.[8] The reasons for targeting U.S. citizens and institutions vary. For many, the United States represented and embodied imperialism and, as such, it was responsible for Latin America's ills. It perpetuated underdevelopment, it intensified exploitation, and it supported political oppression. But those views common among many leftists were given strategic coherence by the Cuban revolutionary government.

On 15 January 1966, in his closing speech at the Tricontinental Conference held in Havana to support revolutions in Africa, Asia, and Latin America, Fidel Castro explained the ideological and strategic foundations for Cuban internationalism: "The imperialists are everywhere. And for Cuban revolutionaries the battle ground against imperialism encompasses the whole world." He went on: "And so our people understand their duties, because they understand that the enemy is one and the same, the same who attacks our shores and our territory, the same who attacks everyone else. And so we say and proclaim that the revolutionary movement in every corner of the world can count with Cuban combat fighters."[9] In his 1967 message asking for support for national liberation struggles, Ernesto (Che) Guevara also argued for the need to create "two, three Vietnams" to confront the United States everywhere, to prevent it from winning anywhere, and to bring revolutionary regimes to power.[10]

A leading Brazilian theorist and practitioner of urban insurgency, Carlos Marighella, agreed that the fight against Brazil's military government was part of a global struggle and pointed to useful tactics: "the kidnapping of personalities who are known artists, sports figures, or are outstanding in some other field, but who have evidenced no political interest, can be a useful form of propaganda for the revolutionary." He distinguished outlaws from revolutionaries: "The outlaw benefits personally from the action and attacks indiscriminately without distinguishing between the exploited and the exploiters. . . . The urban guerrilla follows a political goal and only attacks the government, the big capitalists and the foreign imperialists, particularly North Americans."[11]

Most left-wing revolutionaries followed suit. In Uruguay, the Tupamaros urban guerrillas targeted U.S. citizens and organizations, making no distinction between

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Carlos Franqui, *Diary of the Cuban Revolution* (New York, Viking Press, 1980), 325–326, 356–358, 429–430.

[8] Talton F. Ray, *The Politics of the Barrios in Venezuela* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969), 128.

[9] *Documentos políticos: política internacional de la revolución cubana*, I (Havana: Editora Política, 1966), 83.

[10] George Lavan, ed., *Che Guevara Speaks* (New York: Merit Publishers, 1967), 144–159.

[11] Carlos Marighella, "Minimannual [sic] of the Urban Guerrilla," *Tricontinental Bulletin* 56 (November 1970): 3.

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those in an official capacity and those in the private sector, even though the United States had had little involvement in Uruguayan history or contemporary life. Even Uruguayan trade with the United States was limited. The Tupamaros's focus on U.S. targets is best explained in terms of revolutionary ideology. From 1964 to 1971, the Tupamaros bombed the offices or factories of the First National City Bank, the Moore-McCormack shipping lines, All American Cable, Western Telegraph, Burroughs, General Motors, and the U.S. consulate in Montevideo. They killed a U.S. public safety adviser. In addition, they kidnapped the British ambassador, bombed the residence of the Brazilian ambassador, and kidnapped Argentine and Brazilian executives.[12] In Guatemala, too, the respective chiefs of the U.S. military mission were killed in 1965 and in 1968; the U.S. ambassador was killed in 1968.[13]

Between 1966 and 1969, urban guerrillas in Brazil bombed the U.S. Information Service building in Brasilia, the Peace Corps office in Rio de Janeiro, the personal residences of a U.S. consul and of an air attaché, the U.S. consulate, and a Sears store in São Paulo; they kidnapped the U.S. ambassador and assassinated a U.S. Army captain. In 1970, they also kidnapped the German and Swiss ambassadors and the Japanese consul to São Paulo. Beginning in late 1969, urban guerrillas in Argentina targeted U.S. and other business executives to raise large sums of money to finance their activities. Ford Motor Company and Firestone were especially hard hit, but so too were European firms.[14] Though each insurgency focused primarily on government and other national targets, there was also an explicit international dimension clearly contrary to the interests of the United States and its allies.

Though insurgencies in South America were crushed by the 1970s, they endured in Central America. Although the impact of the United States was far more significant on Central than on South American countries, in the 1970s revolutions in Central America did not focus on U.S. targets. One likely reason was the new U.S. human rights policy. In early 1977, in order not to be subjected to U.S. human rights pressures, the governments of Guatemala and El Salvador ended their military assistance treaties with the United States. U.S. economic aid to them also fell. The Somoza government in Nicaragua sought to continue military relations with the United States, but the Carter administration sharply cut back on military aid disbursements to Nicaragua and stopped them altogether by late 1978. The United States also curtailed economic aid and, in early 1979, it withdrew its military attachés and Peace Corps volunteers and reduced the number of diplomats. The Carter administration did not favor a Sandinista victory, but it did favor Somoza's departure. It also favored political changes in Guatemala and in El Salvador.[15]

[12] James Kohl and John Litt, *Urban Guerrilla Warfare in Latin America* (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1974), 197–220.

[13] Richard Gott, *Guerrilla Movements in Latin America* (Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor, 1972), 112–113, 585.

[14] Kohl and Litt, *Urban Guerrilla Warfare in Latin America*, 63–69, 347–364.

[15] John A. Booth, *The End and the Beginning: The Nicaraguan Revolution* (Boulder, Colo.: West-

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Insurgents had fewer reasons to attack U.S. targets. Insurgent attacks on U.S. targets might also have alarmed the U.S. government and changed U.S. policy. The new U.S. policy, moreover, pressured the incumbent regimes, helped to undermine their legitimacy, and eroded their resource base, benefiting the revolutionaries albeit unintentionally. When the U.S. policy changed again in the early 1980s to support the government of El Salvador against a substantial insurgency, attacks on U.S. targets, including off-duty military officers and civilian targets, increased again. In short, except for the second half of the 1970s in Central America, the process of left-wing insurgency itself has been typically at odds with U.S. and allied interests.

The experience of the late 1970s suggests one way to reduce the likelihood that U.S. citizens and organizations will become targets, provided the United States strongly opposes the incumbent government and either wants the insurrection to prevail or has an alternative to both the incumbents and the insurgents. This "political center" was too weak in Cuba and in Nicaragua but, despite differences among the cases, in the 1960s this center succeeded in defeating the insurgency in Venezuela and in curtailing it in Colombia.[16] This center is also the main hope to defeat the ongoing insurgency in El Salvador in the long run. When this political center exists, the United States may find it both feasible and desirable to oppose the insurgency, especially if insurgents target U.S. citizens or organizations. If the center does not exist, policy alternatives are fewer and less attractive.

The Common Defense and Victorious Left-Wing Insurgencies

Since World War II insurgents have won only in Cuba and Nicaragua. In time both outcomes became seen as adverse to the common defense. Other left-wing regimes to which the U.S. government has objected have come to power through a civilian coup (Grenada in 1979), a military coup (Peru in 1968), or an election (Chile in 1970).

Since 1959 Cuba has become the USSR's premier ally in the Third World. Cuba is Latin America's strongest military power and has the region's most experienced armed forces. It has deployed well over 100,000 troops overseas since 1975; its steady-state overseas troop presence has exceeded 30,000 per year. It has deployed civilians in over two dozen countries and military advisers in about a dozen countries. Its alliance with the Soviets brought the world close to the edge of nuclear war in 1962 and it remains a concern for the United States and its allies.[17] Many factors have contributed to Cuban foreign policy, including Fidel Castro's convictions, the unexpected opportunities that Cuba has exploited well in international affairs,

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view, 1982), chap. 8; Lars Schoultz, *Human Rights and United States Policy toward Latin America* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1981).

[16] Edward W. Gude, "Batista and Betancourt: Alternative Responses to Violence" in Hugh Graham and Ted Gurr, eds., *Violence in America: Historical and Comparative Perspectives* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1969), 577–588.

[17] Jorge I. Domínguez, *To Make A World Safe for Revolution: Cuban Foreign Policy*, forthcoming.

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the constraints that the United States has imposed on Cuba, and the exigencies of the Soviet alliance. The result is a foreign policy strongly opposed to the United States. This article's focus is narrower, however. Directly related to the regime's insurgent origins, Cuban foreign policy supports insurgencies as a part of its strategy to combat the United States.

Fidel Castro is a committed revolutionary. As a university student in 1948, he took part in the riots in the city of Bogotá, Colombia. He was later trained to invade the Dominican Republic to help overthrow the Trujillo regime. Argentine-born Ernesto Guevara, Cuba's third-ranking figure from 1959 to 1965, had worked in Guatemala until the Arbenz government's overthrow in 1954. Cuban leaders have believed in internationalism, and have lived it. The hostility to the United States was recorded in private correspondence well before victory in 1959, though it became known only years later. After 1959, their foreign policy was just as revolutionary as they themselves.

In June 1959 expeditions left from Cuba to seek to overthrow the governments of the Dominican Republic and Nicaragua. The official Cuban newspaper praised the country's new foreign policy as not being "encased in the old molds of international law." Cuba's ambassador to the United Nations noted with pride Cuban support for the Dominican insurgency.[18] And yet, the first official Soviet envoy had not arrived; Cuba did not even have diplomatic relations with the USSR. The new regime's support for insurgencies was wholly unrelated to Soviet preferences. While much of Cuban foreign policy in subsequent decades has to be explained as a part of the Cuban-Soviet connection, no one has had to twist the arms of the Cuban leaders to support many revolutionary movements overseas. Just as significant is that relations with the United States had yet to deterioriate badly. To be sure, there had been some rocky moments during the first six months of 1959, and a serious dispute was brewing about Cuba's implementation of its new land reform law. But there was no dispute between the United States and Cuba that required these Cuban actions, and there was much reason for the Cuban government to delay an open confrontation with the United States. Therefore, these Cuban decisions to support two insurgencies in the early months of 1959 can be explained only with reference to the regime's insurrectionary origins stemming from the personal experiences and ideologies of its leaders.

In later years Cuba found strategic reasons to support revolutions to combat the United States, but Cuba's reasons remained independent from the Soviet Union. In May 1967, for example, the Cuban Communist party's Central Committee admitted that three Cubans had joined with Venezuelans in a landing party to overthrow that country's democratic regime. After attempting to show that none was a Cuban official, the Central Committee added: "But there is no question here of our being interested in evading any responsibility whatsoever . . . nor does the Cuban Revolution ask permission or forgiveness in order to carry out its duties of solidarity with all revolutionary forces of the world, including Venezuelan revolu-

[18] *Revolución* (Havana), 16–27 June 1959.

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tionaries. Revolutionary acts are justified by the very existence of imperialism."[19] Late in 1967 Guevara was killed by U.S.-trained Bolivian troops; two members of the Cuban party's Central Committee died along with him. Cuba accused the Moscow-affiliated Bolivian Communist party of responsibility in abandoning Guevara's group. Cuba had earlier condemned the Moscow-affiliated Venezuelan Communist party for treason to the revolution. Cuba found itself increasingly at odds with Soviet policy. Soviet-Cuban relations neared the breaking point in 1968. In short, Cuban support for insurgencies was not only hostile to the United States but also at odds with the Soviet Union and its allies.

Cuba's enduring motivation to support revolutions, though less at odds with Soviet policy after 1970, remained above all responsive to the ideology and interests of Cuban leaders. Cuba supported the Sandinistas during their insurgency against the Somoza regime. Nicaragua's Interior Minister Tomás Borge has noted with pride that he graduated from military training in Cuba and that Cuba supplied weapons especially valuable in the closing months of the insurrection in 1979.[20] Cuba has also admitted that it supplied weapons and other support to the guerrillas in El Salvador in late 1980 and early 1981. Even Cuba's subsequent denials of U.S. allegations about Cuban support for revolution in El Salvador were defiant. This "did not imply a . . . self-denial of the sacred right to help a fraternal people in a way that may be feasible. It would not be immoral nor damnable to help with weapons."[21] These, too, were Cuban policies, not forced by the Soviets.

President Castro has described candidly Cuba's vanguard role in supporting insurgencies in the Americas, leading a more cautious Soviet Union: "One of the great lies that the imperialists use concerning Central America is their attempt to impute the revolutions in this area to the Soviet Union." Instead, the "Soviets did not know even one of the present leaders of Nicaragua . . . during the period of revolutionary struggle." Castro added that "the same holds true for El Salvador. There, the Communist party is only one of the five left-wing organizations joined together in the Farabundo Martí Front . . . but, with the exception of the Communist party of El Salvador—militant and independent but small, and not one of the major groups—the Soviet Union did not know the leaders of these revolutionary organizations and had no contact with them. The same goes for Guatemala." In contrast, Cuban leaders knew the leaders of these movements very well, he concluded.[22] Cuba no longer fought against the Soviets, no longer criticized them in public, and no longer undertook foreign policies at odds with them. But, within those significant limitations, there was still much autonomy. Cuban leaders exercised it to promote their values and their interests as they saw them: "It is the duty of revolutionaries to make the revolution."[23]

[19] *Granma Weekly Review* (Havana), 21 May 1967, 8.
[20] "Nicaragua in Revolution," FRONTLINE, Public Broadcasting System, first aired April 1985.
[21] *Bohemia* (Havana), 11 September 1981, 49; ibid., 25 September 1981, 57.
[22] *Granma Weekly Review*, 19 December 1982, 4.
[23] Fidel Castro, *Obras escogidas, 1953–1962*, I (Madrid: Editorial Fundamentos, 1976), 131.

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Sandinista Nicaragua exhibits important differences from Cuba's regime in origins and evolution. By Cuban standards seven years after victory in July 1979, the Nicaraguan regime is remarkably moderate. By Nicaragua's and Central America's own historical standards, of course, the Nicaraguan regime is the most radical in the region's history. Its foreign policy, too, responds to many sources and factors, and it is less aligned with the Soviet Union than Cuba was at a comparable point after their respective revolutionary victories. Nonetheless, by the mid-1980s Soviet-Nicaraguan relations had become quite close, and were a concern for the United States and its allies.[24] Once again, this article's purpose is to understand whether the new regime's insurgent origins have shaped its foreign policy.

Sandinista Nicaragua has supported the insurgency in El Salvador over the years; its military contribution was most direct in advance of the 1980–81 guerrilla general offensive. The Sandinistas did so notwithstanding the Carter administration's warnings. Though the Sandinistas behaved more cautiously and slowly than the Salvadoran guerrillas wanted, they and the Cubans did provide assistance. The Soviets played a minor and very reluctant role in this external support.[25] The Sandinistas had had good working relations with the Carter administration; the United States had been the main foreign-aid donor to Nicaragua since 1979.[26] There were good reasons for the Sandinistas not to provoke a U.S. government that had envisaged working with a regime born of a left-wing insurgency. Sandinista support for the Salvadoran insurgency thus results most from ideology and the coalitional ties they built during their own insurgency with the Salvadoran guerrillas. Neither Soviet pressure nor U.S. hostility account well for their behavior.[27] After 1981 there is evidence of Nicaraguan support for the Salvadoran guerrillas, short of the delivery of weapons; the evidence on weapons deliveries is much weaker. There appears to be some Nicaraguan support for other guerrilla movements, especially in Colombia.[28]

Neither Cuban nor Nicaraguan support for insurgency is the main explanation for the origins, evolution, or outcome of insurgencies in Central America. Even U.S. government documents help to demonstrate that this external support for insurgencies was a secondary, albeit important, factor. And yet there has been external support for insurgencies, and it was aimed at U.S. allies and, indirectly, at

[24] *Nicaragua: glorioso camino a la victoria* (Moscow: Academia de Ciencias de la URSS, 1981).

[25] The best single source is U.S. Department of State, *Communist Interference in El Salvador: Documents Demonstrating Communist Support of the Salvadoran Insurgency*, 23 February 1981. The "White Paper" to which the documents were appended has been rightly criticized for inaccuracies and exaggeration. The documents do not support several of the White Paper's key assertions. However, the authenticity of the documents has not been challenged successfully. They do support the proposition that Nicaragua contributed many resources to the Salvadoran insurgency in 1980–81.

[26] Arturo Cruz Sequeira, "Nicaragua: crisis económica, radicalización o moderación?" in *Centroamérica: más allá de la crisis* (Mexico: Ediciones SIAP, 1983), 148–149.

[27] Enrique Baloyra, *El Salvador in Transition* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1982).

[28] U.S. Department of State and Department of Defense, *News Briefing on Intelligence Information on External Support of the Guerrillas in El Salvador*, 8 August 1984; James LeMoyne, "The Guerrilla Network," *New York Times Sunday Magazine*, 6 April 1986.

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the United States. It began even before Cuba in 1959 or Nicaragua in 1980 clashed with the U.S. government; this support is an important source of the subsequent clashes. Nonetheless, the Soviet Union did not play an important role in this evolving revolutionary policy. Nicaragua and Cuba supported insurgencies in response to the histories and ideologies of their respective leaderships. These policies opposed the United States and its allies even though the Soviet role in support for the insurgencies was modest. Other policies of the Cuban and Nicaraguan regimes in alliance with the Soviets were also adverse to the common defense, though more plainly so in Cuba's case.

Should the United States Support Some Insurgencies?

Beginning in the 1950s, some have thought that the U.S. government should support some insurgencies to overthrow governments it did not like. In 1954 President Dwight Eisenhower authorized direct military aid to Guatemala's so-called Liberation Army, led by Carlos Castillo Armas, to overthrow the government of President Jacobo Arbenz.[29] Richard Bissell, in charge of the operation for the CIA, has noted that the U.S. government supplied "funds, military equipment, a few obsolete aircraft, radio and electronic equipment of various amounts, but above all, I would say, leadership, initiative, organization and skill."[30] Even so, the opposition to the Arbenz government was genuine and had been developing on its own. The "civil war" lasted only from June 18 to June 27, though preparations had begun in 1953. No more than a few hundred men were ever involved in the fighting. In the main "battle" at Chiquimula, only seventeen people died. The main reason for Arbenz's fall was that the armed forces refused to defend the government and forced him out.[31]

The U.S. government was elated. The operation was swift; it cost few lives and few U.S. resources. It eliminated a regime that the U.S. government considered a Soviet beachhead on the American mainland. In fact, the evidence of Soviet penetration of Guatemala, or of Communist domination of the Arbenz government, is weak. The U.S. government acted more out of ideological fear than out of the facts of the case. Nonetheless, the Arbenz government was not aligned with the United States and might have evolved toward a more radical posture in the future; but it is difficult to argue that its actual or foreseeable policies justified its overthrow.

The case for caution is strengthened upon reflection about Guatemalan history thereafter.[32] Guatemala was launched on an unprecedented cycle of bloody in-

[29] Dwight D. Eisenhower, *The White House Years: Mandate for Change, 1953–1956* (New York, Doubleday, 1963), 425–426.

[30] "The Yankee Years," FRONTLINE, Public Broadcasting System, first aired April 1985.

[31] Cole Blasier, *The Hovering Giant: U.S. Responses to Revolutionary Change in Latin America, 1910–1985*, 2nd ed. (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1985), 151–177; Ronald M. Schneider, *Communism in Guatemala, 1944–1954* (New York: Praeger, 1958).

[32] Richard Adams, *Crucifixion by Power: Essays on Guatemalan National Social Structure, 1944–1966*

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surgency, private vendettas, and unrestrained repression. In the early 1980s, the military repression reached levels unknown perhaps anywhere in the western hemisphere. These results were directly traceable to the 1954 events in four ways. First, though private armies had been common among Guatemalan landlords for centuries, the 1954 Liberation Movement was itself a new source of weapons. Much of the U.S.-supplied funds for that movement went to purchase weapons, which then remained in the hands of the political right. Second, many Guatemalan army officers opposed the U.S. role in 1954, especially its arming of the Liberation Army against the regular Army. And though the regular Army forced Arbenz out of office, the U.S. government maneuvered against its wishes to install Castillo Armas as president. The result increased nationalism among Guatemalan officers, and it made U.S. policies increasingly ineffective in Guatemala as time passed. U.S. government influence on the Guatemalan military has been negligible under every U.S. president ever since.

Third, some Guatemalan officers became guerrillas against the new order; they were especially effective because they had U.S. military training in counterinsurgency. Finally, the 1954 "liberation" leaders sought to roll back the previous social, economic, and political reforms, instituting a political system at odds with the values of the common defense. In short, U.S. support for, and direction of, the Guatemalan insurgency in 1954 is, at best, highly problematic. Though the U.S. government promoted it, the victorious regime's eventual policies and the outcomes traceable to the 1954 insurgency have been at odds with important U.S. interests and certainly with many values of the common defense.

U.S. support for insurgencies, of course, may fail. The Bay of Pigs expedition, undertaken in 1961 by Cuban exiles to overthrow the Castro government, was a nearly perfect failure. The U.S. government thought it could replicate the Guatemalan experience. As the CIA's Richard Bissell put it: "Possibly it is in order to say that one of the adverse consequences of that success was that subsequently, in other countries, too much reliance was placed on the method that had been successful."[33] The U.S. government misunderstood the Castro government's genuine strength; the U.S refused to commit its own troops or sufficient military support for a major campaign; and it deceived its own people and its allies. The invasion's defeat weakened the U.S. government worldwide and exposed it to charges from some about immorality and from others about ineptitude.[34]

In the late 1980s, U.S. support for those seeking to overthrow the Nicaraguan

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(Austin: University of Texas Press, 1970), 194, 260–269; Brian Jenkins, Cesar Sereseres, and Luigi Einaudi, *U.S. Military Aid and Guatemalan Politics* (California Arms Control and Foreign Policy Seminar, 1974); Cynthia Brown, ed., *With Friends Like These: The Americas Watch Report on Human Rights and U.S. Policy in Latin America* (New York: Pantheon, 1985), 180–204.

[33] "The Yankee Years."

[34] Lloyd S. Etheredge, *Can Governments Learn?: American Foreign Policy and Central American Revolutions* (New York: Pergamon, 1985); Peter Wyden, *Bay of Pigs: The Untold Story* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1979); Lucien S. Vandenbroucke, "The Decision to Land at the Bay of Pigs," *Political Science Quarterly* 99 (Fall 1984): 471–491.

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government raises similar issues. U.S. policies shake the moral and strategic foundations of the common defense that joins the United States to other liberal democracies. U.S. government agents sponsored a manual that taught terrorist tactics including assassination and mined Nicaragua's harbors, damaging merchant ships of U.S. allies. The U.S. government withdrew from the jurisdiction of the International Court at the Hague and sought to discredit the Court to reduce the impact of its judgment against the United States concerning the mining of the harbors.[35]

When in late 1981 President Reagan authorized support for the Nicaraguan Democratic Force (FDN) in its war against the Sandinistas, by U.S. government admission "the FDN did have a relatively high percentage of former guardsmen among the few hundred in its ranks in 1982," including its military commander, former National Guard Colonel Enrique Bermúdez. By late 1985, one quarter of the fifty-three senior FDN military leaders but a majority of the twenty-one FDN officers at senior headquarters were still former national guardsmen.[36] Regardless of the individual merits of former guardsmen, U.S. government support for what was in its origin a former guard organization, and which remains dependent on former guardsmen for military leadership, indicates blindness to Nicaraguan history. Most Nicaraguans hated the Somoza regime and the guard, and overthrew them in a broadly based national mutiny.[37] The role of the former guardsmen was also a reason why the anti-Sandinista opposition has been so divided and unable to unite under a single command. Many who fought against Somoza, symbolized by ex-Sandinista Commander and war hero Edén Pastora, could not easily join forces with those they once opposed so bitterly.

U.S. policy was often counterproductive and internally contradictory. The original rationale to support the FDN was that it would interrupt Sandinista supplies for the insurgency in El Salvador. Later on, support for the FDN was justified as a bargaining chip to pressure the Nicaraguan government to negotiate with its neighbors and to restore democratic liberties at home. Implicit in both policy rationales was that the United States viewed these fighters as policy instruments, to be used or discarded as the U.S. government saw fit. The U.S.-funded FDN came to be seen as a mercenary tool of U.S. policy, despite much talk about "freedom fighters." The latter found it difficult to appear as Nicaraguan patriots if they were agents of a foreign government.

The administration's reluctance to commit itself to full and overt support for the overthrow of the Sandinista regime was conditioned by opposition in the U.S. Congress and public opinion and among U.S. allies. Unpopular as the Sandinistas had become, many in the United States and in allied countries questioned whether

[35] *Psychological Operations in Guerrilla Warfare* (New York: Vintage, 1985); Andrew Pierre, ed., *Third World Instability: Central America as a European-American Issue* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1985); Abram Chayes, "Nicaragua, the United States, and the World Court," *Columbia Law Review* 85 (November 1985): 1445–1482.

[36] U.S. Department of State and Department of Defense, *The Challenge to Democracy in Central America* (Washington, D.C.: 1986), 41.

[37] Richard Millett, *Guardians of the Dynasty* (Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis, 1977), chaps. 10–11.

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U.S. pro-insurgency policies advanced the common defense. These doubts stemmed in part from the atrocities and abuses committed against Nicaraguan civilians by some of the anti-Sandinista forces. Some of those killed or injured by these forces were citizens of countries allied with the United States. For the United States, this misbehavior presented further dilemmas. Support for the FDN was also justified in part as an alternative to the direct engagement of U.S. personnel. But one way to reduce atrocities was to increase U.S. control over these forces. The more the counterrevolutionary war came under U.S. control, the weaker the FDN's nationalist claims and the weaker the U.S. policy rationale that support for this insurgency was an alternative to direct U.S. engagement.[38]

By 1986 the Sandinista regime had become authoritarian, repressive, and closely allied to the Soviet Union and Cuba, as a result of coinciding explanations: the beliefs of top Sandinista officials and the need to fight a war fostered by the United States.[39] But it had also undertaken some constructive social changes that had generated political support. It embodied the national resistance against a United States portrayed as the imperialist enemy that linked the "symbolic monsters" of Nicaraguan history—the national guard and the CIA. In the United States the regime had become viewed as adverse to the common defense. But the U.S.-supported insurgency did not have good prospects for victory, and its conduct was also adverse to the common defense's values and interests. Even if it were to win, indefinite guerrilla warfare was likely, a U.S. military presence might be required, and further abuses by the new regime might be expected. The pro-insurgency policy isolated the U.S. government. It was opposed by most people in the United States and by most U.S. allies in Latin America and western Europe. Its self-defeating and contradictory features weaken its claim to moral support or pragmatic effectiveness. In short, even U.S.-guided insurgencies may not serve the common defense.

Conservative Interests, Liberal Values

Insurgencies have generally failed since World War II. Their few successes brought regimes to power in countries that matter relatively little beyond their subregion; China, Vietnam, and Cuba are the main exceptions. Nonetheless, the regimes that stemmed from insurgencies have generally opposed the interests and values of the United States and allied liberal democracies. In Latin America, more ideological and anti-imperialist (as opposed to communal) insurgencies have made the very process of insurgency, as well as the two regimes that emerged from them, adverse to the common defense. The United States and its allies have good reasons to oppose left-wing insurgencies, though the policies to be adopted must clearly respond to the exigencies of each situation.

[38] Shirley Christian, *Nicaragua: Revolution in the Family* (New York: Random House, 1983); Christopher Dickey, *With the Contras: A Reporter in the Wilds of Nicaragua* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1985).

[39] Brown, ed., *With Friends Like These*, 156–179.

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Even U.S.-guided insurgencies are often adverse to the common defense. The insurgency itself, as in Nicaragua in the 1980s, divides the United States from its allies and weakens the values that inform their alliance. Beyond the Americas, U.S. pro-insurgent policies have aligned the U.S. government with South Africa in support of UNITA's (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola) rebellion in Angola, with Islamic fundamentalists fighting against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, and with genocidal Pol Pot's policies in Kampuchea. U.S. support for insurgents in Ethiopia threatens to further balkanize that country, an outcome the United States wants to avoid generally in Africa. The U.S. government surely does not wish to be so associated with these outcomes of its policies. The most fundamental problem is intrinsic to U.S. pro-insurgency policies. Insurgent actions cannot be controlled as if they were U.S. troops; to the extent that control is attempted, the moral and political standing of these fighters is questioned and the very rationale for U.S. policy is undermined.

In short, the United States has conservative interests not well served by support for any insurgencies and at odds with virtually all left-wing insurgencies. Most governments that matter in the world, and even many weaker ones, are aligned with the United States. The United States has more to lose than the USSR from the erosion of the norm that governments should not support insurgencies. And yet, heir to an insurgency itself, and to the liberal values that broadly inform its Constitution and its history, the United States appropriately seeks to promote the values on which its own polity is based and which unite it with other liberal democracies. It is always difficult to reconcile conservative interests with liberal values in foreign policy.

The ideological basis for U.S. policy and for the common defense requires opposition to authoritarian regimes of all kinds. In the Americas, these values and the conservative interests require support for democratic regimes under attack by left-wing insurgencies whose histories during the insurgencies, and in the two cases when insurgents have won, have been at odds with U.S. and allied interests and values. The United States should also not sponsor, support, or guide insurgencies on its own because even these policies are at odds with its conservative interests and the liberal values of the common defense. The form and extent of support or opposition to regimes, and opposition to insurgencies, should vary with specific circumstances.

Two puzzles remain. What should be done when insurgencies fight against regimes of which the United States disapproves? The United States cannot support the repression that many Latin American regimes have unleashed in the name of anticommunism. In every major South American country, including most of the Chilean opposition to the Pinochet regime, and in most of Latin America, including elements of the governments in power in the mid-1980s in El Salvador and Guatemala, there are alternatives to dictatorships of the right and of the left. Failure to find such alternatives in Cuba and in Nicaragua should not blind policy makers to their existence elsewhere.

The second problem is what should policy be toward insurgencies that succeed.

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The record with regard to Cuba is not generally reassuring. But beginning in 1962, the United States succeeded in its technological updating of the Monroe doctrine, barring Soviet nuclear weapons deployments and since 1979 even the deployment of Soviet conventional forces. Though Cuba has continued to support revolutionary movements overseas, one by one most governments in Latin America and Africa have established a *modus vivendi* with Cuba that has constrained, and in most cases, stopped Cuban support for revolution in those countries. This is not an airtight nor an easy policy to implement, but it is preferable to its alternatives and it serves as a possible model for the evolution of U.S. policy toward Nicaragua—a web of informal understandings and formal agreements, perhaps through the mediation of the so-called Contadora countries of Latin America (Colombia, Mexico, Panama, and Venezuela), to constrain the disruptive aspects of Nicaraguan foreign policy. Such diplomacy is not likely to liberalize internal Nicaraguan affairs, no matter what the formal texts might say, and that remains a troubling consequence of the Sandinista regime's consolidation.

Enlisting Soviet Support

Fortunately for the pursuit of conservative interests, there are many coincidences between Soviet and U.S. interests with regard to insurgencies. Moscow-affiliated Communist parties have been generally reluctant to support insurgencies. Even the parties that at some point joined the armed struggle, such as those in El Salvador, Guatemala, or Venezuela, have at other times opposed it. The legalization of Communist parties is often an effective technique to isolate and weaken the insurgent left. The Soviet Union has supported insurgencies in Latin America only by exception. It had to be led by Cuba and Nicaragua to its most recent modest support for the Salvadoran guerrillas. Moreover, even in the 1980s the Soviet Union has not supported every insurgency that Cuba has supported. The United States and the Soviet Union have had comparable policies toward Polisario's (Popular Front for the Liberation of Saquiat al-Hamra and Rio de Oro) struggle against Morocco, and both have had good and important relations with the Moroccan government. Cuba, in contrast, supports Polisario.[40] And when Cuba supported Colombia's M-19 Movement in 1980–81 against the Colombian government, the Soviets and other eastern European governments still sought to improve relations with the Colombian government.[41]

Most dramatic was the case of Soviet-Peruvian relations. In the early 1980s, a radical insurgency, led by a movement calling itself Sendero Luminoso, developed in south-central Peru; its violence reached to the capital city of Lima by mid-decade. Beginning in 1973, the Soviet Union began a comprehensive program of

[40] John Damis, *Conflict in Northwest Africa: The Western Sahara Dispute* (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1983), 119–131.

[41] Anatolii Olshani, "Colaboración económica y comercial de los países miembros del CAME y Colombia," *América latina* 3 (1982).

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training and military equipment sales to Peru that amounted to over $1.6 billion dollars by 1985. About 3,000 Peruvian officers have been trained in the Soviet Union. In the mid-1980s, 150 Soviet military advisers and technicians were stationed in Peru. The Soviets (and the Cubans) strongly opposed Sendero Luminoso and the latter reciprocated. Sendero has no known international ties to any government. Soviet citizens and organizations in Peru have been targets of Sendero attacks.[42] Soviet military aid to Peru's liberal democracy serves the interests of the United States and its allies.

The United States has little to gain, and at times much to lose, from the existence or the success of insurgencies. The policies that follow from this conclusion need to be tailored to the particularities of each situation. Because most insurgencies are weak and will lose, the United States need not become involved. Because not all insurgencies are Soviet-supported, even the Soviets might be enlisted in some counterinsurgency efforts. Because even U.S.-guided insurgencies may threaten U.S. and allied interests and values, the United States should eschew supporting them. The defensible U.S. opposition to insurgencies requires understanding the nature of the threat, which is usually modest; the tools that might be useful, which should not include promoting insurgencies; and the nature of the allies, which might at times include even the USSR. The common defense rests on the promotion of conservative interests and liberal values through prudent policies that themselves eschew insurgencies. In the 1980s, the United States called its policies toward Latin America conservative, but they were not; claimed to be prudent, but were subversive; and sought to promote liberal values through policies that undermined them and thus weakened the common defense they purported to serve.

[42] U.S. Department of Defense, *Soviet Military Power, 1985* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1985), 123; Eugenio CHang-Rodríguez, *Opciones políticas peruanas, 1985* (Lima: Centro de Documentación Andina, 1985), 393–428; Soviet views in "Colaboración en bien de los pueblos," *América latina* 7 (1984): 69–173; "Encuentros: 'la herencia de Velasco Alvarado vive'," ibid., 2 (1985): 48–52.

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The Electoral Cycle and the Conduct of Foreign Policy

WILLIAM B. QUANDT

Two-hundred years ago, when the Constitution was taking shape, the conduct of the new nation's foreign affairs was not central to the concerns of the Founders. Once independence was achieved, it was widely believed, the United States would be able to remain comparatively uninvolved with the rest of the world. A wide ocean separated it from the messy politics of Europe and permitted the first president to imagine the United States could remain unentangled in the affairs of the rest of the world.

The Founders did, of course, make passing reference to the division of powers between the executive and the legislature in such matters as negotiating and ratifying treaties with foreign powers and with raising an army and a navy and directing them in time of war. As elsewhere in the Constitution, on these matters one sees the determination to prevent too much power from being concentrated in any one part of the federal government.[1] Divided responsibility was the key to avoiding abuses of power, and in the domestic arena the wisdom of this philosophical bent has been widely applauded. In the conduct of foreign policy, however, it is much more difficult to argue that the virtues of divided responsibility enhance the common defense or promote the general welfare.

Still, even the most ardent proponent of strong presidential leadership in foreign policy would have a difficult time arguing that the specific provisions of the Constitution regarding foreign policy are at the root of our contemporary prob-

[1] See James MacGregor Burns, *The Deadlock of Democracy: Four-Party Politics in America* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1963), 8–23, on Madison's concept of checks and balances.

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lems in world affairs. Very little of foreign policy today takes the form of formal negotiation of treaties and official declarations of war. While the fate of the Treaty of Versailles and SALT II may be pointed to as exceptions, in both cases the Senate's refusal to ratify a signed treaty was in part due to mistakes by the executive in not preparing public opinion and in not cultivating Congress. In short, if the system worked poorly, it was more a political than a constitutional failure. Certainly the Founders had very much in mind that a president should work to ensure the Senate's support on major foreign policy matters.

It is true, of course, that Congress has periodically tried to limit the powers of the president in the conduct of foreign affairs. This was the intent of the unsuccessful Bricker amendment in 1954, which would have sharply curtailed the president's authority to negotiate treaties and to enter into executive agreements. Since then, executive agreements have become commonplace. Similarly, efforts to constrain the president's authority to commit troops abroad in the form of the War Powers Resolution of 1973 have been ruled to be of questionable constitutionality and no president has agreed to accept this constraint on his authority.[2]

It would be fair to conlude, then, that the Constitution does not cripple the president in the conduct of foreign policy, at least not because of the definition of powers. These are defined sufficiently broadly and ambiguously so that a strong and popular president can provide effective leadership, while a relatively weak and unpopular one will have a difficult time. That is pretty close to what one imagines the intent of the Founders must have been.

The Problem of the Electoral Cycle

But there is still a constitutionally rooted problem that seriously affects the conduct of foreign policy. It derives from the structure of the electoral cycle. Here there is no ambiguity at all in the Constitution. Presidential elections take place every four years; congressional elections every two years; and since the passage of the twenty-second amendment, a president can only be elected twice. In practice, this often means that presidents have little time during their incumbency when they have both the experience and the power needed for sensible and effective conduct of foreign policy. The price we pay is a foreign policy excessively geared to short-term calculations, in which narrow domestic political considerations often outweigh sound strategic thinking, and where turnover in high positions is so frequent that consistency and coherence are lost.

Not all observers would agree that this is a serious problem. Some would like to see foreign policy closely tied to public opinion. This might have helped to prevent some of the better known debacles in foreign policy, including the later phases of the Vietnam war. But few would take this point to the extreme of saying that foreign policy should be conducted by referendum or public opinion polls. If

[2] James L. Sundquist, *Constitutional Reform and Effective Government* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1986), 58–61, 66–68, 215–233.

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diplomacy and national security planning are accepted as inevitably requiring a degree of both expertise and confidentiality, foreign policy decision making will always be somewhat elitist. The public and Congress may well set the broad lines of foreign policy, but most Americans seem to want a president who can act decisively abroad in defending American national interests. Indeed, at the onset of crises, presidents almost always find an increase in public support for their policies.

If a president were to abuse his authority in foreign policy, or if the public were to lose confidence, the Constitution does provide remedies. Impeachment is a possibility if the abuses are flagrant. Congress can refuse to fund the programs that it opposes. And eventually, the electorate will have its day in the voting booth as well. While these are not remedies to be used lightly or immediately, and they do not help to deal with specific problems in the management of foreign affairs, they do serve as a reminder that presidential authority in foreign policy is limited. The greater problem seems to be the difficulty, in large measure because of the electoral cycle, of providing presidents with enough experience, time, and power to act like statesmen and strategists as they deal with foreign countries.

The electoral arrangements for the presidency and Congress have rarely been justified by the contribution they make to sound foreign policy. The rationale is almost entirely domestic. Representatives are supposed to remain closely tied to the wishes of their constituents; hence the two-year term. Senators are expected to take a broader view and thus are given six-year terms. The Senate is supposed to embody a degree of continuity, and, therefore, only one-third of its membership is up for election at any given moment. Presidents fall in between, having to renew their mandate after four years and being obliged to retire at the end of a second term. A pervasive distrust of presidential power can be detected in these arrangements, a distrust that is historically understandable, but which also can have debilitating effects on foreign policy.

In domestic policy it is probably wise to structure the federal system so that presidential authority is limited. After all, the country has so many diverse interests that it is hard to imagine the system working well unless there are strong incentives for compromise and moderation. A certain amount of inconsistency, of vacillation, of changing the calculus of winners and losers is needed to keep this heterogeneous country together. The federal structure and the electoral cycle are all part of the system that allows domestic political issues to be resolved with a minimum of conflict and violence.

Foreign policy is different. Washington speaks for the country as a whole in foreign policy. The president is supposed to be the commander-in-chief of the armed forces. And in the modern world he literally holds the power of life and death, since he has the ultimate authority to decide on the use of nuclear weapons. Such decisions might have to be made in a matter of minutes, and extraordinary measures are taken to be sure that the president is always in a position to act on the basis of the best information available. In the nuclear era there might not be time to consult with Congress, to await declarations of war, or to cultivate public understanding. An enormous responsibility rests with the president, and presumably it

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is in everyone's interest that matters affecting the nation's welfare and security be handled with skill, expertise, and intelligence. The present electoral arrangements do not contribute to that goal.

The Nature of the Problem

Ideally, one would like to see a president bring wisdom and experience in foreign affairs to the Oval Office. Once there, one could hope that he or she would have the time, the power, and the authority to deal with problems of national security and foreign policy in ways that promote the national interest. But to list these desirable circumstances is to be reminded of how far they are from the recent historical record.

Wisdom is something that a president either has or lacks, and the electoral cycle cannot be held responsible. But experience and power, as well as the time and inclination to deal with foreign affairs, are tied to the rhythms of the electoral cycle. Simply stated, a newly elected president may well have the authority, the power, and the inclination to address foreign policy issues, but he rarely has the experience necessary to form sound judgments. Thus, it is common for serious errors to be made in the first year of a presidential term. During the second, and part of the third year, there may be a happy coincidence of sufficient power, experience, and time to deal with the complexities of world affairs. But during the last year or more of a typical first term, a president is drawn into the politics of reelection and rarely has much time or inclination to deal with foreign policy issues unless they seem to hold out the promise of winning votes, which is rarely the case.

A reelected president in his second term faces a somewhat different problem. Experience and authority are likely to be available, but after the mid-term elections the "lame-duck" problem is very likely to set in, making it difficult for a president to conduct foreign policy. Leaders abroad will begin to ask themselves why they should bother to deal with this president, when someone else will be in the Oval Office before long, perhaps bringing a change of policy with him. The opposition party has little incentive to help the outgoing president win any foreign policy victories, and within his own party the struggle for succession may weaken his normal base of support. In normal times it would be surprising to find major foreign policy successes in the last phase of a two-term president's incumbency.

This simple descriptive model should not be seen as an absolute guide for how a president will fare in the conduct of foreign policy at different moments of his term. Crises can radically change the normal political calculus, enhancing presidential power and forging a bipartisan base of support. But if a crisis turns into a prolonged, indecisive, costly commitment—as in Vietnam and Lebanon—domestic political considerations are likely to come to the fore again and force a president's hand.

None of this would matter so much if presidents did not really have much to say about foreign policy. In theory, policy might be carried out by the experienced professionals in the bureaucracy on a nonpartisan basis. Or a grand bipartisan

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consensus might develop that would establish the broad lines of policy, leaving the president relatively free from domestic political considerations as long as he operated within that consensus. Those who used to proclaim that "politics stops at the water's edge" were expressing the hope that a nonpartisan foreign policy could be found. But certainly since the mid-1960s and the trauma of Vietnam, there has been no consensus on foreign policy that could insulate a president from the impact of domestic politics and the electoral cycle.

First-Term Presidents: The Typical Pattern

A president's assessment of risks and opportunities is generally a product of his experience in office and where he stands with respect to the electoral cycle. For analytical purposes and at the risk of some distortion of a more complex reality, it is useful to distinguish among patterns in the first year of a presidential term, the second year, the third, and the fourth.

These categories are useful for understanding the typical evolution of policy over a four-year cycle. They alert the observer to the changing weight of domestic political considerations as a presidential term unfolds. The time when a president decides to do something is heavily influenced by this cycle, unless he is reacting to a foreign policy crisis.

If a president and his advisers are inattentive to the political cycle, they are apt to make serious mistakes. A learning process seems invariably to take place in the course of a four-year term. By the end, most presidents recognize that some of what they tried early in their term was unrealistic; they have become more familiar with the limits on their power; they aim lower and pay more attention to the timing of their major moves.

A skillful president will make use of the political cycle to enhance the chances of success in his foreign policy. A careless one will probably pay a high price for ignoring domestic realities. Events, of course, can get out of control, as they did for Jimmy Carter with the Iranian hostage crisis in 1979. It was particularly bad luck for him that this happened just as an election year was beginning. By contrast, Ronald Reagan managed to terminate the controversial American military presence in Lebanon just before his reelection campaign began in 1984, and the issue seemed to do him no political harm at the polls. Luck and skill go hand in hand in successful political careers.

Looking back on their time in office, presidents and their advisers usually decry the intrusion of domestic politics so heavily into the foreign policy arena. Former Secretary of State Cyrus Vance has argued that the only solution to the problem is to elect a president for one term of six years.

> From experience in the making of foreign policy in several administrations, I have concluded that a four-year presidential term has serious drawbacks, especially when it comes to foreign affairs. It takes each new president from six to nine months to learn his job and to feel comfortable in the formulation and execution of foreign policy. For the next eighteen months the president can operate with assurance. But during the last year or

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so, he is running for reelection and is forced to divert much of his attention to campaigning. As a result, many issues are ignored and important decisions are deferred. Sometimes bad decisions are made under the pressures of months of primary elections. And at home and overseas, we are frequently seen as inconsistent and unstable.[3]

Others have tried to address the problem by pleading for bipartisanship, the removal of foreign policy from the domestic political agenda. Zbigniew Brzezinski, President Carter's national security adviser, has written:

> Every Administration goes through a period of an ecstatic emancipation from the past, then a discovery of continuity, and finally a growing preoccupation with Presidential reelection. As a result, the learning curve in the area of foreign policy tends to be highly compressed. Each Administration tends to expend an enormous amount of energy coping with the unintended, untoward consequences of its initial, sometimes excessive, impulses to innovate, to redeem promises, and to harbor illusions. In time, preconceptions give way to reality, disjointedness to intellectual coherence, and vision to pragmatism. But by the time this happens, the Presidential cycle is usually coming to an end. That the four-year election process has a pernicious influence on foreign policy is evident, but it is also clear that this structural handicap is not likely to be undone.[4]

The Pattern of the First Year

A president and his advisers often begin their term with relatively little background in foreign policy issues. This lack of background is especially important if the president has been a Washington outsider and if there has been a change of the party in control of the White House. But even in the case of a Washington insider, such as a senator with experience on the Foreign Relations Committee or a vice president moving up to the presidency, there is little reason to expect more than the faintest familiarity with most foreign policy issues.

Presidents are not allowed the luxury of taking no position on issues until they have learned enough to make sensible judgments. Instead, on issues that evoke strong public interest, such as the Middle East or arms control, candidates for the presidency will be expected to have a position and may even devote a major speech to the topic.

These first definitions of a president's position, often taken in the midst of the campaign, are typically of considerable importance in setting the administration's initial course. They are likely to reflect general foreign policy predispositions—a tough policy toward the Soviets, for example—and will generally imply that the previous administration was on the wrong track and that things will soon be put straight. (This, of course, assumes that the presidency is passing from one party to the other.) In addition to defining a course of action by contrasting it with one's predecessor in office, a newly-elected president will have to decide what priority

[3] See Cyrus Vance, *Hard Choices: Critical Years in America's Foreign Policy* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983), 13.

[4] See Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Adviser, 1977–1981* (New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 1983), 544.

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to attach to the main foreign policy issues on the agenda. Not all issues can be dealt with at once, and a signal of presidential interest or disinterest may be more important in setting the administration's policy than the substantive position papers that inevitably begin to flow to the White House from the bureaucracy.

If an issue is treated as important, and if presidential predispostions are reflected in the charting of the initial course, the early months of the new term are likely to be marked by activism. Having just won a national election, the president will probably be optimistic about his ability to use the office to achieve great results in foreign and domestic policy. If initiatives are decided upon, they tend to be ambitious. It takes time to recognize what will work and what will not.

It also takes time for a president and his advisers to develop a comfortable working style. A high degree of confusion is not unusual in the early days. Public statements may have to be retracted, and it will take time to know who really speaks for the president among the many claimants to the role. In addition, it will take time for the president and the new secretary of state to develop contacts with various foreign leaders. These encounters will eventually add to their education, but at the outset there is usually only a faint understanding of the foreign players, their agendas, and their strengths and weaknesses.

What all of this adds up to is a first year that is often somewhat experimental, where policy objectives are set in ambitious terms, where predispositions and campaign rhetoric still count for something, and where international realities are only dimly appreciated. Typically, toward the end of the first year it becomes clear that the policy agreed upon in January or February has lost momentum or is on the wrong track. Reassessments are then likely, but not until considerable time and energy have been invested in pursuing false leads and indulging in wishful thinking.

The Pattern of the Second Year

Despite the frequent disappointments of dealing with foreign policy issues in the first year, presidents rarely decide to turn their attention away from the international arena in their second year. If recent experience is a guide, year two is likely to be marked with considerably greater success, either in promoting international agreement through negotiations or in the skillful management of a crisis.

The difference between the first and the second year shows that experience can be a good teacher. Policies in the second year are often more in tune with reality. There is less of an ideological overlay in policy deliberations. At the same time, goals are likely to be less ambitious. Plans for comprehensive solutions may be replaced by attempts at more modest partial agreements.

By the second year, some of the intrabureaucratic feuding and backbiting is likely to have subsided, or at least a president has had the chance to put it to an end if he so chooses. The gap between the political appointees and the foreign service professionals has also narrowed, and more regional expertise is typically being taken into account during policy discussions. If a senior bureaucrat has survived into the second year, he is no longer seen as the enemy and has often been

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judged a team player. In any case, the failures of year one tend to make the president's men less contemptuous of the knowledge of the professionals.

During the second year, presidents also begin to realize that mishandling of foreign policy issues, especially in the Middle East or concerning U.S.-Soviet relations, can be costly. Congressional elections are scheduled for November, and in most cases the party in power has to expect some losses. Such losses make it more difficult for the president to govern, and thus he has a strong interest in minimizing them. This is no time for controversial initiatives. If initiatives are to be taken, there is a high premium on the appearance of success. The mood in the White House is much less experimental than in the first year. Practical criteria come to the fore. Success may require compromises with principle. This is the year in which presidents realize that the slogan of politics being "the art of the possible" is applicable to foreign as well as domestic policy.

The Pattern of the Third Year

During the third year of a typical presidential term, foreign policy issues are likely to be assessed at the White House in terms of whether or not they can help advance the incumbent's reelection bid. The tendency, therefore, is to try for an apparent success if an initiative is underway, even if the result leaves something to be desired. The administration will even be prepared on occasions to pay heavily with concessions or with promises of aid and arms to get an agreement.

If the prospects for an agreement do not look good during the third year, the tendency is to cut one's losses and to disengage the president from the diplomatic effort. Above all, the president does not want to be seen as responsible for a foreign policy failure as the election year approaches. And certainly by the end of the third year, if not considerably earlier, the pre-election season is likely to be underway.

The rush for success, along with the tendency to abandon controversial and costly policies, means that mistakes are often made in the third year. Opportunities may be lost through carelessness. The price of agreement may become very high as the parties to negotiations realize how badly Washington wants a success. Political considerations tend to override the requirements of steady, purposeful diplomacy. Nonetheless, this is sometimes a year in which genuine achievements are possible, especially if the groundwork in the second year has been good.

The Pattern of the Fourth Year

Most presidents go to great lengths to deny that electoral considerations are allowed to influence their conduct of foreign policy. But as political realists, they all know that they must take politics into account. If nothing else, the extraordinary demands on a presidential candidate mean that little time is left for consideration of complex foreign policy problems, for meeting with visiting heads of state,

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or for fighting great battles with Congress over aid or arms sales. Added to this is the desire not to lose the support of constituencies that have particularly strong feelings about specific foreign policy issues. This can be important in terms of votes as well as in terms of financial contributions to the party and to congressional candidates.

The guidelines for the fourth year with respect to potentially controversial foreign policy issues are thus fairly simple. Try to avoid taking a position. Steer clear of new initiatives. Stick with safe themes and patriotic rhetoric. Attack your opponent as inexperienced, ill-informed, possibly reckless. If crises are forced upon you, they must of course be dealt with, and even in election years presidents have considerable authority in emergencies.

In brief, most presidents recognize that they can hope to achieve little in foreign policy in the midst of an election campaign. Even if a president were prepared to take some bold initiative, foreign leaders would be reluctant to respond positively out of a concern that the president might not be in office the following January. Statesmen are likely to want to know who will be in the White House for the next four years before they take major decisions. This weakens the influence of the president in his fourth year even when he is not up for reelection.

The Pattern of the Second Term

For a president in his second term, the four-year pattern changes significantly. The first year and a half may be the best time for taking foreign policy initiatives. The president knows as much about substance as he ever will. The reelection has provided the proof he may feel he needed that the public is behind him.

Late in the second year, however, domestic considerations begin to intrude on foreign policy concerns. Midterm elections are likely to be of special importance, for they will determine to a large extent how much power the president has in his last two years. If he loses control over one or both houses of Congress, his legislative agenda will be in jeopardy. Any significant loss for his party may speed up the succession struggle and can embolden his opponents in Congress. The idea that a president who does not have to face reelection will be free to act in a statesmanlike manner in his last two years misses the point. He may be free, but he is unlikely to be taken very seriously as he reaches the end of his term. At some point in the third or fourth year, the "lame duck" phenomenon is bound to affect the president.

Some Illustrative Examples

In the post-World War II era, only two men, Dwight Eisenhower and Richard Nixon, assumed the office of president with some measure of expertise in world affairs. Even for these two, however, there were vast gaps in their knowledge and a period of on-the-job training was essential. All other presidents—Harry Truman, John

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Kennedy, Lyndon Johnson, Gerald Ford, Jimmy Carter, and Ronald Reagan—had relatively little experience with world affairs by the time they assumed office.

If we leave aside the cases of Truman, who became president in the midst of a war, and of Eisenhower, who had to deal with the Korean war in his first year, we can look for typical errors of inexperience especially in 1961, 1977, and 1981. These are the purest examples of a relatively inexperienced man coming to the Oval Office after having campaigned against the previous incumbent.

Whatever one may think of the brief Kennedy presidency, its first year was not its finest hour. In the spring of 1961 Kennedy stumbled into the Bay of Pigs fiasco. In addition, having campaigned on the basis of a nonexistent missile gap, he had to reverse course and adapt to new realities, but not before he had set in motion a new phase of the arms race.

For Carter, his first year was marked by excessive ambition and awkwardness. He tried to move abruptly away from the arms control guidelines that Gerald Ford and Leonid Brezhnev had laid out at Vladivostok, calling instead for deep cuts in strategic weaponry. The Soviets rejected this new proposal and precious time was lost before arms negotiations could get back on track. In the Middle East, Carter launched an ambitious peace initiative, but compromised its success by some of his clumsy public diplomacy and by mishandling the surrounding dialogue with the Soviet Union. By fall 1977, he felt that he was paying a heavy domestic political price for his Middle East efforts and told Egypt's President Anwar Sadat that there was little more that he could do. At that point Sadat, perceiving Carter's weakness, set off on his own to deal with Israel directly.

Reagan's first-year errors were in part a product of inexperience. In the Middle East, for example, he lent his weight to a policy of building strategic consensus against the Soviet Union. From this perspective, regional problems such as the crisis in Lebanon and the Arab-Israeli conflict were relatively unimportant. Countries such as Israel, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia, all strongly anti-Soviet, would be encouraged to drop their local quarrels and cooperate in pursuit of anti-Soviet policies. Needless to say, strategic consensus was illusory, and neglecting the problems of Lebanon and the Palestinians set the stage for the explosion that came the following year.

Presidents in the second year have presumably learned something of value from their on-the-job experience. This is a time to look for initiatives that are rooted in realism and crisis management marked by some skill and self-confidence. For Kennedy, the Cuban missile crisis came in the second year and his handling of it won him high marks as a tough but flexible statesman. Nixon's deft management of the Jordan crisis, particularly the mobilization of Israeli power to help deter the Syrians, came in his second year. Carter's Camp David success was similarly timed. Finally, Reagan's well-conceived but poorly executed Middle East peace initiative also came late in his second year.

Third years are difficult to characterize. On the one hand, presidents have the power and the experience to do well, but they may feel the need to rush for success or to drop controversial issues before the election year is upon them. Particularly

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in recent years the reelection campaign seems to begin about midway through the third year. Eisenhower may have been somewhat affected by these considerations in the way he handled the Soviet Union in 1955. Here was a mixture of conciliation—the spirit of Geneva—and confusion—the response to the Soviet arms deal with Egypt. On this latter point, Eisenhower wavered between trying to win Egypt's President Gamal Abdel Nasser away from the Soviets with offers of economic aid for the Aswan High Dam and punishing him for refusing to make peace with Israel and for flirting with the Soviets. Not surprisingly, as the election year arrived, the decision was to punish Nasser. The Aswan offer was abruptly withdrawn; Nasser responded by nationalizing the Suez Canal; and before long Eisenhower faced a full-scale international crisis on the eve of elections.

Kennedy's third year is difficult to judge. He seems to have been on the way toward dealing effectively with the Soviets on arms control. Where he was heading with his policy toward Southeast Asia is difficult to determine.

Carter's third year was a mixed one in foreign policy. It began with the collapse of the Shah's regime in Iran, which caused great confusion in Washington. About the same time, however, Carter threw himself into the final negotiations for Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty and was successful. He also pushed SALT II through to signature. But he dropped the Middle East issue when the Palestinian autonomy negotiations were getting underway, thus insuring their failure, and he was unable to win Senate ratification for SALT II.

Election years rarely witness great success in foreign policy. Carter struggled in frustration with the Iranian hostage crisis. Reagan withdrew ignominiously from Lebanon after more than 250 Marines had died. The great exception to this pattern, of course, was Nixon in 1972. Nixon was an unusual president in many ways. He had served as vice president under Eisenhower for eight years, and thus came to the Oval Office with much more knowledge of world affairs than other presidents. He also had a shrewd sense for timing in politics and seemed to realize that his reelection prospects would be helped if he could demonstrate his skill in foreign policy in the election year. Most other presidents have shied away from foreign policy initiatives as the election drew close. Nixon, however, prepared his biggest moves in near secrecy over the previous years. Then in 1972 he brought the American involvement in Vietnam to an end, he traveled to China, and he signed the SALT I agreement in Moscow. All this took place in the space of several months and in an election year. His Democratic challenger, who had been painting Nixon as a reckless warmonger, never had a chance. Many voters, who felt little personal regard for Nixon, nonetheless had to admit that he was a master at the game of nations. His electoral victory was complete.

Conclusion

The American political system was not designed with the conduct of foreign policy in mind. Checks and balances, frequent elections, and the concept of popular sovereignty were all meant to limit abuses of power, not to make it easy for a presi-

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dent to govern. In foreign policy the constraints are often less than in the domestic arena. But in modern times even foreign policy has become highly controversial, and thus subject to all the political forces that limit the power of a president.

To understand how American foreign policy is made, one needs to look carefully at the views of key decision makers, especially the president and his top advisers. The individuals do matter. But they operate within a political context that has some very regular features. Therefore, if they are to leave their imprint on policy, they will have to understand what the broader constitutional system allows. And they will have to learn much about the world as well.

Presidents do have great power at their disposal. It is often most usable in the midst of crises, when the normal restraints of political life are suspended, at least for a little while. Presidents can also usually count on a fairly wide latitude in the conduct of foreign policy in their first two years. But in time the need to appeal to the electorate, to have congressional support, and to prepare for reelection appears to dominate thinking at the White House, regardless of who is the incumbent.

This means that the United States is structurally at a disadvantage in trying to develop and sustain policies that require a mastery of complex issues and call for consistency and a long-term vision to enhance the prospects of success. It is hard for presidents to look beyond the next few months. Consistency is often sacrificed for political expediency. Turnover of personnel in top positions erodes the prospects for continuity.

At the same time, the United States, for these very reasons, rarely pursues a strongly ideological foreign policy for long. There are pressures to pursue a course that has broad popular support, eschewing extremes of left or right. Pragmatic criteria are a common part of policy debates. Thus, if one course of action has clearly failed, another can be tried. This may be hard on the nerves of other world leaders, but sometimes this experimental approach is needed if a viable policy is to be found.

Most of the reforms of the American constitutional system that are proposed by those who deplore its consequences in the international arena seem unlikely. If a president hopes to do well in foreign policy, he will have to operate within the system much as it now exists. There is, however, room for improving performance.

Each president comes to office with a tendency to believe that he can reshape the realities of the international environment. In time, he learns otherwise. This learning period seems to take much of the first year. But it need not always be a wasted year. Even if a president cannot be expected to master the nuances of arms control, the debt crisis, or the Arab-Israeli conflict immediately, he can begin with a modest agenda until he feels more secure in his knowledge, and he can rely more heavily on the advice of those who have had experience.

Similarly, the typical errors of the third year, the rush for success and the corollary tendency to miss opportunities, might be curtailed if there were greater awareness of the dangers. The domestic political gains and losses associated with the conduct of foreign policy in the third year have probably been overestimated. There

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is no evidence that Ford and Carter were helped by their successes, nor were Nixon and Reagan punished for their third-year fumbles.

While there may be little that can be done to prevent the distortions brought on by the election year, presidents need not act as if the election has already begun by the middle of their third year. There might well be a good case for acting presidential instead. Realizing the full potential of the office of the presidency is probably the best practical solution to the problems posed for the conduct of foreign policy by the constitutionally-designed electoral cycle. But that requires that the American people elect statesmen as presidents, and that cannot be expected in the television era. Thus, we will probably have to live with a system that weakens the ability to conduct an effective foreign policy. Understanding that reality may be small consolation, but it may serve to temper the grandiose notion that the United States, as a great power, can reshape the world in its image. Neither the realities of the world nor those of our own political system will allow that.*

* An elaboration of parts of this article may be found in William B. Quandt, *Camp David: Peacemaking and Politics* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1986), 9–29.

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Can SDI Provide a Defense?

JEROME SLATER
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Is it possible to "provide for the common defense" in the nuclear age? President Ronald Reagan clearly thinks so, given his refusal at Reykjavik, Iceland to compromise on his Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), even in exchange for a sweeping nuclear arms-reduction agreement with the Soviet Union. Though the President's adamance on this issue is politically popular, SDI has been greeted with widespread skepticism and criticism among scientists and the arms-control community. This reaction is quite understandable in light of the specific arguments emphasized by the Reagan administration and, equally importantly, the overall record of the administration in arms control and Soviet-American relations. Nonetheless, we will argue that a negotiated introduction of a limited population defense system is both feasible and desirable and that such a system, if embodied in a far-reaching arms-control regime, could provide the basis for full-scale population defense in the future. Should this prove feasible, real meaning could be restored to the Constitutional mandate to establish a "common defense."

At present, however, there is both confusion and inconsistency over the purpose and mission of a ballistic missile defense system (BMD). There are four possible missions that BMD might perform. First, the President's conception: a full-scale population defense of the United States, to be shared with the Soviet Union at some later date, that will have the effect of ending mutual assured destruction (MAD) and rendering nuclear weapons "impotent and obsolete." Second, however, full-scale population defense might be pursued not because it will abolish mutual assured destruction and make all nuclear weapons obsolete, but in the ex-

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pectation that it will abolish *Soviet* assured destruction and make *Soviet* nuclear weapons obsolete. This seems to be the real goal of Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger and those other administration officials and defense analysts who appear to believe that full-scale population defense is a realistic goal in the next decade or so. In their view, SDI will restore U.S. strategic superiority over the Soviet Union, enhance the credibility of the U.S. nuclear commitment to Europe, and give the United States a usable war-fighting strategy.[1]

A third mission for BMD—or SDI—would be to protect the U.S. strategic retaliatory force and its command, control, and communications network, rather than protect populations, with the goal of enhancing deterrence rather than replacing it. Most administration defense officials, including those most closely associated with the SDI program as well as the nongovernmental defense analysts on whom the administration relies, have emphasized that SDI will focus on this mission at least through the end of this century.[2]

To be sure, in theory the two missions of force defense and population protection may be combined to create a new national security strategy of "assured survival" or "defense dominance." Since the inception of SDI, this has emerged as the avowed administration goal. Under the defense-dominance strategy, ballistic missile defenses would begin by protecting the most vulnerable components of the U.S. retaliatory system, particularly intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) in fixed silos, and gradually move toward population defense. Ideally, the transition to population defense would be negotiated and jointly managed with the Soviet Union, and it would be accompanied by substantial reductions in offensive weapons. If the Soviet Union refused to negotiate this new joint strategic relationship, however, the United States would proceed unilaterally, relying on the effectiveness of the American system ultimately to persuade the Soviets of the futility of seeking to preserve MAD. The eventual outcome would not be the end of nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence, but a new system in which deterrence is a function of the inability of the Soviet Union to achieve a significant military advantage through nuclear attack ("deterrence through denial") rather than fear of unbearable retaliation ("deterrence through punishment"). An official government statement puts it this way: "Successful SDI . . . would not lead to abandonment of deterrence but rather to an enhancement of deterrence and an evolution in the weapons of deterrence through the contribution of defensive systems that

[1] See Caspar Weinberger's remark that with the success of SDI "we could be back in a situation we were in . . . when we were the only nation with a nuclear weapon." Quoted by George Ball, "The War for Star Wars," *New York Review of Books*, 11 April 1985; see also the various writings of Colin S. Gray, a close adviser of the administration, especially "A New Debate on Ballistic Missile Defense," *Survival*, March-April 1981.

[2] For example, James Abrahamson, the SDI program director, told Congress in 1984 that "First and foremost, an effective defense against ballistic missiles would improve stability and reduce the likelihood of war by removing the military utility of a preemptive nuclear strike." Quoted in Peter A. Clausen, "SDI in Search of a Mission," *World Policy Journal* 2 (Spring 1985); for an extended, quasi-official development of the administration's ideas, see Keith B. Payne and Colin S. Gray, "Nuclear Policy and the Defensive Transition," *Foreign Affairs* 62 (Spring 1984).

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threaten no one. We would deter a potential aggressor by making it clear that we could deny him the gains he might otherwise hope to achieve rather than merely threatening him with costs large enough to outweigh those gains."[3]

A final mission of ballistic missile defense might be to provide limited protection of U.S. cities against small-scale nuclear attacks, such as an unauthorized or accidental Soviet launch or a deliberate attack by a small nuclear power. This role has received the least emphasis by the administration and the least attention by defense analysts, whether pro- or anti-SDI. Yet, it is the only mission for ballistic missile defense that makes sense for the foreseeable future.

Population Defense Examined

The arguments against seeking an all-out population defense system as the major goal for SDI in the foreseeable future are by now well-known, so we will only briefly discuss them here.[4] First, given the destructiveness of nuclear weapons, a full-scale population defense system would have to work with nearly 100 percent effectiveness to provide any meaningful protection at all. No such system is on the horizon, and it is difficult even to imagine what kind of technology could provide significant protection against a superpower determined to nullify defenses. Even if the various exotic technologies currently being explored by the United States (as well as by the Soviet Union)—supercomputers, software programs of unprecedented complexity, orbiting space stations, lasers or particle-beam weapons, etc.—prove to be feasible in principle, which is by no means assured, there would still be perhaps insoluble operational problems of joining the various technologies together into a complex weapons system that would have to work in near-perfect fashion the first time it was actually used in battle.

Thus, even without assuming an adversary determined to nullify defensive systems, the problem of creating an effective population defense system against a nuclear superpower would be formidable. In any case, both the current overall relationship between the superpowers and the President's specific SDI program insure that the Soviet Union *would* seek to counter any American defensive system—as the Soviets themselves have repeatedly warned. Similarly, the Reagan

[3] U.S. Department of State, "The Strategic Defense Initiative," June 1985. For similar statements by high administration officials, see Paul Nitze, "SDI: Its Nature and Rationale," Bureau of Public Affairs, Department of State (Washington, D.C.: October 1985); and Fred C. Ikle, "Nuclear Strategy: Can There Be a Happy Ending?" *Foreign Affairs* 63 (Spring 1985).

[4] Our critique of a unilateral effort at full-scale population defense relies on the following sources: Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS), *The Fallacy of Star Wars* (New York: Vintage, 1984); Sidney D. Drell, Philip J. Farley, and David Holloway, *The Reagan Strategic Defense Initiative* (Cambridge, Mass. Ballinger, 1985); Harold Brown, "Is SDI Technically Feasible?" *Foreign Affairs* 64 (3); Harold Brown, " The Strategic Defense Initiative," *Survival* 27 (March/April 1985); McGeorge Bundy et al., "The President's Choice: Star Wars or Arms Control," *Foreign Affairs* 63 (Winter 1984-85); Ashton Carter, *Directed Energy Missile Defense*, Office of Technology Assessment (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1984); Office of Defense Technology, *Ballistic Missile Defense Technologies* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1986).

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administration, even while proclaiming that SDI is the joint interest of both sides and will lead to the abolition of nuclear weapons, is already at work on ways to counter prospective Soviet defensive systems.[5] Given the context of ongoing Soviet-American conflict, this kind of superpower behavior is inevitable, for worst-case analyses will continue to drive the military strategies and weapons systems deployment of both sides. Each fears a situation in which its adversary simultaneously deploys both an effective defense system and highly-accurate counterforce offensive missile forces. Such a system might be designed only for defensive, damage-limitation purposes in the event deterrence fails: counterforce weapons to destroy the other side's nuclear weapons, defensive systems to shoot down those that are missed. However, such a force posture would be indistinguishable from an offensive, first-strike force. As is well known, when faced with potential enemies, nations assume the worst about intentions and base their military planning on their adversary's capabilities; as a result each superpower will seek to prevent the other from achieving an even theoretically effective defense. In short, SDI will surely complicate efforts at arms control and stimulate an intensified arms race.

In such an arms race, the judgment of most nongovernmental scientists and other experts on BMD is that the defense cannot win, for any system deployed by either side designed to protect its population against a full-scale retaliatory attack by the other can be destroyed, overwhelmed, or circumvented. Among the steps that could be taken are a preemptive attack on the space-based defense systems, various countermeasures to protect retaliatory forces against laser or particle beam weapons, the overwhelming of defenses by much larger offensive missile deployments or the retargeting of existing missiles to aim at cities instead of military forces, and the circumvention of BMD systems through low-flying cruise missiles or depressed-trajectory ballistic missiles launched from submarines close to American shores. And if all else fails, high technology systems could be avoided altogether, with nuclear weapons "delivered" clandestinely in the holds of commercial ships or airlines or even by a man with a suitcase.

A second argument is that a full-scale population defense is bound to be extremely costly. Although the Pentagon's SDI organization has so far been unable or unwilling to provide even rough cost estimates to Congress,[6] a number of authoritative critics have estimated the costs as ranging from a minimum of $100 billion for an ICBM protection system to over a trillion dollars for an all-out population defense.[7]

Perhaps even more significantly, few analysts believe that a defensive system could be made "cost-effective" against a determined superpower adversary. In the inevitable contest between offense and defense, the overwhelming scientific consensus is that it will always be cheaper for the offense to add new capabili-

[5] *New York Times*, 15 December 1985.

[6] Union of Concerned Scientists, *Nucleus* 8 (Summer 1986).

[7] Brown, "Strategic Defense Initiative"; James R. Schlesinger, "Rhetoric and Realities in the Star Wars Debate," *International Security* 10 (Summer 1985).

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ties to overcome the defense than the reverse.[8] The administration began the SDI program with the forthright acknowledgement that it would not make sense to deploy a defensive system unless it proved cost-effective. But recently—obviously in response to a variety of studies (including its own internal ones) that predicted the unlikelihood of meeting this criterion—the administration had begun to suggest that a vague "affordability" standard may suffice.[9] But unless the cost-effective criterion is met, the United States could spend hundreds of billions of dollars without any net gain in defensive capabilities. Indeed, it might be even worse off if the Soviet Union should choose to counter by emphasizing countercity rather than counterforce targeting.

Perhaps the most serious criticism of SDI is that it will be destabilizing, particularly in a serious superpower crisis. In such a crisis, it is argued, defensive systems would give both sides a high incentive to initiate a nuclear attack, either in a deliberate, aggressive attempt to disarm the other side, or as a desperate, essentially defensive measure to "preempt"—that is, strike first when war seems inevitable in order to minimize the destruction to one's homeland.

Some opponents of SDI have argued that the dangers of either surprise or preemptive attack are greatest when one side has a unilateral edge, regardless of which side has it. For example, Sidney D. Drell and his associates have argued as follows: "An effective but imperfect ABM [antiballistic missile] on one side would exacerbate the risk [of war] because the side that did have an ABM might calculate that it would be better off if it struck first and used the ABM defense to deal with the weakened response. . . . Similarly, the side that did not have ABM might calculate that its situation would be better (however bad) if it struck first and avoided being caught trying to retaliate with a weakened force against the ABM defense."[10]

However, the dangers of either surprise attack or preemptive war are probably exaggerated, even in the case of serious defensive asymmetries. No rational government would initiate nuclear war in the expectation that it would be "better off" merely in the sense that it would gain a *relative* advantage in the postwar balance of power; surprise attack could be considered only if one could be confident that the other side would be disarmed with little risk of one's own cities being destroyed in retaliation. In practice, though, no rational government could have such confidence, for it would surely make conservative estimates: that its offensive weapons might function below their theoretically expected effectiveness, that its opponent's defenses might perform at a better than expected level, and that its own defenses

[8] Wolfgang Panofsky, "The Strategic Defense Initiative," *Physics Today*, June 1985.

[9] For a review of the administration's progressive abandonment of the cost-effective criterion, see *New York Times*, 1 May 1986.

[10] Sidney D. Drell, Philip J. Farley, and David Holloway, "Preserving the ABM Treaty," *International Security* 9 (Fall 1984): 21; for other arguments stressing the destabilizing potential of SDI, see Jonathan B. Stein, *From H-Bomb to Star Wars* (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1984); and UCS, 1984.

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might be less effective than predicted.[11] Thus, the range of operational uncertainties would weigh very heavily against a deliberate attack. It follows, of course, that the logic of a deliberate attack is even less persuasive for the side with no or lesser defenses.

The dangers of preemptive war also appear to be exaggerated. In theory, it is true that the desire to exploit any plausible first-strike advantage would be increased to the extent that the outbreak of war is deemed inevitable. In practice, however, there is little reason to fear preemption because of asymmetries in defensive capabilities. First, as long as there is mutual awareness that neither side can confidently preclude massive retaliation by striking first, it is hard to see how either side could decisively conclude that nuclear war was "inevitable." Further, the most likely effects of concern over imminent war would be the adoption of a policy of launching a retaliatory strike on the basis of early warning of an attack, even before one's military targets had actually been struck. Since each superpower must rationally assume that its adversary may already have adopted such a "launch on warning" policy, the incentive to strike first is undercut or negated. Indeed, it seems reasonable to assume that the side with no ABM would be *particularly* inclined to launch on warning, so that the side with a defensive could never count on facing only a weakened retaliatory strike.

Nor can the would-be preemptor rationally assume a better outcome if he attempts to "decapitate" his enemy with a surprise attack against the victim's command, control, and communication system (C3), for it must be assumed (as, in fact, both the United States and the Soviet Union have already strongly implied) that the authority to respond to a successful decapitation attack will have been predelegated to lower-level military commanders. Indeed, under such an assumption, it would be worse for the attacker to destroy the enemy's C3 systems than to preserve them, for in the latter circumstance there is at least a chance that the attacker may avoid a devastating "spasm" retaliatory attack.

Thus, no matter how severe the crisis, states should always prefer not to strike first, for war may not, after all, occur. On the other hand, that state choosing to preempt thereby *guarantees* that there will be war and it must assume that its cities will be destroyed in a retaliation it cannot prevent. Put differently, a first strike against a superpower can *never* make sense: even if the motive is defensive rather than aggressive, even if the attacker has a (less than perfect) population defense system and his opponent doesn't, and even in a high crisis. In each case a first strike converts an uncertain probability of war in which one's weapons are the target into the certainty of war in which one's cities face catastrophic damage.

Even if the destabilizing dangers of SDI are exaggerated, the other arguments against it are decisive: the extreme unlikelihood that effective population defenses could work against a determined adversary, the huge costs of making the attempt, the destruction of existing as well as potentially more effective arms control agreements, and the likelihood of an all-out arms race.

[11] Stephen Weiner, "Systems and Technology" in Ashton B. Carter and David N. Schwartz, eds., *Ballistic Missile Defense* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1984).

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SDI AND WAR-FIGHTING DOCTRINES

What of the argument that SDI will restore U.S. nuclear superiority, strengthen the credibility of extended deterrence, and allow the United States to actually employ nuclear weapons in war?[12] Proponents of this SDI mission argue that the American commitment to use nuclear weapons if necessary to repel a Soviet conventional invasion of Europe has lost its credibility in light of the fact that the United States itself could be completely destroyed in a Soviet retaliatory strike. Since no country will commit suicide on behalf of its allies, the reasoning goes, the Soviets must doubt the credibility of the U.S. commitment and hence may no longer be deterred from a conventional invasion of Europe. Thus, an effective population defense of the United States would restore the credibility of the U.S. nuclear commitment to Europe, for nuclear war would no longer be suicidal for the United States (whatever the effects on Europe). Similar logic would also apply elsewhere where U.S. interests might be sufficiently vital to justify a strategy of the first use of nuclear weapons to offset Soviet conventional advantages, for example, to repel a Soviet invasion of the Persian Gulf.

However, neither the portrayal of the alleged problem nor its suggested remedy are convincing. There is no evidence that the Soviet Union regards the American commitment to use nuclear weapons in defense of Europe as noncredible. The credibility problem is at least thirty years old, for the Soviet Union has had the capability of striking the United States with nuclear weapons for this long—yet the Soviets have not taken advantage of their conventional superiority to invade Europe. Moreover, if today there is a serious credibility problem with extended deterrence, a population defense of American cities would not remedy it. For all the reasons already discussed, no rational American president could order the use of nuclear weapons in western Europe on the assumption that even if the Soviets chose to escalate they would lack the capability of inflicting unacceptable damage on the United States.

SDI AND THE PROTECTION OF MILITARY TARGETS

Perhaps in response to these criticisms of the population defense mission (whether designed to end the nuclear balance of terror or, more characteristically, to restore U.S. nuclear superiority), most Reagan administration officials have recently emphasized that at least initially the goal of SDI will be to protect military targets (ICBM silos and command and control systems) rather than cities, with the aim of enhancing deterrence rather than eliminating it. The chief virtue of this mission is that it appears to be technologically feasible in the near future, especially within a system employing preferential defense and/or deceptive basing of ICBMs. Unlike population defenses, hard-point defenses of military targets would not have

[12] For example, Colin Gray argues that SDI might allow the United States to "take a controlled and limited strategic nuclear initiative on behalf of beleaguered overseas allies" in his comment in Carter and Schwartz, *Ballistic Missile Defense*, 405.

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to be nearly leakproof to be effective, for even 50 percent effectiveness would make a disarming Soviet first-strike far more uncertain and difficult. Moreover, ICBM defenses are not subject even in principle to the criticism that they will increase crisis instability, for they would not diminish either side's second-strike, countercity retaliatory capability. In the logic of the nuclear age, then, they would not add to the theoretical dangers of surprise or preemptive attacks.

On the other hand, even ICBM defenses would be expensive—the usual estimate is at least $100 billion.[13] More importantly, they might also stimulate a further arms race, for both the Soviet Union and the United States would probably seek to counter ICBM defenses in pursuit of their current counterforce strategies. Still, these might be costs worth bearing if it were indeed the case that the theoretical vulnerabilities of the U.S. strategic forces created a real-world risk of a Soviet deliberate or preemptive attack. In fact, though, it is extremely unlikely that there is such a risk. Such an attack would not, of course, disarm the United States. A Soviet attack on ICBM silos might precipitate an American decision to launch on warning or under attack, leaving only empty holes for the attacking missiles to strike. Even if the Soviets irrationally chose to ignore the possibility of that kind of U.S. response, their attack would be unlikely to achieve the 95 percent kill rate that some theoretical contributions attribute to it.[14] Finally, no matter how successful an attack on ICBM silos might be, such an attack would still leave untouched thousands of American strategic weapons, including cruise missiles and other nuclear weapons carried by Strategic Air Command (SAC) bombers and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) aboard the largely invulnerable U.S. submarine force. With these forces the United States could either attack the remaining Soviet strategic forces or completely destroy Soviet society, or both.

The typical response of those who believe that the problem of ICBM vulnerability is real is to acknowledge the potency of U.S. retaliatory power under any conceivable circumstances, but to contend that the Soviets might attack vulnerable components of the retaliatory force anyway, counting on their ability to "deter our deterrent." The reasoning is that our surviving forces would lack a meaningful counterforce capability and could only destroy Soviet society—insuring our complete destruction in retaliation. Thus, a well-executed first strike would confront the United States with a choice of "suicide or surrender," and Soviet leaders might reason that the United States would prefer surrender.

Such a scenario, however, is bizarre, for it assumes a propensity to take literally insane risks that no Soviet leaders have ever demonstrated. A Soviet attack on U.S. silo forces would nonetheless kill 20–40 million Americans, almost guaranteeing an American response, which even if confined to military targets would be at least as devastating to the Soviet Union as World War II.[15]

[13] See *New York Times* summary of a recent study by Barry Blechman and Victor Utgoff, 23 July 1986.

[14] For an authoritative analysis of the purely technical problems of a coordinated attack on ICBM silos, see Matthew Bunn and Kosta Tsipis, "The Uncertainties of a Preemptive Nuclear Attack," *Scientific American*, November 1983.

[15] Bunn and Tsipis, "Uncertainties of Preemptive Nuclear Attack"; Albert Carnesale and Charles

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In any case, even if it is desirable to guard against remote contingencies, there are a number of other less costly and probably more effective ways to do so. These include relying more extensively on the air and undersea components of the U.S. retaliatory forces; phasing out vulnerable ICBMs that could serve as a lightning rod for a Soviet attack; developing mobile land-based systems such as the proposed "Midgetman" system; relying more extensively on cruise missiles (though both of these latter measures might seriously complicate the possibilities of arms control); or—best of all—placing greater reliance on arms control measures such as banning or reducing the number of multiple-warhead missiles.

In summary, no rational government could risk launching an attack when its cities are in hostage, despite bizarre scenarios to the contrary. Thus, even though ICBM defenses are much more feasible and less provocative than full-scale population defenses, they are still a costly and unnecessary response to a largely nonexistent problem that, if it were real, could be far better remedied by a variety of other measures.

Are There Good Arguments For Population Defense?

If there are good arguments for BMD—as the analysis that follows will contend—they have been all drowned out by the bad arguments made by the Reagan administration. Moreover, because of the administration's continued build-up of offensive nuclear weapons, its rejection of a variety of serious arms control agreements, and its overall confrontational posture toward the Soviet Union, even the good arguments receive little attention from either the Soviet Union or Americans concerned with arms control and détente.

Unfortunately, we have seen something like this before. The current situation bears an uncanny resemblance to the 1965-1972 period, when the earlier ABM debate took place. By the mid-1960s earlier-model ABMs had become operational, but there was considerable uncertainty about how and for what purpose they should be deployed. Then as now, the initial rationale was that ABMs could provide a meaningful defense against a full-scale Soviet attack on cities. Then as now, an intense national debate generated mounting skepticism toward the claim that we could find real safety against the Soviet nuclear arsenal by deploying ABMs. Then as now, commentators worried that an American effort to protect its cities would be seen by the Soviets as a provocative step, leading to Soviet counteractions that would escalate the arms race and might prove destabilizing in crises. Then as now, as these apparent defects of heavy population systems gained wider recognition, new rationales for ABM were devised. The Johnson administration briefly argued for deploying an ABM system against the hypothetical kind of ICBM attack that China might be capable of mounting in the mid-1970s, but this rationale was

L. Glaser, "ICBM Vulnerability: The Cures are Worse than the Disease," *International Security* 7 (Summer 1982).

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dropped as the Vietnam war wound down and the rapprochement with China was undertaken. Next, the Nixon administration again changed the rationale of the ABM system; the new "Safeguard" ABM system was designed to protect land-based ICBMs, even then said to be vulnerable to a surprise Soviet attack. Once again, though, the rationale proved unpersuasive, as critics demonstrated that the overall U.S. deterrent remained unchallengable. More and more the ABM appeared to be a Pyrrhic technological triumph, a weapon in search of a rationale. Faced with strong public and Congressional opposition to ABMs of any kind, the Nixon administration was compelled to seek the strict limitations on ABM development and deployment that were embodied in the 1972 Strategic Arms Limitations (SALT) treaties.[16]

Thus, in both the earlier period and today defense has been championed primarily by strategists and political figures committed to hard-line cold war policies; moreover, even on the merits, the criticisms of defensive systems have been much more persuasive than the ever-changing rationales for them. Unfortunately, however, once again Gresham's law has prevailed: all but lost in the chaff of bad ideas has been the germ of a good one.

What is worth saving in SDI? To begin with, the underlying critique of MAD is sound. Indeed, there is a growing consensus cutting across the ideological spectrum that in the long run MAD must be replaced. This view is shared by a conservative administration, conservative military strategists (like Donald Brennan and Herman Kahn earlier, and Colin Gray, Keith Payne, Albert Wohlstetter and many others today) and long-term liberal critics of current strategies such as Freeman Dyson, Jonathan Schell, and the American Catholic Bishops Conference. MAD has three fatal defects. First, it is radically immoral: it directly violates the most fundamental moral and legal norms limiting war, for it explicitly threatens to annihilate millions of innocent people in retaliation or revenge for actions of their governments over which the people have little or no control. Second, MAD is ultimately unstable: even though it has prevented nuclear war so far, it cannot be relied upon to do so indefinitely. Sooner or later a system so complex, so dependent on the sanity and rational self-restraint of all future decision makers of all nuclear powers, so increasingly decentralized, and so dependent on advanced technology is bound to fail for one reason or another. Finally, the consequences of failure will be catastrophic. Even relatively minor failures that do not result in full-scale war are likely to produce disasters unprecedented in human history; a general breakdown of MAD might well imperil human life on earth. It is not enough, then, to seek to deter war through a balance of terror. We must also seek to defend our civilization, society, economy, and lives in case deterrence fails. And in the long run, we must seek to abolish the balance of terror itself.

But where to begin? The gravest defect of MAD is not that it is unreliable as a means of deterring the superpowers from deliberately initiating nuclear war

[16] The preceding paragraphs are drawn from Jerome Slater, "Population Defense Reconsidered: Is the ABM Really Inconsistent with Stability?" *Policy Sciences Journal* 8 (Autumn 1979).

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against each other. On the contrary, MAD has worked very well for that purpose, and there is no reason to think that will change in the future. The destructiveness of nuclear weapons is so great and so evident that no minimally-rational government can deliberately initiate war against a nuclear-armed adversary. Put differently, the balance of terror—*defined to mean the state of mutual deterrence between the governments of the major powers*—has not been "delicate" since at least the mid-1950s; it is not delicate now; and it will not be delicate in the foreseeable future, regardless of any currently imaginable technological change. *However*: nuclear holocaust could occur in a variety of ways that are simply undeterrable, such as an accidental launch of nuclear weapons as a result of a communications or technological failure, an unauthorized launching by an insane or fanatical lower-level commander, or a clandestine attack on one of the superpowers by a third party, such as a terrorist group or renegade government. Yesterday's science-fiction nightmares could easily become today's realities: despite technological and other efforts to prevent such events, the odds of a catastrophe mount as the number of nuclear weapons increase, as weapons-grade nuclear materials proliferate around the world, and as the knowledge of how to build nuclear weapons becomes increasingly diffused.

Thus, MAD cannot deter human error, technological breakdown, or ideological or criminal fanaticism. These events become increasingly likely with the passage of time; and in such cases MAD is *worse* than useless, for a limited launch of nuclear weapons could trigger a spasm exchange between the superpowers, turning a horrible but limited catastrophe into apocalypse. And even if total war were averted, the prospects are not very comforting. Consider this: a single American Trident submarine can today target 240 separate Soviet cities, and Soviet submarines will soon have comparable capabilities. Thus, an unauthorized or mistaken attack by a single submarine could produce a holocaust hardly less consequential for the survival of society than a deliberate all-out attack.

Against such prospects we need defense, not (or not merely) deterrence. Put differently, MAD overdeters but underdefends. That is, through overkill it provides a redundance of deterrence but no defense against the least likely contingency—a deliberately initiated nuclear war by a superpower. It provides neither deterrence nor defense against the much more likely contingencies—accidents, unauthorized launches, or third-party attacks. Even worse, by justifying extremely large numbers of nuclear weapons and delivery systems, MAD perpetuates the risk of such events and the likelihood that they will lead to full-scale nuclear war.

The central argument of this article is that it is possible for the superpowers to defend themselves against nuclear attacks without destabilizing the overall structure of deterrence. Superpower defenses against light attacks have long been recognized as a potentially feasible mission for BMD systems, but both proponents and critics of BMD generally have paid scant attention to the matter.[17] Propo-

[17] For brief discussions of light defense, see Freeman Dyson, *Weapons and Hope* (New York: Harper & Row, 1984); Office of Defense Technology, *Ballistic Missile Defense Technologies*; Ashton Carter,

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nents of BMD tend to treat defense against various light attacks as a desirable but relatively marginal bonus of heavy defenses against the Soviet Union. As a result, critics of BMD—even when they recognize the desirability of light defense in principle—tend to reject it because of fears that light defenses will be only the opening wedge for heavy defenses.

The legitimate concerns of critics of SDI and other proposed missile defense systems could be met by the careful negotiation of a new superpower nuclear regime. This new regime would allow for limited population defense systems, and it would have two purposes. First, it would provide at least some defense against various forms of light attack, particularly unauthorized or accidental superpower ballistic missile launchings and deliberate third-country attacks. Accidental superpower launchings are of greater near-term concern, but there are indications that ballistic missile technology is proliferating, and it is in both superpowers' interest to avoid vulnerability to what is likely to be a progressively greater number of small nuclear powers.[18] It is not implausible to imagine future Khomeinis or Khadafys resorting to nuclear blackmail to extract concessions, and the United States would then want wider options than threatening nuclear retaliation. Perhaps the most unsettling future scenario is that of a small power possessing a nuclear missile-carrying submarine, raising the prospect of a small nuclear attack of unknown origin. Limited population defenses (anti-aircraft as well as anti-missile) can limit the consequences for the superpowers of nuclear proliferation, and superpower defensive technology would be particularly effective in coping with the small and relatively primitive offensive capabilities of new nuclear powers.

Second, and perhaps more important, a joint regime for initially modest purposes could provide a model for a far more comprehensive regime that would substitute defense dominance for MAD at some future date. It is necessary to begin with small steps: defensive parity at low levels would be far easier to negotiate than a more far-reaching transition to defense dominance. Meanwhile, though, limited bilateral defenses could provide a basis for the technical management of more substantial deployments, as well as generate political support and confidence for pursuing a full-scale defense-dominance regime.

A transitional strategic regime based on limited population defense would be based on the assumptions that as long as the cold war persists each superpower will seek to maintain its deterrence capabilities, each will define deterrence as requiring the capacity to completely destroy the other side, and that neither side can be denied that capacity. In other words, MAD would persist, for it is a function of both the existence of nuclear weapons and high political conflict. Given

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"BMD Applications: Performance and Limitations" in Carter and Schwartz, *Ballistic Missile Defense*; Drell, Farley, and Holloway, "Preserving the ABM Treaty"; William Schneider and Donald Brennan, *U.S. Strategic-Nuclear Policy and Ballistic Missile Defense* (Cambridge, Mass.: Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, 1980).

[18] On the spread of ballistic missiles, see Aaron Karp, "Ballistic Missiles in the Third World," *International Security* 9 (Winter 1984-85).

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the destructiveness of nuclear weapons, a heavy population defense system can succeed only if the superpowers choose not to exercise their capacity to overwhelm it; given high political conflict, neither superpower will make that choice. *However*: mutually negotiated, limited population defense systems, large enough to provide significant protection of cities against accidents, unauthorized launchings, and third-party attacks, but not nearly large enough to defend against a deliberate superpower retaliatory strike, would serve the common interests of each side regardless of the level of political conflict or arms competition. Thus, it ought to be possible to build on these minimal superpower common interests not to destroy or be destroyed by accident, lunacy, or third parties and design population defenses that neither side will have any rational incentive to overcome.

What might such a system look like? As soon as nonnuclear city defense systems are technologically feasible in both the Soviet Union and the United States, the two superpowers should agree on a joint, negotiated deployment of limited defense systems to defend their cities, industries, and command and control centers against all kinds of nuclear missile attacks—*except* for very large, deliberate superpower attacks. To be sure, there might be formidable technical problems to be resolved, particularly if missile defense systems were to be based on exotic, space-based laser or particle-beam weapons. The task would be to devise systems that would have defensive capabilities only and that would provide each side with a specified and equal degree of limited defense. Assuming these problems can be solved, the design of the system would provide significant defense against accidents, unauthorized launches, and third-party attacks, but would do nothing to destabilize the underlying superpower balance of terror.

At the same time, other stabilizing measures could be undertaken and should be feasible even in the absence of more fundamental political settlements. For example, if both sides were to move toward more invulnerable second-strike retaliatory forces, whether unilaterally or by joint agreement, a limited population system would be even more attractive, though it would not *require* such steps. In particular, if both sides were to reorient their strategic nuclear forces away from theoretically vulnerable fixed land-based ICBMs and toward submarine forces, mobile missiles, cruise missiles, and the like, the incentives to overcome limited population defense systems would be diminished further (although this would have to be weighed against the possible complications for arms control). There would then be no possibility that a counterforce surprise attack could reduce the other side's retaliatory forces to a level that could be reliably neutralized by the aggressor's city defense system.

Moreover, other arms control measures would remain feasible, still within the context of a continued U.S.–Soviet adversary relationship. The elimination of multiple warheads and major reductions in overall numbers of strategic nuclear weapons would further diminish the possibility of a disarming first strike, lessen the chance of accidents and unauthorized launchings, lessen the task of limited population defense systems, and lessen the destructiveness of accidents or unauthorized attacks that occur regardless of precautions and defense. Doing so would stabilize

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MAD and increase the security of both the United States and the Soviet Union—all without assuming an overall cold-war settlement or utopian agreements on true disarmament.

The Objections Considered

Let us consider the principle objections to a limited ballistic missile system. First, it has been argued that BMD cannot work. However, nearly all such arguments are based on the key premise that each superpower will seek to overwhelm defensive systems; in the context of a limited-defense arms control regime this should not occur. Given the promise of new defensive technologies, the reorientation of SDI to such a finite and far more realistic objective could make operational systems feasible within the next decade.

Conversely, there is concern that any BMD system might prove to be destabilizing. But this argument is based on the assumption of a competitive, unconstrained offense-defense arms race, and even in that context fears of destabilization seem exaggerated. In any case, a joint Soviet-American deployment within negotiated limitations that would be carefully designed to hold the BMD system below the threshold at which it would theoretically threaten the MAD regime would meet most of those concerns.

Another concern is that one or the other of the superpowers will suddenly seek to "break out" of negotiated limitations and attempt to upgrade limited defensive systems into full-scale population defenses.[19] Of course, such concerns are a potential problem with *any* negotiated arms control treaty, not just a BMD treaty. Any such behavior would be irrational, for the other side would quickly detect major breakout moves and would undertake a variety of countermeasures in order to nullify the effort. Meanwhile, the side that cheated would have irrationally destroyed the regime that it had agreed to create because it served its own high self-interests to do so. Put differently, all arms control treaties assume rationality, while at the same time hedge against irrationality. It would not be difficult to deter as well as simultaneously hedge against unilateral breakout from an arms control regime incorporating limited population defenses.

Would the Soviets agree to negotiate a bilateral deployment of limited defensive systems? Surely the present Soviet rejection of the Reagan administration's SDI program does not make it inevitable that they would reject a very different system. The earlier history of the ABM treaty is instructive in this regard. Early in the early 1960s the Soviets strongly favored building defensive systems and curtailing offensive systems, consistent with the long Russian military tradition emphasizing homeland defense. When the Johnson administration tried to convince the Soviets to eschew defenses in favor of institutionalizing MAD, the Soviets initially resisted. Premier Alexei Kosygin indignantly replied that "Defensive systems which pre-

[19] Brown, "Strategic Defense Initiative"; Charles Glaser, "Do We Want the Missile Defense We Can Build?" *International Security* 10 (Summer 1985).

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vent attacks are not the cause of the arms race, but constitute a factor preventing the death of people." True, the Soviets were eventually persuaded to abandon these views, and they joined in signing the ABM Treaty in 1972. This shift, however, may have been less a result of a new "sophistication" in their strategic thinking than of a resigned realization that they were on the wrong end of a self-fulfilling prophecy. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara had repeatedly argued that "neither side" would allow the other to create a theoretically effective defense system: defensive systems always could and inevitably would be overwhelmed by additions to the opposing offensive systems. These arguments were hardly hypothetical: rather, they were a concrete warning of what the United States would in fact do if the Soviets sought to build a heavy ABM system. Thus, McNamara had the unquestioned capability to insure he was right in "predicting" that the deployment of ABM systems would only stimulate an offensive arms race, create dangerous new tensions and interacting fears, and end by being futile as well as dangerous.

Today, in the context of intensified cold war and the Reagan administration's SDI program, the positions have been reversed; and Mikhail Gorbachev is just as correct as McNamara was earlier in predicting the consequences of a *unilateral* defensive deployment. However, it is reasonable to hope that the Soviets could be persuaded to reassess the situation in light of their unhappiness with the doctrine of assured destruction, the traditional Russian emphasis on defense, their present efforts to limit homeland nuclear destruction by anti-aircraft defenses and counterforce targeting, and the specific arguments that can be made for the deployment of limited defensive systems. This would be particularly the case if negotiations should occur in a less confrontational context and were accompanied by serious arms control limitations on offensive weapons.

Still another concern is that limited missile defenses would require the abrogation or renegotiation of the SALT I ABM Treaty, the most successful arms limitation treaty of the nuclear age. This would not be a high cost, however, as long as the deployment of BMD was not unilateral but followed from bilateral negotiations. The ABM Treaty was not supposed to be an end in itself. It was not based on the rationale that defense per se was bad, but rather that drastic limitations of defenses were a necessary means to an undeniably desirable end—meaningful cutbacks of offensive systems. The underlying assumption was that limitations of ABMs would leave both superpowers unambiguously hostage to each other, would institutionalize MAD, and would thus eliminate the forces driving the offensive arms race.

In retrospect, however, we can now see that in this crucial respect the ABM Treaty has been a dismal failure. The *rationale*—such as it was—for a continuing offensive arms race may have been eliminated, but the race has nonetheless been substantially escalated since the treaty was signed in 1972. What went wrong? It is now clear that the notion that the arms race was primarily a function of an action-reaction cycle between offense and defense underestimated other potent forces driving that race—the underlying Soviet-American ideological and political conflicts; the implementation of particular military strategies, like counterforce or

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damage-limitation; worst-case reasoning in both superpower defense establishments; the inexorable march of technology; the impact of domestic politics, interservice rivalries, and bureaucratic competition; and the desire for negotiating advantages or bargaining chips in arms controls talks themselves.

Thus, fifteen years after the ABM Treaty ended the prospects of protection against any kind of nuclear attack, little or nothing has been done to seriously inhibit the arms race or stabilize mutual deterrence. Put differently, the single weapons system meaningfully constrained after twenty-five years of more-or-less serious superpower arms control negotiations has been the single weapons system that was defensive, that actually had some promise of saving lives rather than destroying them. Surely we can do better than that. A joint renegotiation of the ABM Treaty is hardly too high a price to pay for a limited defensive system that will not destabilize the underlying mutual deterrence relationship.

Another potential argument against limited population defenses is that Soviet deployments would undermine the British and French independent nuclear deterrent capability. However, while the reaction of European allies is of considerable importance, there is no reason to assume that their concerns would preclude a superpower agreement. After all, limited Soviet defenses would not meaningfully reduce the prospective risks of a Soviet plan to invade Europe. Rational Soviet leaders could not be confident that their defenses would be impenetrable to the already-substantial British and French forces, and they would further have to assume that a Soviet attack on Europe would lead to American as well as British and French retaliation.

Nevertheless, alarm at the prospective reduction of their retaliatory capability could provoke one or both of the European nuclear powers to augment their nuclear forces. While the Soviets might conclude that the overall benefits of a limited population defense were worth the costs of some increase in British and French nuclear capabilities, a radical increase in European offensive forces could imperil any U.S.-Soviet arms control plan. For this reason, legitimate European concerns would have to be addressed during negotiations for a limited superpower population defense regime. If this were done, it would be implausible that the British or French would act in ways that would undermine an arrangement endorsed by both their principal ally and their major adversary.

Whatever the ultimate effect of limited population defenses on European nuclear forces, it seems plausible that the global effect of superpower defenses would be to inhibit nuclear proliferation. In the face of even limited defenses, small states with no current nuclear capacity would face far greater difficulties than Britain or France in achieving a meaningful deterrent against either superpower. To be sure, non-nuclear states might have other incentives to acquire nuclear weapons. Still, superpower defenses would degrade the value of small nuclear forces and to that degree should have a net beneficial effect in slowing the spread of nuclear weapons.

Finally, one has to consider the economic costs of deploying defensive systems. A limited defense that did not have to guard against superpower countermeasures

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would of course be far less expensive than Reagan's SDI, although undoubtedly it would cost many billions of dollars.[20] However, this expense would be spread out over a number of years, and it could be offset by negotiated reductions in offensive systems. In any case, it would be worth billions to protect our society against the most likely threats of nuclear catastrophe.

Conclusions

The replacement of the present MAD regime with one of "defense dominance" is a good idea whose time has not yet come. The political obstacles are even greater than the technological ones, for no matter what technological advances may be made in the foreseeable future, it will still remain the case that no defense can succeed against a powerful adversary determined to nullify it. If anything, in recent years the political conditions for defense dominance have become even more unfavorable, even as the technology begins to show promise. The predominant intellectual and political champions of defense dominance today are also militantly anti-Communist, confrontationist, and committed to the restoration of the U.S. nuclear superiority and perhaps even war-fighting capabilities, rather than arms control.

Over the long run, though, it seems unexceptionable that the end we should aim at is not (or not merely) the stabilization of MAD, but its elimination through the progressive dismantling of the doomsday machine that we have created. The complete elimination of nuclear weapons is almost certainly impossible; and arguably it would be undesirable, even if it were feasible. However, it is much less utopian to aim at a shift in strategies and weapons systems toward defense dominance, in which the superpowers agree to mutually deploy heavy population defense systems to defend against full-scale nuclear war.

There would be three fundamental preconditions that would have to be met for such a regime to be implemented. The first would be that each superpower would have to refrain from nullifying the other side's defensive systems. Since effective full-scale population defense systems would mean the end of the balance of terror, this could happen only in conjunction with an end to the cold war and an overall political settlement between the United States and the Soviet Union. Put differently, however paradoxical it might superficially appear, no nuclear defense against a major power can succeed unless it is grounded in a cooperative rather than adversarial relationship.

The second precondition is that major reductions in offensive weapons would have to accompany the deployment of heavy population defensive systems, for

[20] There have been no careful studies of the costs of a limited defense system. However, the recent Blechman/Utgoff study estimated the cost of a system that provided both terminal defenses for ICBM silos and limited defenses of the forty-seven largest U.S. cities to be about $160 billion. Clearly a limited population defense system alone would be substantially less, although the costs cannot be meaningfully estimated at this time. *New York Times*, 23 July 1986.

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it could never be assumed that *any* defensive system could provide meaningful and reliable protection against thousands of nuclear warheads.

Finally, a defense-emphasis arms control regime could only be attained if the West had confidence in the stability of the conventional balance in Europe. The anxious reaction of the European NATO allies to the discussion of nuclear disarmament at Reykjavik reflects deeply ingrained fears of a Soviet conventional advantage. Given those concerns, a retreat from reliance on nuclear deterrence will depend ultimately on both sides' willingness to maintain an unambiguously nonthreatening force posture at the conventional as well as nuclear level.

If these preconditions were met, the superpowers could gradually move from thin population defenses, which are not dependent on a transformation of political relations but only on recognition of the most minimal common interests in survival, to thick defenses, which are indeed dependent on radical psychological and political changes in the international political movement, or at least in the bilateral U.S.-Soviet relationship.

Why, it might be objected, would defenses be necessary at all after an end to the cold war? Why not just proceed directly to the elimination of nuclear weapons instead of defending against them? For a number of reasons, complete nuclear disarmament would require more than a Soviet-American political settlement. Such a settlement would still leave many nations with nuclear weapons and a number of unresolved serious international conflicts. Even more important, it is difficult to imagine how a reliable international regime for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons could be created in light of the well-understood difficulty of disinventing an established technology. And even if one day serious efforts are made in this direction, population defensive systems would undoubtedly play an important role as a means of providing a safeguard against clandestinely retained nuclear weapons.[21] Thus, strategic defense, if regarded as an instrument of arms control rather than of military strategy, may offer the most viable basis for a safe and durable arms control regime.

For the present, however, we need not be concerned with how to convert utopias into realities. There are two important and quite realistic functions that defenses against nuclear weapons could play in the near future—to provide at least modestly effective defense against a variety of possible limited attacks and to serve as a model for a future defense-dominant world. In this manner, real meaning could again be restored to the concept of a "common defense," even in the nuclear age.*

[21] For arguments on the role defense systems might play in conjunction with far-reaching nuclear disarmament, see Dyson, *Weapons and Hope*; Payne and Gray, "Nuclear Policy and the Defensive Transition."

* The authors wish to acknowledge the important contributions made by Mark Ensalaco to earlier drafts of this article.

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Political Science Quarterly

Volume 101
1986

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

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

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



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